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BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
SOFTSOLUTIONS, INC • , 
Defendants. 
HZHORANDUH DECISION 
An arbitration hearing was held on the fallowing dates: 
September 26, 27, 28, 29, 199 5. Brigham Young University, 
petitioner, hereinafter referred to as "BYU", was represented by 
David B." Thomas and Eugene H. Bramhall. SoftSolutions, Inc. by-
Ear 1 J. Peck and David B. Hartvigsen. As the arbitrator, I heard 
testimony of witnesses, admitted documentary evidence and reviewed 
all memoranda submitted by respective counsel. 
The 3 0 day period was vaived for rendering a decision to allow 
BYU to conclude an audi:: of SoftSolutions' accounting. The 
arbitrator having received the accounting information from BYU and 
the responses from SoftSolutions, the arbitrator now makes its 
ruling-
This case arose as a result of a series of license agreements 
entered into between BYU and SoftSolutions. SoftSolutions licensed 
Docantiai software and intellectual orcpertv which was referred to 
R. SUPP. 1 
BYU V. SOFTSOLUTIONS PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
as DSearch from BYU for development of various application software 
including a document package. 
The license agreement:, among other things, provided for 
royalty payments to BYU. The royalty payments were to be 
calculated upon the net sales. The June 1991 contract provided 
that SoftSolutions shall pay a royalty of 5% on all sales 
containing DSearch in the products. 
The license agreement provided for a 3% penalty on all 
royalties that were more than 3 0 days in arrears, interest at the 
rate of 18% on payments 3 0 days in arrears and a provision that any 
action to enforce the terms of the agreement must be brought within 
one year after the cause of action was discovered. 
After the contract was executed and SoftSolutions began to use 
DSearch, SoftSolutions contended that there were competitors who 
were using DSearch inteilectiual technology which adversely affected 
the marketability of SoftSolutions' product. SoftSolutions 
requested that BYU pursue injunctive relief to protect certain 
proprietary and patented technology. 
In response to SoftSolutions' contentions about the 
infringement claim,, BYU recommended that SoftSolutions undertake 
any legal action it deemed appropriate to protect rhe proprietary 
and technological properties cf DSearch; that a cap be placed on 
R. SUPP. 2 
BYU V. SOFTSOLUTIONS PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
t h e c o s t of l i t i g a t i o n and t h a t BYU would be w i l l i n g t o work v i t h 
S o f t S o l u t i o n s i n b r i n g i n g t h e r o y a l t y p a y m e n t s c u r r e n t - ( S e e 
E x h i b i t 29) . 
S o f t S o l u t i o n s r e s p o n d e d t o BYU's 2 / 8 / 9 1 l e t t e r r e q u e s t i n g t h a t 
t h e minimum r o y a l t i e s b e w a i v e d b e c a u s e of t h e p e n d i n g i n f r i n g e m e n t 
l i t i g a t i o n and t h a t no i n t e r e s t o r l a t e f e e s b e i m p o s e d . 
BYU c o u n t e r e d by s t a t i n g t h a t i t had i n v e s t i g a t e d t h e p a t e n t 
i n f r i n g e m e n t c l a i m s made by S o f t S o l u t i o n s and found them t o be n o n -
e x i s t e n t . BYU once a g a i n a s s e r t e d i n a l e t t e r d a t e d March 4 , 1 9 9 3 , 
( E x h i b i t 63) t h a t BYU was e n t i t l e d t o r o y a l t i e s i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h 
t h e l i c e n s e a g r e e m e n t . 
F o l l o w i n g t h e demand made by BYU f o r r o y a l t y p a y m e n t s , 
S o f t S o l u t i o n s r a i s e d t h e i s s u e o f f l a w e d D S e a r c h t e c h n o l o g y w h i c h 
wou ld p r e c l u d e BYU from r e c e i v i n g r o y a l t y p a y m e n t s p u r s u a n t t o t h e 
t e r m s of t h e l i c e n s e a g r e e m e n t . D e s p i t e t h e c l a i m s of t e c h n i c a l 
d e f i c i e n c i e s w i t h DSea rch , S o f t S o l u t i o n s r e p r e s e n t e d t h a t i t w o u l d 
be w i l l i n g t o pay o n e - h a l f o f t h e r o y a l t y r a t e , w a i v e a l l p e n a l t y 
a n d i n t e r e s t and pay t h e a m o u n t d u e a t t h e r a t e of $2 ,50 0 p e r 
m o n t h . 
BYU r e s p o n d e d by l e n d e r d a t e d A p r i l 1 2 , 1993 ( E x h i b i t 67) 
s p a c i n g t h a t i t would c o n s i d e r n e g o t i a t i n g t h e paymen t of i n t a r a s r 
and a oavmsn:: s c n e d u l e zo c a v o f f t h e i n d e b t e d n e s s . At t h i s 
R. SUPP. 3 
r J V 1 , 1( t:,vrvf:zl{jrT![jH ux^E hvj'lr! MEMORANDUM UiC^SLON 
j u n c t u r e an impasse was r e a c h e d and t h e i s s u e s wer-<-:i suhiii1 t N " ' i ' l - ' - t , 
ine i i a t i o i i ai id t h e n t o a r b i t r a t i o n . 
P r i o r t o t h e i m p a s s e b e i n g r e a c h e d , BYU di d engage P r Lee 
H : : ] 1 a i: j: : of i t e i : St.- : th. Ill i i < ' en: s i !:  ::a h 
to determine if infringements were occurring. In addit.*-
Hol lar was requested to cetermi ne i f the modifications maae "• 
Sof I :So In tions had • zhanged DSearch to the extent that Sof tSolutions 
prod u c t s i i ::) 1 o n g e r f e 11 u n d e r t h e patent and alleviated 
SoftSolution s f i: • :in III in a k :i i i :; r ::i) v a 1 t;; ) p a y "in e i i, t: s 
The parties stipulated that the following issues were tn be 
arbitrated: 
1. 
2. What defenses or offsets exist which reduce or relieve 
a i i\ o b 1 i g a t i o i i f' ; ::: i: i: a \ a 1 l i. e b LJ ':," .;.i * i L, C b *;:J J. I I t. I o n s ? 
3- Are BYU's claims for royalties barred by a contractual 
limitation period? 
4. Di • I t: 1 u > :i i i tie] i e c r u a i p r a p e r t v p r o v i d e d t o S c f t S o l u t i a n s 
per form In a c c o r d a n c e w i t h d e s c r i p t i o n s , s p e c i f i c a t i o n s , 
a i l :I ::: s ID r e s e n in: a t: : :: i i 3 c 1: E" :!'" I I ? 
BYU V, SOFTSOLUTIONS PAGE FIVE MEMORANDUM D E C I S I O N 
5 . D i d BYU h a v e a n o b l i g a t i o n t o p e r i o d i c a l l y p r o v i d e 
e n h a n c e m e n t s a n d c o r r e c t i o n s t o t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l p r o p e r t y 
pi:1' :i p i de- 3 ? 
6 . Was t h e u r t h e i n t e l l e c t *1 p r o p e r t y d i s c o n t i n u e d s o 
t h a t r o y a l t i e s s i ^ ~ u a c c r , r . t " 
T h e f i r s t i s s u e t ~ ^ « i d d r e s s e d . ' . ; . . / . rh<=> c o n t r a c t u a l 
l i m i t a t i o n p e r i o d . "'-•- * r e * - r a t e r -t L . ier : r . i a t t n e c c n t r ; j c t u a l 
] i in i t . a t::i oi i p e r :i od v ' * ~ 
t h e i r o n g o i n g n e g o t i a t i o n s z^ z e ^ c L v e t i^ * n t t e n c o m p l a i n t - : : » i s e d 
b y S o f t S o l u t i ons * • f i i ? r ' :;.----**- ~r ?* t h e 
e \, i d e r :i c e , e xl: i i b i t: s , : 
t h e c o n t r a c t u a l l i m i t a t i c - o r i c d s n :L* r : c : i r a r B\ f r o m 
c o l l e c t i n g r o ]
 :
ra l t y p a y m e n t s t h a t T*-» 7 — - • - . -> r-
T h e s e c o n d i s . . *e +"^ ^*- a d d r e s s e a n 
o b l i g a t i o n t o p e r i o d i c . o r - v i d e e n h a n c e m e n t s : o c o r r e c t i o n s t o 
I n s c h e : . ; ^ " D S e a r c h s p e c i f i c a t i o n s " r e f e r e n c e i s m a d e i n 
p a r a g r a p h :^ - - t * - ! * ' ' "w ; ; - t e n a n c e 1 
E n h a n c e m e n t s o r c o r r e c t i o n s f o r t h e D S e a r c h sy s tern 
a r e d e s i g n e d t o b e u p w a r d c o m p a t i b l e . I f 
i n c o m p a t i b i l i t i e s e x i s t , c o n v e r s i o n u t i l i t y p r o g r a m s a r e 
p r o v i d e d . S o u r c e o r o b j e c t c o d e c o r r e c t i o n s a r e s e n t t o 
e a c h u s e r of t h e s v s t a ~ o n a o e r i o d i c b a s i s . 
R. SUPP. 5 
BYU 7. SQFTSOLUTIONS PAGE SIX MEMORANDUM DECISION 
There was no evidence presented that Indicated that the source 
code provided to SoftSolutions was incorrect or needed enh.ince.ment:. 
E urthermore, no enhancements or corrections were solicited -or 
expected by SoftSolutions; therefore, there w.'S no need for RYTJ to 
n r - i ' i 1 n i c MI h ' R ' i";r\ei l t . S o r C G I Z e c t L'JII I i I I I ^ C t u t L p i . VJ l e d t:.0 
Sof tSoLu t lons . 
Ihe t n i r c : c : ^ + : on s ide r ed i s : u i a t M* i n t e l l e c t u a l 
p r o p e r t y prov f cj . . *:. . ^ : i J , . . u t i o n s perform ^ ^ i:car::a,^<; w_th 
d e s c r : r ; : c r . L , s p e c i f i c a t i o n s . - . r epresenta t ions c: T/"** 
I i ' " S 
op^; .
 4t_ - .-* .^„ c: vj^^i- ^^.i*. - - ; iSl . iL; .v . iout Mr. 
Peck r h i s i . o s i n c argument: adequate! summaries *~ - - a s - i ^ o n y of 
a 
transmiss::
 tt^ v^ .s
 J
~ large encugn t .i.i.:--. „e tne engine power. 
"t-s eri'Tcerent oi. L^C *~ ransmissirr- *. - not m. the 
.. . -:., ~ words £_ . nverso^ . . -^.^tions * .awed 
proci. *- v.t: •• i- * ;r *itis:y * - needL f . ~ the intended :se by 
Softst tions. 
j . rehuttec « o : : „ w a l l i e n s ' r*cnten+"io r ,s v"*-^ t h e i r w i t n e s s , 
;.. .'e r l c l . i r ,i o r o f e s s c r c : computer s c i e n r a a : the U n i v e r s i t y 
and 
esta i snad t.nat i : s r - ~e: - n . patent , . r . ^ i n c e m e n t s by c a m p e t i t o r s 
of S o f t S o l u t i o n s , ana t n a t r s e a r c n parfcrmec as r e p r e s e n t e d by 3YU. 
• '..OfrTiuLU'i'i.'.-N.. PAGE SEVEN MEMORANDUM DECISION 
ni . Hollar's a,M ' ,' • ' i .1 JLJI^'II^ ».ji!< uuntered by SaftSalations 
-.'LJ its inability to properly implement DSearch to the satisfaction 
of it3 customers 
J> l
- > c i t .J o jit i ons overso Id DSearch to its us er s 
and did net have the expertise or capabilities to fully utilize t he 
DSearch technology. 
-fcinents, i vizness for Sof tSolut Ions sets tDr*"h in 
SoftSolutions Exmbit n-.j- attached hereto inn jt i-nm 1 > w IIM 
and M , h in n Ii u r , -it: iacing DSearch and the douole rtonut 
algorithm in SoftSolutions 3. I Mr. Hollar refuted their opinions 




 -iin . ;;-, -aulty and wuuld not have alleviated 
the problems Hollar convinced t arbitrator that the 
problems complained oi i In n corrected 
wi thi n the parameters of DSearch i; Mr Clements arc Hanson had 
expertise to do so. 
The fourth, i /: , - . he use of the 
in Lo1 Leotuai property discontinued so that royalties stepped 
accruing? 
Th^ i nil ' i. ''•' ! liit. ' ortiao Lutions did not ne*."' > • 
replace one technology of DSearch; therefore, SoftSolutions cou-C 
net avoid royalty oavmentis •. < * i • ubii .J ^l A search engine. 
- SUPP. 7 
5YU "' ? SOFTSOI .UTIONS PAGE EIGHT MEMOS PLNDI I'M DECISION 
DSearch was capable of performing If SoftSolutlons fully understood 
the ceciina lacy i"11 I Jlearcn cind implemented the technology 
accord ing1y. 
The fi f th :i ssi le t: u I: i a i: eso] * ed I s xh a t: defenses • ::)i: :)ff sets 
e x I s t w h 1 c h r e d u c e o r r e, 11 e v e a n y o b I I g a 11 o n f o r r a y a 111 e s b y 
SoftSolutions? 
' II le ar bi l:::r at' :::JI: « ::t DI i< : : l i i d e d t h a t So f t i l :: ] i:i t:I : 'ins I s no t e n t i t l e :I t o 
a n y o f f s e t s o t h e r t h a n t h e p a y m e n t c f p e n a l t i e s a n d +-he c o m p o u n d i n g 
o f i n t e r e s t . The,, a r b i t r a t o r a g r e e s t h a t t h e p a r t : ca n c o n t r a c t 
f o r t h e r a t e of I n t e r e s t a n d p e n a l t i e s . H o w e v e r , t h e a r b i t r a t o r 
w i l l n o t a l l o w t h e c o m p o u n d i n g o f I n t e r e s t o r t h e i m p o s i t i o n o f 
p e n a l t i e s • t i :i s pa :::: t:i e s w e r e a t: t e m p t :i i ig t: :» r e s i :i)l v e 
I n f r i n g e m e n t c o m p l a i n t s a n d w h e t h e r D S e a r c h w a s m i s r e p r e s e n t e d t o 
S o f t S o 1/ixt I o n s , 
? s a i: es'i i 1 t • ::JI: t h e i leg o t i a t i oi i s t ha t t o o k p ] a c e r e g a r d l rig 
c o m p l a i n t s made by S o f t S o l u t i o n s a n d t h e a t t e m p t s t o r e s o l v e t h e 
p r o b l e m s , Saf t S o l u t I o n s w i t h h e I d p a y m e n t s o r d i d n ' t p a y t i m e l y . 
1 1 :J *i ' =i, ' = J : t:,h e ar b i t r a t o r d i d f i : ... : 1 inns J ccnduc :::: • :i i d i i D t 
warrant t he imposit ion of p e n a l t i e s . 
The s i x t h i s sue I s : What a m o u n t o f r ::: y a ] t i s s a i: e d i : e 51: i i I b y 
S c f t S o I u r I c n s , I n c ? 
i 
BYU V. SOFTSOLUTIONS PAGE NINE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
S o f t S c l u t i c n s i s i n d e b t e d t o BYU in t h e amount of $ 1 , 6 7 2 , 4 6 7 
w h i c h i s r e f l e c t e d i n BYU's memorandum d a t e d A p r i l 3 , 1 9 9 6 . T h e 
b e s t e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d by t h e p a r t i e s by l i v e t e s t i m o n y a n d 
memorandums was t h e f a c t t h a t S o f t S o l u t i o n s had s u b s t a n t i a l s a l e s 
f o r a p e r i o d of t i m e w h i c h w e r e a d i r e c t r e s u l t of D S e a r c h 
T e c h n o l o g y ; t h e r e f o r e , r o y a l t i e s w e r e due BYU. 
The r e a s o n s g i v e n by S o f t S o l u t i o n s f o r n o t mak ing r o y a l t y 
p a y m e n t s d i d not c o n v i n c e t h e a r b i t r a t o r t h a t S o f t S o l u t i o n s h a d a 
v i a b l e d e f e n s e f o r f a i l i n g t o p a y r o y a l t i e s a s p e r t h e c o n t r a c t : . 
The a r b i t r a t o r i s c o g n i z a n t o f S o f t S o l u t i o n s ' e x p e n d i t u r e s i t 
b e l i e v e d t o be n e c e s s a r y t o r e s o l v e p r o b l e m s i t s c u s t o m e r s 
e n c o u n t e r e d . However, S o f t S o l u t i o n s d i d have s a l e s t h a t a m o u n t e d 
t o m i l l i o n s of d o l l a r s . T h e f a c t t h a t S o f t S o l u t i o n s d i d n o t m a k e 
a s much a s i t a n t i c i p a t e d d o e s n o t e x c u s e S o f t S o l u t i o n s from p a y i n g 
r o y a l t i e s as d i c t a t e d i n t h e c o n t r a c t . 
The a r b i t r a t o r was c c n c e r n e d a b o u t a l l o w i n g BYU t o c o l l e c t 
r o y a l t i e s a f t e r 1994, b u t t h e a r b i t r a t o r was a d v i s e d t h a t N o v e l l 
p r o d u c e d t h e r e c o r d s i n 1996 same t i m e a f t e r t h e h e a r i n g . S i n c e 
t h e s a l e s i n f o r m a t i o n was n o t p r o d u c e d a t t h e h e a r i n g , BYU i s 
e n t i t l e d t o r o y a l t i e s a s c a l c u l a t e d by BYU from t h e N o v e l l s a l e s 
r e o o r t s . 
R. SUPP. 9 
BYU V, SOFTSOLUTIONS PAGE TEN MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The last issue to be determined by the arbitrator is the issue 
of attorney fees. The arbitrator is very familiar with the leading 
cases on the issue of attorney fees. The case which is cited most 
often is Dixie State v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985 (Utah 1983) , which 
sets forth the criteria for the award of attorney fees. 
1. What legal work was performed? 
2. How much of tha~ work was reasonably necessary to 
prosecute and defend the ma~cer? 
3. Was the attorney's billing rate reasonable in light of 
the locality and type of services rendered? 
4. Are there other factors requiring special consideration? 
In this case Mr. Thomas' affidavit establishes the fact that 
legal work was done as evidenced by the pleadings and hearings. 
The arbitrator found that the legal work performed by the 
attorneys for BYU was reasonably necessary. 
One of the problems nhe arbitrator had in arriving at its 
decision on attorney fees was Mr. Thomas' failure to give an hourly 
itemization of the time spent. The arbitrator established the 
number of hours spent by Mr. Thomas by dividing $150 into $137,000. 
Mr. Thomas spent approximately 913.33 hours on this case over a 
period of years, which is nou unreasonable in view of the 
complexity cf this case. However, the arbi~raror, upon reviewing 
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BYU V, SOFTSOLUTIONS PAGE ELEVEN MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Mr. Thomas7 a f f i d a v i t and S o f t S o l u t i o n s o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e awazrd o f 
a t t o r n e y f e e s , c o n c l u d e d t h a t $ 1 1 5 , 0 0 0 i s a r e a s o n a b l e amount t o b e 
awarded t o BYU f o r a t t o r n e y f e e s , 
S o f t S o l u t i o n s s h o u l d n o t r e a p t h e b e n e f i t b e c a u s e i n - h o u s e 
c o u n s e l p e r f o r m e d l e g a l s e r v i c e s , n o r s h o u l d BYU r e c e i v e a 
w i n d f a l l . BYU d i d n o t r e c e i v e a w i n d f a l l b e c a u s e i t i s b e i n g 
c o m p e n s a t e d f o r t h e t i m e c o u n s e l s p e n t on t h i s c a s e a n d f o r 
s e r v i c e s r e n d e r e d by i t s l e g a l s t a f f f o r t h e work u s u a l l y d o n e b y 
Mr. Thomas b u t f o r t h i s c a s e . 
BYU i s n o t e n t i t l e d t o e x p e r t w i t n e s s f e e s . 
Da ted t h i s -J3 day o f J u l y , 19 9 6 . 
JQSJf A. ROKICH 
ARBITRATOR 
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BYU V. SOFTSOLUTIONS PAGE TWELVE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this — ^ day of 
July, 1996: 
Eugene H. Bramhall 
David B. Thomas 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
A-350 ASB 
Prove, Utah 8 4602 
Earl J. Peck 
David B. Hartvigsen 
Attorneys for Defendant 
6 0 E. South Temple, Suite 110 0 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Eugene H. Bramball, #0427 
David B. Thomas, #3228 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Brigham Young University 
A-350 ASB Provo, UT 84602 
Telephone: (801) 378-4722 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF UTAH 




vs. : Judge Fred D. Howard 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY, : 
: Civil No. 960400497 
Defendant. 
The above entitled matter came on before the Court on cross-motions concerning the 
confirmation of an arbitration award entered by the arbiter, John A. Rokich, on July 3, 1996. 
SoftSolutions was represented bv Jay Peck and David Hairvigsen of the firm of Nelson & Senio:, 
and Brigham Young University was represented by its General Counsel's office through David B. 
Thomas. The Court having heard the cross-motions concerning the confirmation of the arbitration 
award entered its Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award and Plaintiffs 
Motion to Vacate or Modify Arbitration Award dated February 9, 1998 which confirmed me 
arbitration award. Thereafter, BYU submitted a form of Judgment for the Court's signature. 
SoftSolutions objected to the submitted Judgment challenging me interest calculations and the 
amount of attorney's fees awarded. Those matters having been submitted and the Court having 
entered its Ruling on Plaintiffs Objection to Form of Proposed Judgment, and for good cause 
appearing therefor, 
•csv-j-j :•» -7 r,! ;. !' 
W9CRORMH) *3—! 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Brigham Young 
University shall have judgment against SoftSolutions, Inc. as follows: 
1. For past royalties due and owing in the amount of $1,672,467.00; 
2. For interest on the sum of $1,672,467.00 at the contract rate of 18% per annum, 
from July 3, 1996 to the date of the entry of this Judgment, and thereafter at the contract rate of 
18% per annum. 
3. For attorney's fees awarded as a part of the original arbitration award in the amount 
of $115,000.00; interest thereon from July 3, 1996 to the date of entry of this Judgment at the rate 
of 7.61% from July 3 to December 31, 1996; at the rate of 7.81% from January 1, 1997 to 
December 31, 1997; and at the rate of 7.23% from January 1, 1998 to the date of entry of this 
Judgment and thereafter at the legal rate established by § 15-1-4 U.C.A. 
4. An additional award of attorney's fees of $28,987.50 made pursuant to this Court's 
rulings dated February 9, 1998 and May 19, 1998, with interest thereon at the judgment rate as 
established by §15-1-4 U.C.A. 
DATED this 7 ^ day of £ ^ 1 9 9 8 . 
Jay Peck 
David Hartvigsen 
Attorneys for SoftSolutions, Inc. 
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BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY, 
a Utah nonprofit Corporation, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO CONFIRM 
ARBITRATION AWARD AND 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO VACATE 
OR MODDJY ARBITRATION 
AWARD 
CASE NO. 960400497 
DATE: February 9, 1998 
HONORABLE FRED D. HOWARD, 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
This matter came before the above entitled court on Defendant Ikigham Young 
University's ("Defendant") Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award and Plaintiff SoftSoiutions' 
("Plaintiff) Cross-Motion to Vacate or Modify Arbitration Award, pursuant to Rales 78-31a-12, 
78-3 la-14 and 7&-31a-15 of the Utah Code Annotated, which were submitted for decision on June 
20, 1997, pursuant to Rule 4-501(l)(d) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration (U.CJ.A.)-
A hearing on the aforementioned motions was held on December 12, 1997. 
FACTUAL SETTING 
1. This case arises out of a series of license agreements entered into between BYU and 
SoftSoiutions. SoftSoiutions licensed potential software and intellectual property wnich was 
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referred to as D-Search from BYU for development of various software applications including a 
document package. (Mot. to Conf. Ajrb. Award and in Opp'n to SoftSolutions' Mot. to Vacate 
or in the Ad., to Modify 1 1) (quoting Mem. Dec. of the Hon. Join A. Rokich, Arb. of July 3, 
1996, at 1, 2.) 
2. On or about June 1, 1990, the parties entered into a contract drafted by the Defendant 
whereby the Defendant granted SoftSolutions, Inc. an exclusive1 right to use D-Search, its 
parented computer software indexing and information retrievil roitine. (Compi. t 5.) 
3. The D-Search routine was integrated rfito a document maragement product called 
SoftSolutions that was being developed and marketed by SoftSolutions Technology Corporation 
("STC"), a separate corporation affiliated with SoftSolutions, Inc. (Compl. ^  6.) 
4. The June 1, 1990 contract between BYU and SoftSolutions provides that SoftSolutions, 
Inc. will pay an earned royalty in an amount equal to five (5) percent of the net sales of the 
licensed products or licensed processes used, leased or sold by or for SoftSolutions and its 
Affiliates containing the licensed process(es) and the support of custom software applications 
containing D-Search, the licensed process(es). (Compl. Ex. A 14.1.) 
5. After the June 1, 1990 contract, a dispute arose between the parties concerning patent 
BYU had previously issued D-Scardi licenses to the following compan^s and entities: Creative Index, Inc., 
ECHO Solutions, Inc., the Church of Jesus Cbnst of Latter-day Saints, Linguatecii Inc^ Tremco, Inc. and Larson-Davis, 
IDCL (Compl. Ex- A f^ 2.5.) However, under the ^Exclusive License Agreement bcrweca Bngham Young University and 
ScdSotaions, Inc." dated June 1, 1990, BYU promised that no further licenses weald be given. (Mot. to Conf. Aib. 
Awmid and in Opp. to SoftSolutions7 Moc to Vacate or in die Ait., to Mod. Ex. E t 12.) 
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infringements by third parties who were alleged to have used D-Search. This dispute was 
eventually resolved. (Compl. 1 7.) 
6. Subsequent to patent infringement claims, SoftSolutions raised the issue of flawed D-
Search technology which would preclude BYU form receiving royalty payments pursuant to the 
terms of the license agreement. Despite claims of technical deficiencies with D-Search, 
SoftSolutions rqpresented that it would be willing to pay half of the royalty rate, waive all penalty 
and interest, and pay the amount due at the rate of $2,500.00 per month. (Mot. to Conf. Arb. 
Award and in Opp. to SoftSolutions' Mot. to Vacate or in the Alt., to Mod. ^ 7) (quoting Mem. 
Dec. of the Hon. John A. Rokich, Arb. of July 3, 1996, at 3.) 
7. MBYU responded by letter dated April 12, 1993, ... stating that it would consider 
negotiating the payment of interest and a payment schedule to pay off the indebtedness. At this 
juncture an impasse was reached, and the issue was submitted first to mediation and then to 
arbitration." (Mem. Dec. of the Hon. John A. Rokich, Arb. of July 3, 1996, at 3 , 4.) 
7. D-Search technology was removed from the SoftSolutions product in July of 1993 and 
replaced with a routine available in the public domain. (Compl. 1 9.) 
8. The Contract contains the following provision regarding arbitration of disputes: 
15.1 ... In the event, after one or more mediation sessions, either party believes 
the mediation process is not likely to resolve the dispute by mutual agreement, the 
dispute shall be resolved by final and binding arbitration in Provo, Utah. Each 
party shall choose one arbitrator and these two arbitrators shall in turn select a third 
arbitrator, which three arbitrators shall constitute the arbitration panei. The 
arbitrators shall have no power to add to, subtract from or modify any of the. 
- j -
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terms or conditions of this Agreement. An award entered in such arbitration may 
be enforced by either party in either courts of the State of Utah or in the United 
States District Court fro the District of Utah in which jurisdiction for such purposes 
BYU and SOFTSOLUTIONS hereby irrevocably consent and submit. The 
arbitration proceedings shall be conducted in all maters not specifically 
identified in this Agreement pursuant to the rules of the American Arbitration 
Association, unless otherwise expressly agreed in writing by the parties. (Compi. 
Ex. AT 15.1.) 
10. Rule 43 of the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association 
limits the scope of an arbitrator's powers to those authorized by the parties in the contract between 
the parties. (Compl. 1 11.) 
11. On or about February 4, 1997, BYU initiated the arbitration proceedings by demand letter 
to counsel for SoftSolutions, Inc. (Compl. ^ 13.) 
12. The parties each selected an arbitrator and those two arbitrators selected a third arbitrator, 
John A. Rokich. An arbitration hearing date was then set. (Compl. 1 14.) 
13. The week before the arbitration hearing was to begin, the arbitrator selected by 
SoftSolutions, Inc. was called to testify before Congress during the time set for the hearing. Under 
these circumstances, the parties agreed to have the arbitration heard by the third arbitrator alone. 
(Compl. 1 16.) 
14. The parties filed a Joint Statement of Issues to be Arbitrated by John A. Rokich. The 
following were the issues to be arbitrated: 
1. What amount of royalties are due BYU by SoftSolutions, Inc.? 
2. What defenses or offsets exist which reduce or relieve any obligation for 
royalties by SoftSolutions? 
3. Are BYU's claims of royalties barred by a contractual limitation period? 
4. Did the intellectual property provided to SoftSolutions perform in accordance 
with descriptions, specifications, and representations of BYU? 
5. Did BYU have an obligation to periodically provide enhancements and 
convictions to the intellectual property provided? 
6. Was the ise of the intellectual property discontinued so that royalties stopped 
accruing? 
(Mot to Coof. Arb. Award and in Opp. to SoftSolutions' Mot. to Vacate or in the 
AIL, to Med. 111) (quoting Mem. Dec. of the Hon. John A. Rokich, Aib. of July 
3, 1996, at 4, 5.) 
15. For use in the arbitration proceeding and to address issues presented in the arbitration, 
BYU prepared and submitted to the arbitrator^ "Arbitration Memorandum" which laid out the 
facts of the case and supplied specific legal argument concerning the several matters to be 
arbitrated. The facts cited by BYU involved a lengthy recitation of facts concerning the history 
of negotiations of the several license agreements between BYU and SoftSoIuticwis; the history of 
the collection efforts made by BYU; negotiations concerning payment of royalties and 
SoftSolutions' withliolding of royalties based on its claim of third party infringement of the D-
Search patents; and SoftSolutions' claim of defective technology. {See Mot. to Conf. Arb. Award 
and in Opp'n. to SoftSolutions' Mot. to Vacate or in the Alt., to Modify Ex. E 1 1 - 57.) BYU 
described its claim for minimum royalties under the contract. Specifically, BYU described its 
claim for royalties based on actual sales including a claim for the sale of products after BYU's D-
Search technology was substituted out of SoftSolutions products. Finally, the contractual limitation 
period was briefed and legal arguments presented. (Mot. to Conf. Arb. Award and in Opp'n. to 
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SoftSolutions' Mot. to Vacate or in the Alt., to Modify J 12.) 
16. SoftSolutions presented to the arbitrator two memoranda, one dated September 25, 1995 
entitled, "SoftSolutions, Inc.'s Statement of Facts"; and the second was presented on the second 
day of arbitration entitled, "SoftSolutions, Inc.'s Arbitration Memorandum." In "SoftSolutions, 
Inc.'s Statement of Facts", SoftSolutions reviewed the three separate license agreements entered 
into between BYU and SoftSolutions, representations concerning D-Search and it technical 
deficiencies, claims of misappropriations of the D-Search technology by competitors of 
SoftSolutions, and SoftSolutions calculation of "royalties due. (Mot. to Conf. Arb. Award and in 
Opp'n. to SoftSolutions' Mot. to Vacate or in the Alt., to Modify ^ 13). 
17. In "SoftSolutions, Inc.'s Arbitration Memorandum," SoftSolutions briefed the issue of 
"Amount of Sales Subject to Royalties Under the License Agreement and Amount of Royalties 
Paid," which addressed the question of whether upgrades were subject to royalty claims and 
whether products from which D-Search had been removed were subject to the royalty requirement 
of the Semi-exclusive License Agreement. In addition, SoftSolutions briefed the issue of the 
contractual limitation period, and also raised an issue concerning the correct calculation of 
interest. (Mot. to Conf. Arb. Award and in Opp'n. to SoftSolutions' Mot. to Vacate or in the 
AIL, to Modify 1 14). 
18. The arbitration hearing was held on September 26 - 29, 1995. No stenographic record was 
made of the hearing. (Compi. 1 17.) 
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19. At the end of the arbitration hearing it was agreed that SoftSolutions would provide BYU 
with accounting information for the purpose of presenting figures that could be submitted to the 
arbitrator to determine royalties owed. Thereafter, on December 11, 1996, BYU submitted to the 
arbitrator a memorandum entitled, "BYU's Submission of Accounting Information.* That 
submission included claims for royalties under all of the license agreements with SoftSolutions 
(including agreements which were in the name of Tremco, and Tremco, dba SoftSolutions), all 
upgrade sales, and a projected sales figure for sales after 1994, the date of the acquisition of 
SoftSolutions by WordPerfect and thereafter "by Novell. (Mot. to Conf. Arb. Award and in 
Opp'n. to SoftSolutions' Mot. to Vacate or in the Alt., to Modify 1 15). 
20. SoftSolutions responded to BYU's submission of accounting information and presented the 
arbitrator with a memorandum entitled, "SoftSolutions, Inc.'s Response to BYU's New 
Accounting Information," which raised and argued the following: 
A. BYU Improperly Includes Upgrade Sales in its Accounting. 
B. BYU Improperly Computes Royalties on Sales of Class by Tremco. 
C. BYU Improperly Includes Sales of 3.1 and 4.0, Even Though All Evidence Presented 
by Either Party Showed that 3.1 and 4.0 Products did not Contain D-Search. 
D. BYU Improperly Computes Interest. 
E. BYU's Calculation Improperly Fails to Consider the Contractual Limitation. 
F. BYU Incorrectly Claims Our Sales of 3.0 in 1994 and 1995. (Mot. to Conf. Arb. 
Award and in Opp'n. to SoftSolutions' Mot. to Vacate or in the Alt., to Modify 1 16). 
21. As part of the finalization of his arbitration decision, Judge Rokich held a conference with 
the parties on the 9th day of January, 1996. He announced his preliminary decision and invited 
additional discussion concerning those preliminary determinations. During this conference, which 
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lasted several hours, a wide variety of matters were argued including, but not limited to, issues 
concerning the automatic termination provisions of the contract, the sale of SoftSolutions to 
WordPerfect and then to Novell as that transaction might bear on the arbitrator's rulings that 
royalties were due on products sold after the sale of the company, the limitation on royalties 
because of the removal of D-Search technology finom the SoftSolutions products, whether upgrade 
sales should or should not be included in the calculation of royalties, whether sales by Tremco 
under the first series of licenses with SoftSolutions is includable in the award of royalties, whether 
the contract limitation provisions limit recovery of any royalties, and if so, when that limitation 
period might have begun; and whether attorney's fees were to be awarded. (Mot. to Conf. Aib. 
Award and in Opp'n. to SoftSolutions' Mot. to Vacate or in the Alt., to Modify 1" 17) 
22. After the January 9, 1996 conference, SoftSolutions filed a pleading dated February 13, 
1996 entitled, "SoftSolutions, Inc.'s Supplemental Response Concerning Royalty Obligations." In 
that document, SoftSolutions raised and briefed die following issues: 
I. Imposing liability upon SoftSolutions for the sales of WordPerfect or 
Novell would violate the express terms of the contract. 
A. Adding to or modifying any provision of the contract violates the 
contract's arbitration clause. 
B. The contract does not provide for payment of royalties after 
SoftSolutions ceases to do business, [addressing SoftSolutions 
argument concerning the automatic termination provisions] 
C. A requirement to pay royalties after termination of the contract 
would be a modification of the contract and would violate paragraph 
15.1 which limits the arbitrator's powers. 
H. BYU is not entitled to royalties on sales of non-D-Search products. 
A. There has been no finding or evidence offered that would suppf^t 
-8-
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a finding of bad faith on the part of SoftSolutkcs or STC in 
abandoning D-Searcb. 
B. SoftSolutions has complied with the express contractual requirement 
to use its best efforts to bring one or more D-Search products to the 
market. 
C. The non-D-Search products were sold by non-affilizre tthird parties 
for which there is no contractual obligation to pay royalties. 
HI. Sales of non-D-Search products by WordPerfect and NorcSL (Mot. to 
Conf. Arb. Award and in Opp'n. to SoftSolutions, Mot. to Vacate or in the 
Alt., to Modify 118.) 
23. The arbitrator served a "Memorandum Decision" on July 3, 1996 by mail to the parties. 
Although not styled as an arbitration award, it is to be construed as such. (Compl. 1 18, 19.) 
24. The Memorandum Decision ("Arbitration Award") concludes that SoftSolutions, Inc. owes 
BYU $1,672,467 in past due royalties and interest thereon and $115,000 in attorney fees. (Compl. 
t 20.) 
25. On July 26, 1996, SoftSolutions filed a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment2 in the Fourth 
District Court, County of Utah, State of Utah, seeking to have the arbitration award vacated or 
in the alternative, modified. (Mot. to Conf. Arb. Award and in Opp'n. to SoftSolutions' Mot. to 
Vacate or in the Alt., to Modify t 21.) 
26. On ihe 10th day of January, 1997, BYU moved to dismiss SoftSojutions' Complaint for 
Declaratory Reiief. (Mot. to Conf. Arb. Award and in Opp'n. to SoftSoiiitions' Mot. to Vacate 
or in the All., to Modify 1 23.) 
2
 Case #960400497 CV 
-9-
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27. On or about August 20, 1996 in a separate action in the Fourth District Court, County of 
Utah, State of Utah, BYU filed a Motion to Confirm Award of Arbitration3. (Mot. to Conf. Art. 
Award and in Opp'n. to SoftSolutions' Mot. to Vacate or in tie Alt., to Modify 122.) 
28. On November 20, 1996, SoftSolutions filed a Motion to Qoash or in the Alternative, to 
Stay Proceeding in Case #960400557 CV until its Complaint far Declaratory Judgment could be 
heard by Judge Maetani in Case #960400497 CV. (Mot. to Conf. Arb. Award and in Opp'n. to 
SoftSolutions' Mot. to Vacate or in the Alt., to Modify J 23.) 
29. Both BYU's Motion to Dismiss as filed in Case #960400497 CV and SoftSolutions' 
Motion to Quash or in the Alternative to Stay Proceeding as filed in Case #960400557 CV were 
considered by Judge Donald J. Eyre- Judge Eyre rendered a Memorandum Decision on February 
18, 1997. The Memorandum Decision referred both SoftSohnons' Complaint for Declaratoiy 
Relief and BYU's Motion to Confirm Award of Arbitration to Judge Howard H. Maetani far 
further consideration. (Mot. to Cool Arb. Award and in Opp'n. to SoftSolutions' Mot. to Vacate 
or in the Alt., to Modify 1 24.) 
30. Thereafter, BYU and SoftSolutions' submitted to Judge Maetani a stipulation for the 
consolidation of the two actions - Case #960400497 CV and Case #960400557 CV into Cas 
#960400497 CV. Both parties agreed that SoftSolutions' Complaint for Declaratory Judgment wiE 
be treated as a motion to vacate or modify pursuant to §78-5 la-1^-15, and further agreed o 
3
 Case #960400557 CV 
i n 
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submit both SoftSolutions' Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and BYU's Motion to Confirm 
Award of Arbitration as cross-motions with an agreed upon briefing schedule. (Mot. to Conf. 
Arb. Award and in Opp'n. to SoftSolutiocs' Mot. to Vacate or in tie Ait., to Modify 1 25.) 
31. Case #960400497 CV was subsequently reassigned to Judge Fred D. Howard who will 
now rule on SoftSoIutions' Motion to Vacate or Modify Arbitration Award and BYU's Cross-
Motion to Confirm Award of Arbitration-
ANALYSIS^AND RULING 
The court will initially consider Plaintiffs Motion to Vacate or Modify Arbitration Award 
as it is dispositive. 
The policy of our law favors arbitration as a speedy and inexpensive method of 
adjudicating disputes. DeVorev. THC Hospitals, Tnc.r 884 P.2d 1246. 1251 (Utah 1994) (quoting 
Utility Trailer Sales of Salt Lake. Tnc. v. Fake, 740 P.2d 1327, 1329 (Utah 1987). Pursuant to 
that policy, judicial review of arbitraiioa awards should not be perrasive in scope or encourage 
repetitive adjudications but should be limited to the statutory grounds and procedures for review. 
Id.; United Paperworkers Tnt'l. Union v. Uniscor 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987). Additionally, the 
standard for reviewing an arbitration award is highly deferential to the arbitrator . . . *[TJhe ^ " ^ 
should give considerable leeway to the arbitrator, setting aside his or her decision only in certain 
narrow circumstances.'Buzas Baseball. Tnc. v. Salt lake Trappers. Tnc,T 925 P.2d 941, 946 947 
- i i -
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(Utah 1996) (quoting First Options of Chicafo v. Kapan. 115 S.Ct. 1920, 1923 (1995); A trial 
court faced with a motion to vacate or modify an z±iitration award is limited to determining 
whether any of the very limited grounds for modificafon or vacatur exist. It is well settled, both 
in Utah and in the federal courts, that the trial court maj not substitute its judgment for that of the 
arbitrator, nor may it modify or vacate an award because it disagrees with the arbitrator's 
assessment. Id at p. 947 (citations omitted). 
The statutory basis for vacating or modifying an arbitration award are set forth in the Utah 
Code as follows: 
§78-31a-14 Vacation of the award by courL 
(1) Upon motion to the court by any party fco the arbitration proceeding for 
vacation of the award, the court shall vacate the award if it appears: 
(a) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other indue 
means; 
(b) an arbitrator, appointed as a neutral, showed partiality, or an 
arbitrator was guilty of rrisconduct that prejudiced the rights 
of any party; 
(c) the arbitrators exceeded their powers; 
(d) the arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon suffideat 
cause shown, refused to hear evidence material to the 
controversy, or otherwise conducted the hearing to the 
substantial prejudice of die rights of a party; or 
(e) there was no arbitration agreement between the parties to the 
arbitration proceeding. 
§78-31a-15 Modification of award by court. 
(1) Upon motion made within 20 days after a copy of the award is served 
upon the moving party, the coin shall modify or correct the award 
if it appears: 
(a) there was an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident 
mistake in the description of any person or property referred 
to in the award; 
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(b) the arbitrator's award is based on a matter not submitted to 
them, if the award can be corrected without affecting the 
merits of the award upon the issues submitted; or 
(c) the award is imperfect as to form. 
Ruling on Plaintiffs Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award 
Plaintiff cites §78-31a-14(l)(c) as its only statutory basis for vacating the Arbitration 
Award d^iming "that the arbitrator exceeded the powers granted to him under the terms of the 
Contract, in many instances by disregarding express Contract terms, . . / Complaint *[ 27*. 
Hence, §7&-31a-14(l)(c) will be considered as the only asserted basis to vacate the arbitration 
award. 
Plaintiff citing DeVore claims that the evidentiary standard required by §78-31a-14 is 
whether a "reasonable person" would conclude that the arbitrator exceeded the powers granted to 
him under the terms of the Contract in granting the relief contained in the Arbitration Award. The 
court in DeVore held that the evidentiary standard required by §78-31a-14 (l)(b)5 is whether a 
"reasonable person would conclude thai an arbitrator, appointed as neutral, showed partiality or 
was guilty of misconduct that prejudiced the rights of any party." DeVore v. TRC Hospitals. Inc.T 
884 P.2d 1246, 1256 (Utah 1994). We disagree that the court in DeVore held this evidentiary 
standard applicable to §78-31a-14(l)(c) or the other three (3) specific grounds to vacate under 
By ruling of Judge Eyre, and stipulaDca of the parties, SoftSoiutions Complaint for Declaratory Judgement is 
treated as a Motion to Vacate or in the Alternative to Modify under T78-3 la-14-15, U.C.A. 
§78-3 la-14(l)(b) an arbitrator, appointed as a neutral, showed partiality, or an arbitrator was guilty of 
misconduct that prejudiced the nghts of any party, 
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§78-31a-14(l). The DeVore court rejected both the "if it appears" and "actual partiality" standards 
in favor of a "reasonable person" standard under §78-31a-14(l)(b). The court found the "if it 
appears"language in §78-31a-14(l) and §78-31a-15(l) to mean tfif it appears to the court" or "if 
it appears from the record." "Thus, the "if it appears" language merely reflects the distinction 
between a court reviewing an arbitration award and aroitnators reviewing their own award/ 
DeVore at 1254. In rejecting the "actual partiality" in favor of a "reasonable person" standard, the 
DeVore court relied on Morelite and the strong policy implications unique to §78-31a-14(l)(b). 
"For this reason, we cannot countenance the promulgation of a standard for partiality as 
insurmountable as "proof of actual bias." Bias is always difficult, and indeed often impossible to 
"prove." . . . Such a standard, we fear, occasionally would require that we enforce awards that 
are clearly repugnant to our sense of fairness, yet do not yield 'proof of anything." Morelite 
Constr. Corp v. N. Y.C. Pist. Council Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 R2d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1984). 
Recognizing that the burden of proof falls on the movant in a motion to vacate, DeVore at 1256 
and the difficulty in proving actual arbitrator bias, the DeVore court adopted a "reasonable 
person" standard in the context of §78-31a-14(l)(b). However, it is clear that the movant is not 
subject to a similar difficulty in the context of §78-31a-14(l)(c) as the inquiry is limited to 
whether the arbitrator exceeded powers granted to him under the terms of the Contract and does 
not require an examination of any facts outside those established by the arbitration award and the 
1 A 
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memorandum of agreement.6 
The Defendant cites Justice Zimmerman in Elizas who specifically addressed the standard 
of review concerning a claim that the arbitral exceeded his power under §78-31a-14(l)(c). 
Generally, to find that an arbitrator has exceeded his authority, a court must 
review the submission agreement and determine whether the arbitrator's award 
covers areas not contemplated by the sabnrission agreement. "It is . . .fundamental 
that tbe authority of the arbitrators springs from the agreement to arbitrate. Swift 
TndiLS.Jnc. v. Botany Tndus.. Tnc, 466R2d 1125, 1131 (3d Cir. 1972); see also, 
Western Ffectric Co.. v. Communications WTcrs. Of Am., 450 F. Supp 876, 881 
(E.D.N. Y. 1978) (The powers of an arbitrator are defined by the agreement of the 
parties: tbe question they submitted both establishes and limits tbe arbitrator's 
jurisdiction. It is the reviewing coun'^ duty [under the exceeding authority test] 
to determine whether the arbitrator has acted within that jurisdiction.* BuzasT 925 
P.2d at 949-50. 
Thus, ±e initial inquiry is whether the arbitrator exceeded the powers delegated to him by 
the parties7 as an "arbitrator has no powers over the parties other than those expressly granted to 
him in the arbitration agreement/ Birras at 949, and the questions they submitted. 
Additionally, the court must make a further inquiry to determine whether an award is 
The cemt rejects Plaintiffs claim that the evidentiary standard required by §78-31a-14{l)(c) is whether a 
"reasonable perraT would conclude that the arbitrator exceeded the powers granted to him under the terms of the 
Contract in grarcmg the relief contained in the Arbitration Award However, the court notes that under the irrationality 
principle as outfcnc by the court in Buzas. the proper tea is whether reasonable minds could agree that. .[the award] 
was not possible tmdcr a fair interpretation of the evidence. Buzas at 950 (quoting Anchorage Med. & Surgical Clinic v. 
James. 555 P.2d 1320, 1323 (Alaska 1976). 
". . . HI arbitrator does not have a roving corrrni^ gon to do what he or she believes is necessary to put 
everything right. 33 construct a "better agreement." Arbsxacocs are required to address the issues submitted within the 
context of the poaooms of the parties and effectuate the rdicf requested, not to reform the. . . agreements. 
Marple Townsra: v Delaware Countv FOP Lodge 27.660 A.2d 211. 215 (Pa. Cmwith 1995). 
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without foundation in reason or feet. If so, the arbitrator may be found to have exceeded his 
authority. Elizas at 949 citing Brotherhood of K/R. Trainmen v. Central of Ga. Ry., 415 R2d 403 
(5th Cir. 1969). 
In the arbitration context, an award * without foundation in reason or fact' is 
equated with an award that exceeds the authority or jurisdiction on the arbitrating 
body. To merit judicial enforcement, an award must have a basis that is at least 
rationally inferable, if not obviously drawn, from the letter or purpose of the . . 
. agreement. The arbitrator's role is to carry out the aims of the agreement, and his 
role defines the scope of his authority. When he is no longer carrying out the 
agreement or when his position cannot be considered in any way rational, he has 
exceeded his jurisdiction. The requirement that the result of arbitration have 
'foundation in reason or feet' means that the award must, in some logical way, be 
derived from the wording of the contract. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. 
Central of Ga. Ry. Co.T 415 F.2d 403, 412 (5th Ore. 1969). The arbitrator may 
not ignore the plain language of the contract; but the parties having authorized the 
arbitrator to give meaning to the language of the agreement, a court should not 
reject an award on the ground that the arbitrator misread the contract. United 
Paperworters Int, Union v, Misco, 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987) (citing Enterprise 
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (I960)). 
In the instant, the arbitration agreement is found in the "Exclusive License Agreement 
Between Brigham Young University and SoftSolutions, Inc" ("License Agreement"). Paragraph 
15.1 provides: 
In the event, after one or more mediation sessions, either party believes the 
mediation process is not likely to resolve the dispute by mutual agreement, the 
dispute shall be resolved by final and binding arbitration in Provo, Utah. Each 
party shall choose one arbitrator and these two arbitrators shall in turn select a third 
arbitrator, which three arbitrators shall constitute the arbitration panel. The 
arbitrators shall have no power to add to, subtract from or modify any of the 
terms or conditions of this Agreement. An award entered in such arbitration may 
be enforced by either party in either courts of the Stare of Utah or in the United 
States District Court fro the District of Utah in which jurisdiction for such purposes 
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BYU and SOFTSOLUTTONS hereby irrevocably consent and submit. The 
arbitration proceedings shall be conducted in all maters not specifically 
identified in this Agreement pursuant to the rules of the American Arbitration 
Association, unless otherwise expressly agreed in writing by the parties. (Compl. 
Ex. A 1 15.1.) 
The arbitrator's powers are limited to resolving disputes and questions submitted in 
accordance with the License Agreement, and "the arbitrator has no power to addlQ, subtract from 
or modify any of the terms or conditions of this agreement ("License Agreement")." Plaintiff 
claims that, among other things, the arbitrator exceeded his powers by adding and modifying 
provisions in the License Agreement concerning automatic termination, waiver, a contractual 
period of limitation, "Affiliates," "Sales," upgrades, and penalties. The court will now turn to each 
of Plaintiffs specific claims. 
Whether the Arbitrator Deleted the Automatic Termination and Waver 
Provisions of the License Agreement in Issuing his Award, 
The Arbitration Award grants BYU royalties on sales made up to March, 1996. (MoL to 
Conf. Arb. Award and in Opp'n. to SoftSolutions' Mot. to Vacate or in the Alt., to Modify Ex. 
K p. 5.) Plaintiff claims that the agreement terminated and royalties stopped accruing several years 
prior to 1996. The License Agreement, Paragraph 14.2 provides in part: 
This Agreement shall be automatically terminated in the event of the occurrence 
of any one of the following circumstances: 
D. In the event SOFTSOLUTIONS shall erase to carry on its business; or 
i n 
"LI" 
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E. In the event that there is a transfer or sale of the SOFISOLUTIONS' 
business purporting to transfer or assign this Agreement or LICENSED 
TECHNOLOGY without the prior express written consent of BYU; . . . 
SoftSoiutions, Inc. contended at arbitration that it had ceased to cany on its business as 
early as 1991s and by January, 19949 at the latest. Plaintiff claims that the License Agreement 
automatically terminated under Paragraph 14.2 D and Paragraph 14.2 E when STC was sold to 
WordPerfect Corporation on January 24, 1994 as SoftSoiutions, Inc. was no longer doing business 
through its affiliate STC.10 Additionally, Plaintiff claims that the License Agreement prohibits 
the waiver of the automatic termination provision or any other contract term by any means other 
than by written waiver signed by the party against whom it is sought to be enforced. Paragraph 
20.6 of the License Agreement reads in part: 
SoftSoiutions, Inc. was involuntarily dissolved by the State on November 1, 1992. (Rep. in Supp. of 
SoftSoiutions, Inc/s Mot to Vacate or Modify Arb. Award and Req. for Hearing Ex. A). Additionally, SoftSoiutions, 
Inc. attempted ID transfer rights to D-Scarch to SoftSohitions Technology Corporation C*ST(T) in the early 1990's 
without notice or approval from BYU. (Rep. in Supp. of SoftSoiutions, Inc.'s Mot to Vacate or Modify Arb. Award and 
Req. for Hearing p. 12.) 
9
 STC, including the SoftSoiutions product and any interest STC had in D-Search, was sold to an unrelated 
third party, WordPerfect Corporation, in January of 1994. WordPerfect Corporation was sold to Novell, Inc. in 
September of 1994. (Rep. in Supp. of SoftSoiutions, Inc. 's Mot. to Vacate or Modify Arb. Award and Req. for Hearing 
p. 12.) However, BYU briefed and argued before the arbitrator that STC was not dissolved when it was sold to 
WordPerfect as it was a stock sale of the corporation. (Moc to Conf. Arb. Award and in Opp'n. to SoftSohitions' 
Mot. to Vacate or in the Alt., to Modify Ex. K p. 4.) 
The court will not consider whether the License Agreement terminated before January 24, 1994 as 
SoftSoiutions, fnc has taken the position that the License Agreement automatically terminated when STC was sold to 
WordPerfect Corporation on January 24, 1994. (Rep m Supp of SoftSoiutions, Inc. 's Mot to Vacate or Modify Arb. 
Award and Req. for Hearing p. 12.) Additionally, evidence was presented dunng arbitration that STC was an "Affiliate" 
subject to royalties having identical directors and identical management as SoftSoiutions and Tranco (Mot. to Conf. 
Arb. Award and m Opp'n. to SoftSohitions' Mot. to Vacate or in the Alt., to Modify Ex. K p. 3.) 
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No modification or claimed waiver of any of the provisions of this Agreement shall 
be valid unless in writing and signed by authorized representatives of the party 
-against whom such modification or waive [is] sought to be enforced. 
In determining whether the arbitrator exceeded his power under the License Agreeroem 
in awarding royalties after the January 24, 1994 sale of STC to WordPerfect, the court will now 
consider the first test as set forth in fijzas. The parties' Joint Statement of Issues to be Arbitrated 
by John A. Rolririi is the relevant focus of attention. The questions submitted included a question 
as to the amount of royalties SoftSoiutions, Inc. owed BYU. Additionally, the arbitrator was 
charged with determining whether die use of the. intellectual property discontinued so that royalties 
stopped accruing. (Mot. to Coof. Aib. Award and in Opp. to SoftSoiutions' Mot. to Vacate oc 
in the Alt., to Mod. 1 ll)(quoting Men. Dec. of the Hon. John A. Rokich, Arb. of July 3, 1996. 
at 4, 5.) An award based on royalties either before or aiter January 24, 1994 fits squarely wiJiin 
the questions submitted by both parties to the arbitrator for decision. The court finds the first tea 
as set forth in Euzas met. See Flexible MFS Systems PTY Inc. v. Super Products Corporation. 
86 F.3d 96, 100 (7th Cir. 1996XSuper Products1 principal argument, in its motion to vacate 
arbitration award based on a daim that arbitrators exceeded their powers, was that Super 
Products' own termination of the License Agreement rendered invalid the arbitrator's award of 
future lost profits for time periods following termination. The court held the arguments Super 
Products tries to raise here all go to its purported termination of the agreement, the legzl 
consequences of that terminaiioii, and the amount of damages. These were the points that the 
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arbitration panel was charged with deciding). 
In determining whether the second test as set forth in Buzas is met, the question before the 
court is whether an award of royalties after January 24, 1994 is in some logical way derived from 
the wording of the contract or permitted therein. This court sits with a distinct disadvantage in 
answering this question as it lacks detailed reasons for the arbitrator's ruling on this issue.11 In 
the Memorandum Decision, the arbitrator said that he was concerned about allowing BYU to 
collect royalties after 1994, (Compi. Ex. C p. 9), nevertheless, the award was made. 
In response to Plaintiffs claim that undo" paragraph 14.2 D of the License Agreement the 
automatic termination provision was invoked, Defendant briefed and argued before the arbitrator 
that the sale of STC to WordPerfect was in fact a stock sale of the corporation. (Mot. to Conf. 
Aib. Award and in Opp'n. to SoftSolutions' Mot to Vacate or in the Alt., to Modify Ex. K p. 
4). The court finds dial it would not be irrational or inconsistent with the License Agreement for 
the arbitrator to find that a stock sale of STC does oot for purposes of paragraph 14.2 D mean that 
STC "ceased to carry on its business." 
In response to Plaintiffs argument that the automatic termination provision was invoked 
It 15 well eftibtished in arbitration law that arbunions are not required to provide detailed reasons for 
every facet of their awed. See Shearson Havden Stone. Tnr v T ',*n? 653 F.2d 310,312 (7* Cir. 1981); United 
Steelworkers of Amena v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960); Wifro v. Swm. 364 U.S. 
427, 436 (1953). 
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under paragraph 14.2 E of the License Agreement12, Defendant briefed and argued the following 
before the arterafcor: (1.) the License Agreement specifically prohibits any conveyance, transfer 
or assign men: of the D-Search technology to any other entity unless soch conveyance was 
approved by BYU; (2.) no such conveyance bad ever been approved by BYU; and (3.) to BYU's 
knowledge, SoftSolutions, d/b/a/ SoftSolutiocLS Technology Corporation, wzs the licensee. (Mot. 
to Conf. Ait>. Award and in Opp'n. to SofSoJutions' Mot. to Vacate or in the Alt., to Modify 
Ex. K p. 4). Additionally, under paragraph 14.5 of the License Agreement, *upon termination 
of this agreement SoftSolutions shall return to BYU all computer software rcutiiaes, source codes, 
updates, modifications, and enhancements.. .m (Comp. Ex A. p. 13). 
After examining the parties respective pleadings, it is still somewhat unclear to the court 
as to whether evidence was presented at arbitration which alleged that SoftSolutions d/b/a STC 
did not return BYU's licensed technology in violation of paragraph 14.5 of the License 
Agreement Despite this uncertainty and without benefit of the actual record at arbitration, we 
find that the arbitrator could have reasonably found a violation of paragraph. 14.5. Given facts 
known by this cocrt to be presented and briffed at arbitration and a finding by the arbitrator that 
to BYU's knowledge, SoftSolutions, d/b i STC, was the licensee, the arbitrator could have 
reasonably found that STC failed to retun BYU's licensed technology after the stock sale to 
* FWrrnfTs claim here is that the Arbitraicr exceeded his authority by deleting peragraph 14.2 E of the 
Ucences AgreerciertL Plaintiff claims that the License Agtreement was automatically teirnmaed wnder 
paragraph 14.2 E pvea the sale of the SoftSohitioos* busaness which purported to transfer/awigsa licensed technology 
to WordPerfect Corporation without prior express wrxrea consent of 3YU. 
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WordPerfect in violation of paragraph 14.5 of the License Agreement. The arbitrator could hrvc 
reasonably found that paragraph 14.2 of the License Agreement (which contains automatic 
termination provisions) must be ~»:ewed in context with Paragraph 14.5 (which requires the return of 
the licensed technology D-Search in the event of termination). Given SoftSolutions' ability to act 
unilaterally, without notice, in ^ rmination of the license agreement under paragraph 14.2 E, die 
arbitrator could have reasonably seen paragraph 14.5 as a built-ii protection and notice mechanism 
for BYU in the event of SofiSohutions' termination of the License Agreement. Viewed in nis 
cootext, SoftSolutions' return of BYU's licensed technology n compliance with paragraph U.5 
of the license agreement wouid have afforded BYU notice a SoftSolutions' termination of die 
License Agreement. Such notice of termination or SoftSolutions* return of the licensed technology 
to BYU would be inconsistent with a finding by the arbitrator nat BYU understood SoftSolutions 
to be the licensee or holder of an exclusive license on the licensed technology or D-Search. 
Hence, in deciding to sward royalties after the January 24, 1994 stock sale of STC, cfae 
arbitrator could have reasonably found the following: (1.) BYU had no knowledge of the stock 
sate to WordPerfect Corporation, and BYU's understood SonSoiutions to be the licensee. G.) 
SVC failed to return BYU's licensed technology after the stock sale to WordPerfect in violazoa 
of paragraph 14.5 of the License Agreement. (3.) STC iopioperly transferred the liceised 
technology by transferring/assiErring licensed technology withoit approval from BYU. Given ±c 
aforementioned rationale, it woiki not be irrational or inconsistent with the wording of the License 
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Agreement for the arbitrator to find that SoftSolutions csmot claim termination of the License 
Agreement under L4.2 E in order to avoid payment of loyalties under the Exclusive License 
Agreement, yet exclusively possess BYlTs licensed technology in violation of paragraph 14.5 of 
the License AgreermsnL Additionally, termination of the license Agreement does not release the 
parties from any obligation that has matured prior to the effective date of termination according 
to paragraph 14.413 of the license Agreement, (CompL EXL A 114,4), and the court agrees with 
the Defendant that arbitrator could have reasonably seen the stock sale of SoftSolutions to 
WordPerfect and the tens of millions of dollars that the sale generated as being based in part upon 
the value created by the future sales potential of SoftSolutions products, products upon which a 
royalty would be owed to BYU. (Mot. to Conf. Arb. Award and in Opp'n. to SoftSoludoos' Mot. 
to Vacate or in the Alt., to Modify p. 23). 
Whether the Arbitrator Ignored Express Provisions of the License Agreement 
Pertaining to Sales upon which Royalties were to Accrue. 
The arbitrator awarded approximately $935,000 in royalties on sales by WordPerfect and 
Novell after the January 1994 sale of STC stock to WordPerfect. (Rep. in Supp. of SoftSolutions, 
Inc.'s Mot. to Vacate or Modify Arb. Award and Req. for Hearing p. 15). The following 
provisions of the License Agreement are relevant to Plaintiffs claim: 
Upon termination of this Agreement for any reason the ptttflies shall not be released from any obligation 
that has matured prior to the effective date of termination. . . . (ConnriL Ex. A f 14.4). 
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1. DEFINITIONS. 
1.1 "AFFILIATE" means and includes any person or entity owned or controlled 
directly or indirectly by SOFTSOLUTIONS or any other entity controlled 
by, controlling, or under common control with SOFTSOLUTIONS. The 
term "control" means possession, direct or indirect, of the powers to direct 
or cause the direction of the management and policies of a person or entity, 
whether through ownership of voting securities, by contract, agreement or 
otherwise. 
2. GRANT. 
2.1 ...BYU hereby grants...SOFTSOLUTIONS the ...right and license to use 
LICENSED TECHNOLOGY, specifically identified as D-Search...until 
such time as this Agreement is terminated. This grant will extend to the 
manufacture, sale, lease, transfer or other disposition of LICENSED 
PRODUCTS or LICENSED PROCESSES through an AFFILIATE... . 
4. ROYALTIES. 
4.1 For the rights, privileges and license granted under this Agreement, 
SOFTSOLUTIONS shall pay to BYU, in the manner designated below, 
until the Agreement shall be terminated, consideration as follows: 
A. An "earned" royalty in the amount of five (5) percent of the NET 
SALEo of the LICENSED PRODUCTS or LICENSED 
PROCESSES used, leased or sold by or for SOFTSOLUTIONS and 
its AFFILIATES, ... . 
(Compl. Ex. A 1 1, 1.1, 2, 2.1, 4, 4.1) 
Plaintiffs claim here is similar to its first claim that the arbitrator exceeded his power 
under the license Agreement ("Paragraph 14.2") in awarding royalties after the January 24, 1994 
sale of STC to WordPerfect. However, the basis for this claim is paragraph 4.1 of the License 
Agreement in which it is argued that there were no more sales by SoftSolutions, Inc. or an 
"Affiliate" upon which royalties could accrue. As discussed above, the first test as set forth in 
Bii73s is met here as one of the issues to be arbitrated was the amount of royalties due BYU by 
SoftSolutions, Inc. Additionally, the Court finds the second Biizas test satisfied as it would not 
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be irrational or inconsistent with the wording of the License Agreement for the arbitrator to award 
royalties. 
Whether the Arbitrator also Ignored Other Express Provisions of the License Agreement 
Pertaining to the Products upon which Royalties were to Accrue. 
Plaintiff first claims that the arbitrator deleted express terms in the License Agreement 
which prohibit royalties on products not containing D-Search by awarding royalties on sales after 
July, 1993. D-Search technology was replaced with another technology in Version 3.1 of the 
SoftSolutions product in July of 1993. (Rep. in Supp. of SoftSolutions, Inc.'s Mot. to Vacate or 
Modify Arb. Award and Req. for Hearing p. 18). Additionally, Paragraph 4.1 of the License 
Agreement imposes royalties only on products containing D-Search as it provides for royalties 
only on the "Net Sales" of "Licensed Products" and ^Licensed Processes/ The court rejects 
Plaintiffs first claim. 
Under the License Agreement - Paragraph 3 .1 , - SoftSolutions shall, during the term of 
this agreement, use its best efforts to bring one or more Licensed Products or Licensed Processes 
to the market through a thorough, vigorous and diligent program designed to commercially 
develop the LICENSED TECHNOLOGY to its full market potential/ Judge Rokich concluded 
that 'SoftSolutions did not need to replace the technology of D-Search: therefore, SoftSolutions 
could not avoid royalty payments by using a substitute search engine. (Compl. Ex A 7.) Given 
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an express contractual duty14 to use D-Search under the Exclusive License Agreement and a 
finding that SoftSolutions did not need to replace D-Search, an award of royalties on sales which 
should have contained D-Search is not irrational and is derived in a logical way from the wording 
of the contract. Additionally, the court finds an award of royalties on sales after July, 1993 falls 
squarely within the questions submitted by both parties in the Joint Statement of Issues to be 
Arbitrated by Arbitrator Roidch. The questions submitted included a question as to the amount of 
royalties due BYU by SoftSolutions, Inc., and the arbitrator was specifically charged with 
determining whether the use of the intellectual property discontinued so that royalties stopped 
accruing. (Mot. to Conf. Arb. Award and in Opp. to SoftSolutions' Mot. to Vacate or in the Alt., 
to Mod. t i l ) (quoting Mem. Dec. of the Hon. John A. Rokich, Arb. of July 3, 1996, at 4, 5.) 
Plaintiffs sffiQDd claim here is that the License Agreement expressly excludes the sale of 
products "upgrades" from royalty calculations. Plaintiff interprets Paragraph 4.1 of the License 
Agreement to exclude "upgrades." According to Paragraph 4.1 "modifications to packaged 
package software" are not included in royalty calculations. However, the Court finds that it is not 
expressly clear that "modifications to packaged softwa^* means "upgrades." This issue was fully 
briefed and argued before die arbitrator. BYU argued thai the definition of "licensed technology," 
In its Arbitration Memorandum submitted to John A- Riidci, arbitrator prior to arbitration. BYU briefed a 
well established contract principle - where SoftSolutions held an ozhisxve license agreement for D-Searcx it was 
appropriate and equitable to recognize an obligation to exploit the echooiogy and do nothing to injure or interfere with 
BYLTs nghts to receive royalties for products developed and basec en D-Search. (Mot. to Conf. Arb. Aw*rd and in 
Opp'n. to SoftSolutions' Moc. to Vacate or in the Ak.? to Modin IA. E. p. 32, 33.) 
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paragraph 1.2 of the Exclusive License Agreement, the definition of "licensed products," 
paragraph 1.3, the definition of "net sales," paragraph 1.5, and paragraph 4.1 A, a definition of 
"earned" royalties stood for the proposition that upgrade sales were includable. (Mot. to Conf. 
Aib. Award and in Opp'n. to SoftSolutions' Mot. to Vacate or in the Alt., to Modify Ex. E. p. 
25.) Having authorized the arbitrator to give meaning to the language of the contract and absent 
plain language as to what is an upgrade for puiposes of royalties, this Court will not interfere with 
an award of royalties based on upgrade sales. 
Lastly, Plaintiff argues that royalties do not accrue on the sale of CLASS Conflicts of 
Interest product developed and sold by a separate licensee, Tremco Consultants, Inc. pursuant to 
a separate license agreement. The court disagrees. Defendant presented evidence at arbitration 
that the license agreement with Tremco Consultants, Inc. was actually part of a single license for 
which royalties were owed based on the licensing of exactly the same technology. The first 
(license agreement) was dated April 27, 1987 between Brigham Young University and Tremco 
Consultants Inc. which was signed by its president, Kenneth Duncan. One year later, an 
agreement dated May 2, 1988 was entered into between Brigham Young University and Tremco 
Consultants, Inc. dba SoftSolutions, and signed by its president, Kenneth Duncan. Finally, on 
June 1, 1990, an "Exclusive License Agreement Between Brigham Young University and 
SoftSolutions, Inc." was entered into and signed by its president Kenneth Duncan. Each of these 
agreements dealt with the same technology, D-Search. (Mot. to Conf. Arb. Award and in Opp'n. 
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to SoftSolutions' Mot. to Vacate or in the Alt., to Modify p. 26.) Additionally, BYU pointed out 
that in the last agreement, under the recital paragraph C, it states that "SoftSolutions has held, for 
several years, a non-exclusive license to the database indexing retrieval system described herein." 
(Mot. to Conf. Arb. Award and in Opp'n. to SoftSolutions' Mot. to Vacate or in the Alt., to 
Modify p. 26.) Recital paragraph C implies Tremco Consultants, Inc. is not a separate licensee 
possessing a separate license. The court recognizes that the License Agreement is not patently 
clear on this issue as Paragraph 2.5 of the License Agreement states that UBYU has previously 
issued D-Search licenses to the following companies: Creative Index, Inc., ECHO Solutions, Inc. 
. . . Tremco, Inc." This implies a separate license with a separate licensee. However, the 
arbitrator described this case as "arising as a result of a series of license agreements entered into 
between BYU and SoftSolutions," (Compl. Ex. A p. L), and awarded royalties based on the sales 
of CLASS. In the final analysis, having authorized the arbitrator to give meaning to the language 
of the contract and absent plain language as to Tremco, Inc. being a separate licensee under a 
separate license, this court will not interfere with an award of royalties based on sales of CLASS 
Conflicts of Interest product by Tremco Consultants, Inc. 
Whether the Arbitrator Improperly Waived other Critical Provisions of the License 
Agreement without having the Contractually Required Signed, Written Waiver. 
Plaintiffs claim here is that the arbitrator waved two specific provisions as contained in 
the License Agreement. The first provision is a one year limitation period on causes of action 
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arising out of the transaction subject of the License Agreement. The second provision is a three 
percent penalty for late payments. The relevant portions of the License Agreement are as follows: 
12.5 . . . No action, regardless of from, arising out of the transaction subject 
of this Agreement may be brought by either party more than one year after the 
cause of action is discovered. 
4.1 B A late payment penalty in the amount equal to three percent (3%) of any 
payment if the payment is made more than thirty (30) days late. ... 
20.6 . . .No modification or claimed waiver of any of the provisions of this 
Agreement shall be valid unless in writing and signed by authorized representatives 
of the party against whom such modification or waive [is] sought to be enforced. 
BYU brought its arbitration action on February 4, 1994. (Mot. to Conf. Arb. Award and 
in Opp'n. to SoftSolutions' Mot. to Vacate or in the Alt., to Modify Ex. B 1 3.) Plaintiff claims 
that royalties which accrued prior to February, 1993 should be barred by paragraph 12.5 of the 
License Agreement as arbitration was not brought until February 4, 1994. The limitation provision 
question (paragraph 12.5 of the License Agreement) was submitted by both parties to the arbitrator 
for decision. Specifically, the arbitrator was charged to determine whether BYU's claims for 
royalties were barred by a contractual limitation period. (Comp. Ex. C p. 4). Hence, the first test 
in Buzas is met. The arbitrator in his Memorandum Decision stated, "the contractual limitation 
period was waived by BYU and SoftSolutions because of their ongoing negotiations to resolve the 
written complaints raised by SoftSolutions." (Comp. Ex. C p.5). The court recognizes the standard 
set forth in Buzas is that the arbitrator cannot add to, subtract from or modify any terms of the 
License Agreement. In this case, however, the arbitrator found that the parties (BYU and 
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SoftSolutions) themselves by their own conduct modified/waved the License Agreement, and this 
court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the arbitrator. The court does not read Buzas 
to hold that if the parties themselves modify the License Agreement by their conduct, the 
arbitrator must ignore such conduct in favor of express contractual language. Additionally, by the 
language of Buzas it would not be irrational or inconsistent with the wording of the License 
Agreement for the arbitrator to conclude/interpret that paragraph 20.6 is capable of being modified 
by the parties themselves. The arbitrator is charged with interpreting the contract, and it was not 
irrational or inconsistent with the License Agreement as modified by the conduct of the parties to 
find that the limitation period had been waived by BYU and SoftSolutions. 
Plaintiffs claim that the arbitrator exceeded powers granted to him by waiving a three 
percent penalty for late payments (paragraph 4.1 of the License Agreement) is similarly invalid. 
The court finds both prongs of the Buzas test met here. First, the arbitrator was charged with 
detennining what amount of royalties are due BYU and what defenses or offsets exist which 
reduce or relieve any obligation for royalties by SoftSolutions. (Compl. Ex. C. p. 4). A 
determination as to penalties and interest due BYU fits within the issues to be arbitrated. 
Finally, the arbitrator concluded that "As a result of negotiations that took place regarding 
complaints made by SoftSolutions and attempts to resolve the problems, SoftSolutions' 
conduct did not warrant the imposition of penalties." (Compl. Ex. C. p.8). It would not be 
irrational or inconsistent with the License Agreement as modified by the conduct of the parties to 
-30-
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find that late payment penalties could not be collected by BYU given: 1. SoftSolutions' good faith 
disputes with BYU arising out of the License Agreement15 or 2. a waiver of the late payment 
provision by the parties. 
It would not be irrational or inconsistent with the License agreement for the arbitrator to conclude thai good 
faith negotiations between BYU and SoftSolutions as to the amount of royalties owed, given SoftSolutions' complents 
and infringement claims, did not result m a payment default or warrant imposiuon of penalties under the Licence 
Agreement. 
- 3 1 -
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Ruling on Plaintiffs Motion to Modify Arbitration Award 
Plaintiff cites §78-31a-15(l)(b) as its only statutory basis for Modifying the Arbitration 
Award claiming "that the arbitrator's award is based on a matter not submitted to him/ Plaintiff 
claims the following parts of the award must be modified: (1.) Royalties levied on sales made after 
the License Agreement terminated; (2.) Royalties levied on sales after July 24, 1993 when 
DSearch was removed from SoftSolutions' products; (3.) Royalties levied on sales of upgrades; 
(4). Royalties levied on sales of Tremco products; and (5). Royalties levied pre-February 1993 
barred by the contractual limitations period. Having previously examined each of these claims 
as brought under Plaintiffs motion to vacate arbitration award and found the arbitration award 
to be based on matters submitted by both parties for decision, it follows that no asserted statutory 
basis exists to modify the arbitration award. 
- JZ -
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Killing on Attorney's Fees 
Defendant requests attorney's fees in defending Plaintiffs motion to vacate or modify 
arbitiatioa award. Paragraph 7.2 of the License Agreement provides in part: "SoftSolutions shall 
also pay all reasonable collection costs at any time incurred by BYU in obtaining payment of past 
amounts due, including court costs, expenses associated with litigation, and reasonable attorneys 
fees, whether or not any suit was comnaenced by BYU." (Comp. Ex A. p. 8). Thus, the parties 
themselves have expressly contracted for an award of attorneys fees associated with collection of 
past amounts due under the License Agreement. Defendant BYU's Cross-Motion to Confirm 
Arbitration Award is an attempt to collect past amounts due, as determined through arbitration, 
under the License Agreement. Additionally, Utah Code Ann. §78-31a-16 provides: 
Costs incurred incident to any motion authorized by this chapter, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee, unless precluded by the arbitration agreement, may be 
awarded by the court. 
" . . . the fact that the Utah Arbitration Act explicitly provides for an award of attorneys 
fees suggests that our policies favor enforceability of arbitration awards and discourages re-
litigation of valid awards even more strongly than the federal act [Federal Arbitration Act], which 
does not provide for attorneys fees." Bn^as at 953. 
Given the License Agreement wttich provides for attorneys fees and the Utah Arbitration 
Act which permits an award of reasonable attorney's fees, the coun finds an award of attorneys 
-33-
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fees to BYU in defending this action to be reasonable under the circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing analysis, Plaintiff SoftSolutions' Motion to Vacate or Modify 
Arbitration Award is respectfully denied. Accordingly, Defendant BYU's Cross-Motion to 
Confirm Arbitration Award and request for attorney fees is granted. Counsel for Defendant BYU 
is to submit an appropriate affidavit of attorneys fees; and Pursuant to Rule 4-504, Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration, counsel for Defendant BYU is to prepare, within 15 days hereof, an 
Order consistent with the foregoing Ruling and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to 
form prior to final submission to the court for signature. 
Dated at Provo, Utah this/^Tday of February, 1998. 
5^v, 
)URT: 
•§v \ 7 i ^ ^ ^ ? * > i § ) 9 e d D . Howard 
^ \ ^ ^ k ^ f t t t K « & f t Judge 
N £ ^ Q / S T comity 
/ 
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I hereby certify tax a true and correct copy of tie foregoing was mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this ''-— day of ,1998: 
Earl Jay Peck (2562) 
David B. Hartvigsen (5390) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1100 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah S4111 
Telephone: (801)532-1900 
Eugene H. Bramhall (0427) 
David B. Thomas (3228) 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Brigham Young University 
A-350 ASB Provo, UT 84602 







HERSCHEL J. SAPERSTEIN (A2861) 
STEVEN W. CALL, (A5260) 
MICHAEL D. MAYFIELD (A8237) 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)532-1500 
Attorneys for Brigham Young University 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY, a non-
profit entity, 
Judgment Creditor and Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SOFTSOLUTIONS, INC. a dissolved entity, 
Judgment debtor, and 
TREMCO CONSULTANTS, INC., a/k/a 
Tremco Legal Solutions, Inc., a Utah 




AND PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Consolidated Case No. 960400497 
Hon. Fred D. Howard 
Brigham Young University ("BYU"), the judgment creditor and plaintiff in the above-
captioned action, by and through its counsel of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, hereby moves the 
Court pursuant to the Utah Declaratory Relief Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-2 et seq. to interpret 
* * « i • • • « • % * • « « 
certain terms of a 1994 written Agreement made between defendant Tremco and Soft Solutions 
Technology Inc. (hereinafter "STC") which terms are specifically identified below. BYU also 
moves the Court pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to make and enter an 
order of partial summary judgment on each of the legal issues set forth below. 
DECLARATORY RELIEF 
Pursuant to the Utah Declaratory Relief Act, BYU respectfully prays the Court to declare 
the following rights and obligations of the parties with respect to the following two issues in 
connection with the written agreement made between Tremco and STC, a complete copy of 
which is attached as BYU's Exhibit F. 
ISSUE # 1. That the following terms are unambiguous in providing that Tremco had 
been participating in the litigation concerning the license agreements with BYU pertaining to the 
Dsearch algorhythm. 
A. Prior to the date hereof, certain disputes have arisen with respect to 
claims by Brigham Young University ("BYU") as to royalties claimed owing 
under license arrangements regarding the Dsearch algorhythm. 
B. Tremco has been involved in defending that action and has, itself, 
asserted various claims against BYU as offsets or absolute defenses. 
C. The parties hereto desire to clarify the respective responsibilities of 
the companies with respect to the BYU claims. 
(1994 Tremco Agreement, fl|[ A-C). 
BYU's motion for declaratory relief on issue number 1 is brought because if the Court 
determines that the foregoing terms unambiguously provide that Tremco had been involved in 
"> 
defending and asserting claims in the dispute with BYU relating to the license agreements 
pertaining to the Dsearch Algorhythm, then Tremco is bound by the final judgment heretofore 
made and entered by this Court. 
ISSUE # 2. That as between BYU and Tremco, Tremco agreed to be responsible for 
any indebtedness owing to BYU arising from the prior license agreements pertaining to the 
Dsearch Algorhythm, based upon recitals A, B & C (above), and the following additional terms 
of the same agreement: 
1. Tremco consents and acknowledges that Tremco is the responsible party 
with respect to the BYU claims and is solely responsible for the defense and pursuit of 
claims with respect to that matter. In conjunction therewith, Tremco shall assume all 
costs and expenses of every nature, including legal costs and expenses with respect to the 
current disputes with BYU and shall indemnify and hold SoftSolutions harmless from 
any and all claims, damages or liabilities or any nature, including but not limited to costs 
and attorneys fees, stemming from or in connection with, BYU's claims with respect to 
the DSearch algorhythm. 
2. SoftSolutions agrees reasonably to cooperate with Tremco to provide 
information and to make reasonably available for interview and assistance employees and 
personnel having knowledge or information in this regard. 
(1994 Tremco Agreement, fflf 1-2). 
BYU's motion for declaratory relief under issue number 2 is brought because if the Court 
determines that Tremco agreed to be responsible for the indebtedness owing to BYU under the 
license agreements referred to therein, BYU would have the rights of an intended third-party 
beneficiary against Tremco under the foregoing Agreement. 
J 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT RELIEF 
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56, BYU respectfully prays the Court to make 
the following orders of summary or partial summary judgment: 
1. An order of partial summary judgment, to the extent necessary in 
connection with the foregoing declaratory relief, that Tremco was a privy to the earlier 
litigation held before this Court, and that it is therefore bound by the final judgment of 
this Court. 
2. An order of summary judgment, to the extent necessary in connection with 
the foregoing declaratory relief, that BYU is a third-party creditor beneficiary under the 
terms of the 1994 Agreement. 
3. An order of partial summary judgment that the distribution of sale 
proceeds from S.T.C. to its shareholders constituted a distribution of assets before the 
payment of BYU's claims, and therefore the shareholders who received those sale 
proceeds are liable to BYU to the extent of the value of the proceeds received pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §16-10a-1408. 
4. An order of partial summary judgment that the final judgment heretofore 
made by the Court is binding as to all of the joint property in which the judgment debtor 
had an interest, or the proceeds therefrom, pursuant to Rule 17(d) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
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5. An order of partial summary judgment that the assignment of the license 
agreement from S.I. to S.T.C. (together with the goodwill associated therewith) without 
any value given to S.I. in exchange therefor, constituted a transfer in fraud of creditors 
which entitles BYU to an order allowing it to execute upon the sale proceeds received by 
any of the shareholders of S.T.C. who had notice of BYU's claims before the receipt of 
such sale proceeds from WordPerfect, with the issue of such notice to be addressed by the 
Court in the garnishment proceedings to be held before the Court at the time of levy. 
6. An order for such additional declaratory or summary judgment relief as 
the Court deems just and proper in the premises. 
The foregoing summary judgment relief is sought because the undisputed facts set forth 
in the record before this Court establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the 
relief sought. 
The foregoing motions are supported by the following documents, pleadings and exhibits: 
The published decision made by the Utah Supreme Court in this case (Exhibit A); the 1987, 1988 
and 1989 licensing agreements (Exhibits B,C & D); this Court's Ruling on BYU's Motion to 
Confirm Arbitration Award and Plaintiffs Motion to Vacate or Modify Arbitration Award 
(Exhibit E); Tremco's 1994 Assumption Agreement (Exhibit F); public records from the 
Department of Commerce (Exhibits H & I); the memorandum decision by the Private 
Arbitration Panel (Exhibit J); the final judgment made by this Court; and the memorandum of 
points and authorities filed concurrently herewith. 
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Consolidated Case No. 960400497 
Motions for Declaratory Relief and 
Partial Summary Judgment 
DATED this # day of October, 2000. 
RAY, QUINNE Y & NEBEKER 
Herschel J. Saperstein 
Steven W. Call 
Michael D. Mayfield 
Attorneys for Brigham Young University 
557534 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR 
ORDER OF DECLARATORY RELIEF was hand delivered to the following on this / / day 
of October, 2000: 
Sam Gaufin 
BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC & SAVAGA 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
/xt*^^ ^T&^y 
557534 
HERSCHEL J. SAPERSTEIN (2861) 
STEVEN W. CALL (5260) 
MICHAEL D. MAYFIELD (8237) 
RAY, QUTNNEY & NEBEKER 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
Facsimile: (801) 532-7543 
Attorneys for Brigham Young University 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY, a non 
profit entity, 
I AFFIDAVIT OF 
Judgment Creditor and Plaintiff, STEVEN W. CALL 
vs. 
SOFTSOLUTIONS, INC., a dissolved entity, 
Judgment Debtor, and Consolidated Case No. 960400497 
TREMCO CONSULTANTS, INC., a/k/a 
Tremco Legal Solutions, Inc., a Utah 
Corporation, and JOHN DOES 1-10, Hon. Lynn W. Davis 
Judament Debtor and Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF UTAH) 
I. Steven W. Call, being first duly sworn, hereby state under oath as follows: 
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Peck and Mr. Hartvigsen at Nielsen & Senior. A true and correct copy of the certificate is 
attached as Exhibit D. 
15. After the action against Tremco was commenced and the motion to consolidate 
and supporting memorandum were served, I had a telephone conversation with Earl J. Peck 
concerning the case. 
16. During our telephone conversation, Mr. Peck informed me that Nielsen & Senior 
would no longer be involved in the litigation against BYU. While he did not disclose to me the 
exact reason, he indicated to me that because of a change of events, Nielsen & Senior was not 
going to be involved other matters adverse to BYU. 
17. During that same conversation, Mr. Peck represented to me that the law firm of 
Berrnan, Gaufin, Tomsic, Savage & Campbell (hereinafter the "Berman-Gaufin Firm") would be 
handling the dispute with BYU. I specifically asked Mr. Peck if he wanted us to serve him with 
future pleadings in the case. He responded that no further service should be made upon him. 
18. In harmony with the representations made to me by Mr. Peck, no written response 
of any kind was filed by Nielsen & Senior to BYU's motion to consolidate which I had caused to 
be hand-delivered to Mr. Peck at Nielsen and Senior. 
19. Instead, a memorandum in opposition to the motion to consolidate was prepared 
and filed by the Berman-Gaufin Firm. 
20. The foregoing response by the Berman-Gaufin Firm was in harmony with the 
representation which had been made to me by Mr. Peck concerning his firm's decision not to be 
involved any longer with the ongoing proceedings in the case. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, 
COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
Deposition of: 
KENNETH W. DUNCAN 
Date: June 3, 2003 
Civil No. 960400497 
Judge Gary D. Stott 
BRIGHAM YOUNG 










INC., a/k/a Tremco 
Legal Solutions, Inc., 
a Utah corporation, 
and JOHN DOES.1-10, 
Judgment Debtor 
and Defendants. 
Deposition of KENNETH W. DUNCAN, taken by 
the Judgment Creditor and Plaintiff, at Fourth 
District Court, 125 North 100 West, Room 409, Provo, 
Utah, commencing on June 3, 2003, before KAPRICE GUNN, 
a Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public 
within and for the State of Utah, pursuant to Notice. 
IREPORTING SERVICES, INC. 
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A. NetDocuments. 
Q. Where are they located? 
A. 625 South State Street in Orem. 
Q. Were you an officer of SoftSolutions, Inc., 
at any time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When did you first become involved with 
SoftSolutions, Inc.? 
A. 1988. 
Q. What was your involvement? 
A. President. 
Q. What did you — 
A. I should clarify that SoftSolutions, Inc., 
was first incorporated as Kal, K-a-1, Inc., in 1988. 
And in 1989, it changed its name to SoftSolutions, 
Inc . 
Q. Did you remain the president of that entity 
through its duration? 
A. I did until it was involuntarily dissolved. 
Q. Why was the entity involuntarily dissolved? 
A. Because it was set up in order to hold 
intellectual properties, such as licenses, software 
code, patents, et cetera. At the same time we sen 
that up, we also ser up an operating and marketing 
company called SoftSolutions Marketing, Inc. 
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1 We had been advised by legal counsel to hold 
2 our assets in one entity and to have another entity to 
3 do the operations and the marketing. Ir. became 
4 unwieldy for us to manage two entities, and so we 
5 decided that we would do everything in SoftSolutions 
6 Marketing, Inc. 
7 Q. Okay. 
8 A. We didn't have a need for SoftSolutions, 
9 Inc. 
10 Q. And with that decision, what transpired then 
11 with respect to the licenses and other assets that 
12 were held by the SoftSolutions entity? 
13 A. In 1989 — the Tremco license for DSearch 
14 was executed in 1988, was assigned to SoftSolutions, 
15 Inc. Shortly thereafter, when we decided that we 
16 didn't want to manage two corporations, SoftSolutions, 
17 Inc., assigned that DSearch license agreement in 1988 
18 and another one in 1990 to SoftSolutions Marketing, 
19 Inc. 
20 Q. Okay. Who handled the -- when the decision 
21 was made that you would operate only under the 
22 SoftSolutions Marketing entity, was that a decision 
23 that was made by you and the other officers at the 
24 entity? 
25 A. Correct. 
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MR. NIELSEN: I'll object to the question in 
that it's not within the court's order and the 
parameters of the protective -- excuse me, the 
supplemental order and also not within the court's 
order today. 
Q. (BY MR. CALL) Were there other assets of 
SoftSolutions at that time that you were aware of? 
A. No other assets. 
Q. Were there any other assets of SoftSolutions 
Marketing at that time? 
A. No. 
Q. So the primary assets of those entities were 
those licensing rights and so forth, as you've 
testified? 
A. They were assigned to that entity. And we 
did not pay anything for the DSearch license. 








-- of at either of those entities? 
No. 
What became of SoftSolutions Marketing? 
I don't think I need to answer the question, 
(Discussion held off the record between 
Mr. Nielsen and nhe witness.) 
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Q. And how did it acquire that software? 
A. That became its primary asset. 
Q. Was that the same software that had been 
with SoftSolutions, Inc. 
A. SoftSolutions, Inc. -- that's the same 
software that SoftSolutions, Inc., was having 
developed. 
Q. Other than that software, what other assets 
did SoftSolutions Technology — or SoftSolutions 
Marketing have? 
A. None that I'm aware of. 
Q. How long did SoftSolutions Marketing operate 
as a business until it was sold? 
A. 1989 is when it was incorporated as a wholly 
owned subsidiary of SoftSolutions, Inc. 1994 is when 
it was sold as SoftSolutions Technology Corporation to 
WordPerfect. 
Q. Okay. So originally when SoftSolutions 
Marketing was organized, it was a wholly owned 
subsidiary of SoftSolutions, Inc.; is that correct? 
A. That's my understanding. 
Q. And did that ever change? 
A. I don't understand the question. 
Q. Did that ownership relationship ever change 
between those two companies? 
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1 A. I don't know what happens when a wholly 
2 owned subsidiary's parent is involuntarily dissolved. 
3 That's the way I have to answer that question. 
4 Q. Okay. So you're not certain what 
5 transpired? 
6 A. No, I didn't say that. I know that its 
7 parent company was involuntarily dissolved in 1992. 
8 Q. Okay. So in 1993, who commenced the first 
9 negotiations with WordPerfect about the sale of 
10 SoftSolutions Marketing to WordPerfect? 
11 A. I did. 
12 Q. Who did you speak with? 
13 A. Let me correct something. It was not 
14 SoftSolutions Marketing. It was SoftSolutions 
15 Technology Corporation. 
16 Q. Okay. 
17 A. Just remember, there was SoftSolutions 
18 Marketing, Inc. It changed its name for marketing 
19 purposes, PerfectSolution Corporation. It changed its 
20 name, because of an injunction on a trademark, to 
21 Sof^Solutions Technology Corporation. 
22 Q. Right. 
23 A. And that's the company we sold to 
24 WordPerfect. 
Q. Exactly. And wirh resoect tc that sale to 
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WordPerfect, who handled those transactions? 
A. Negotiations --
Q. Yeah. 
A. -- or transactions? 
Q. The negotiations. 
A. I was involved in those, and I think I 
stated earlier, Alvin and Lee would have been involved 
to a lesser degree. 
Q. And who at WordPerfect did you negotiate 
with? 
A. Primarily Duff Thompson and also an 
accounting guy. I can't -- his name slips my mind, 
sorry. 
Q. Where did the negotiations occur? 
A. The first meeting occurred in the -- at the 
WordPerfect offices. 
Q. Who was present at that meeting? 
A. Alan Ashton. This is my best recollection, 
okay? 
Q. Okay. 
A. Alan Ashton; Duff Thompson; a marketing guy 
named Mark; the CTO, whose name was David -- I can't 
recall his last name right now -- and the controller, 
who's the person whose name I can't recall right now. 
Q. What did you discuss during that meeting? 
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1 A. I guess what you would normally discuss on 
2 negotiating the potential sale of a company. 
3 Q. What negotiations transpired with respect to 
4 the amount of purchase price that would be paid by 
5 WordPerfect? 
6 A. Purchase price discussions may have started 
7 in that meeting, they may not have. I'm not sure. 
8 But they would have been discussed over a series of 
9 different meetings. Do you want to know --
10 Q. Sure. 
11 A. Would you ask the question again. 
12 Q. Just explain that for me. 
13 A. No, what was your question? 
14 Q. The question is: What was discussed, then, 
15 during the first — 
16 A. In the first meeting? 
17 Q. — two or three meetings that were had with 
18 WordPerfect? 
19 A. My recollection is that it was predominantly 
20 I technology and how our document management might 
21 | complement their suite of desktop applications. 
Q. So you discussed the software? 
A. Primarily the software, the technology, 
respective technology. And by the way, Alvin 
25 iTedjamulia, Z believe, was also in thai meeting. 
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1 And we also discussed marketing, potential 
2 joint marketing opportunities, and what WordPerfect 
3 would do if they owned SoftSolutions Technology 
4 Corporation. 
5 Q. What transpired after that, when it was --
6 at what point was there some sort of arrangement or 
7 agreement or understanding that there would be a sale 
8 of SoftSolutions Technology to WordPerfect? 
9 A. At what time? 
10 Q. Yeah, when did that -- where were you when 
11 there was first a discussion as to price and that 
12 there would likely be a sale? 
13 A. My best recollection would be that perhaps 
14 in January of !94 -- or it could have been late in T93 
15 that we were discussing price. 
16 Q. Who were you negotiating price with at 
17 WordPerfect? 
18 A. Primarily Duff Thompson and the controller. 
19 Q. Did you have counsel present in those 
20 negotiations? 
21 A. No. 
Q. What was the final price that was agreed 
upon between you-all and WordPerfect for the sale of 
24 I SoftSolutions Technology? 
25 I MR. NIELSEN: I'll object to than. It 
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1 limited partnerships to LLC, they obviously maintained 
2 their ownership. 
3 Q. (BY MR. CALL) Okay. And what I!m trying to 
4 understand is that you testified that SoftSolutions 
5 Technology in its prior -- under its prior name was a 
6 wholly owned subsidiary of SoftSolutions, Inc. 
7 A. That's my understanding. 
8 Q. Right. And what Ifm asking is: How did KWD 
9 receive its interest in that subsidiary? 
10 A. When it was organized, it was KWD, AST and 
11 Julee that were the organizing owners of that 
12 corporation. 
13 Q. So there was some assignment, was there, 
14 from the dissolved parent to KWD? 
15 A. Assignment of what? 
16 Q. It was my understanding from your testimony 
17 that the parent company was dissolved involuntarily, 
18 SoftSolutions, Inc.; is that correct? 
19 A. In 1992, over a period of three, four years. 
20 Q. That's right. And my question is: After 
21 that dissolution, how did KWD receive its interest in 
22 that wholly owned subsidiary, SoftSolutions 
23 Technology? 
24 MR. PECK: ITm going to object and see if I 
25 can't help with the communication. I think that 
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1 Mr. Duncan is assuming that a parent corporation is 
2 one thing, and I think you're understanding, which is 
3 I believe correct, that a parent corporation owns the 
4 stock of the company. And I!m not sure that he's ever 
5 understood -- as you've gone down through and talked 
6 about parent corporation, I'm not sure that he 
7 understands that you mean that the parent owns the 
8 stock of the subsidiary. 
9 THE WITNESS: But even if the parent owned 
10 the stock, the parent stock was owned by KWD, AST --
11 Q. (BY MR. CALL) Right. And that's my 
12 question. That's what I'm trying to get to. It was 
13 my understanding, Mr. Duncan, from your testimony that 
14 the parent company, SoftSolutions, Inc., was owned, at 
15 least its — during its entire existence, you've 
16 testified, was owned by a limited partnership, KWD, 
17 AST -- generally, KWD, a limited partnership; AST, a 
18 limited partnership; and Julee, a limited partnership; 
19 isn't that correct? 
20 A. That's correct. 
21 Q. And you testified that that entity, 
22 SoftSolutions, Inc., had a wholly owned subsidiary 
23 entitled SoftSolutions Marketing? 
24 A, I thought it was organized as wholly owned 
25 subsidiary. Maybe I'm incorrect. 
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Devomax Reporting Services, Inc. 
1 A. It's a check from WordPerfect Corporation to 
2 KWD Associates, LC. 
3 Q. Okay. Was that check given to you? 
4 A.. It was given to me as a managing member of 
5 KWD Associates, LC. 
6 Q. Okay. And was it given to you on or about 
7 July 27, 1994? 
8 A. I don't have a recollection, but I would 
9 assume so based on the date of the check. 
10 Q. And would you look at the second page there? 
11 A. Uh-huh. 
12 Q. I'll indicate to you that it -- this is a 
13 photocopy of a check drawn on WordPerfect 
14 Corporation -- or made by WordPerfect Corporation, 
15 Check No. 271904, in the amount of $2,800,000. Have 
16 you seen — did you see the original check, that 
17 original check? 
18 I A. I'm sure I did. This is when WordPerfect, 
for their own reasons, determined that they wanted to 
waive their milestone — their installment payments, 
and so they approached me and asked if they could pay 
everything off. TharTs whar it looks ro me like, is 
the second check. 
Q. Could it be the other way around perhaps, 
because the second check is dared January of '94 and 
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-~ n^rs^.,— ±ncr Services , Inc. 
1 the first check is dated July of '94? 
2 A. Then logically it could have been the other 
3 way around. 
4 Q. So the $2.8 million in the second check 
5 that's dated January 21, 1994, would that have been 
6 the down payment made for the $17 million purchase 
7 price? 
8 A. I don't know. I would have assumed that the 
9 down payment would have been more than the balance, 
10 but perhaps if it were in three payments, you can see 
11 that maybe that was a third and then .there were a 
12 third and a third. So I don't recall. 
13 Q. Okay. Did KWD receive both of these checks? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. And where did they deposit these checks? 
16 J A. Either in Fidelity or Merrill Lynch, I do 
not recall. 
Q. Fidelity --
A. My best understanding is that that's where 
that would have occurred. My wife handles those kinds 
of matters, so you would have to inquire of her. 
Q. What position did your wife have with KWD? 
A. She has no position with KWD. 
Q. But she handled the checks for that entity? 










R. SUPP. 7i 

























IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT - PROVO COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SOFTSOLUTIONS, INC. , 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 





Judge Gary D. Stott 
BE IT REMEMBERED that this matter came on for hearing 
before the above-named court on June 3, 2003. 
WHEREUPON, the parties appearing and represented by 
counsel, the following proceedings were held: 
CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT 
(From Electronic Recording) 
©#Y 
R. SUPP. 72 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, CSR - LIC. 22-102811-7801 
SALEM, UT 84653 



























before the Court and let's argue these motions and let's 
have them determined, and then if they've got a grounds or 
basis for proceedings with examination and supplemental 
proceedings at that point then that can go forward and 
proceed. And if we have remedies that we wish to seek 
before the appellate court with regard to the July 10th 
order, then we should be allowed at that point to do it. 
But it seems to me the Court would want to be fully informed 
before we resolve all of this. 
THE JUDGE: Well, it's probably a pretty good 
suggestion. So we're going to do this. We're going to set 
a date for a hearing on all of this stuff that you've given 
me. And I use that phrase purposefully, stuff, because I 
don't know what you've dropped off to the office, the 
courthouse last night at 4:00 o'clock. And then we'll see 
where your arguments go with respect to the relief that's 
been asked for in the material that you filed. 
Mr. Call needs an opportunity to respond to what's 
been filed. How long do you need, sir? 
MR. CALL: We'd like the standard 10 days plus 
three days for mailing, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Do you have the calendar there, Keri? 
How about June 16th? That's a Monday. 
MR. NIELSEN: For Mr. Call's response? 
THE JUDGE: Right. 





























THE CLERK: (Short inaudible, no mic). 
THE JUDGE: 21st? 22nd? 
THE CLERK: The 22nd. 
THE JUDGE: What's the 22nd of July like for 
everyone? 
MR. SCHNIBBE: It's fine for me, Your Honor. 
MR. NIELSEN: I will make it available. 
THE JUDGE: Mr. Call? 
MK. CALL: Yes. That's fine, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: On the 22nd of July we will have a 
hearing on all of the motions that are contemplated to be 
addressed. And counsel will provide by the 9th of July all 
motions that are to be discussed at the hearing on the 22nd. 
The hearing on the 22nd will be at 8:30 a.m.. 
Now, I am going to leave the two tables at your own 
initiative to decide who's going to put binders together and 
a few things. I don't need to tell you how to do that. 
Nobody told me before, and you can do it yourself. You don't 
need to have me intervene If you can't decide upon who 
wants to provide what, then this table could give me what you 
feel needs to be addressed and you can do the same, Mr. Call, 
and I'll take a look at it. Okay? 
Yes, Mr. Nielsen. 
MR. NIELSEN: When would Your Honor like to have 
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1 to make a correction of previous statements that you 
2 made in your prior examination. If you would tell us 
3 what correction you'd like to make, please. 
4 THE WITNESS: Yes, I would like to correct 
5 that SoftSolutions Marketing, Inc., which eventually 
6 of course became STC, was not a subsidiary of 
7 SoftSolutions, Inc. I was not equating stock 
8 ownership with the structure of a subsidiary. 
9 EXAMINATION 
















Q. Okay. Well, then, let's start out with that 
correction. Let me ask you, Mr. Duncan, since the 
last examination we had in this matter, tell me what 
information you have looked at that has changed your 
testimony on that issue. 
A. I ]ust knew in my mind -- I mean --
MR. SCHNIBBE: ejection to the extent that 
it calls for privilege, attorney-client privilege. 
Q. (BY MR. CALL) Okay. What I'm asking you to 
testify to is: What information have you looked at or 
gathered that has changed your testimony on that issue 
since your last examination? 
MR. SCHNIBBE. Same objection. 
THE WITNESS: My own mind. I knew it was 
not a subsidiary. I misspoke. Now I'm correcting it. 
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(BY MR. CALL) And why do you believe that 
imony today is more accurate than the 
that you gave earlier? 
Because I misspoke. 
Okay. But have you had some sort of --
No. 
-- refreshment of your memory --
No. 
-- through the review of some document of 
? 
No, I haven't reviewed any documents. I 
And it is not a subsidiary, never was, and 
the facts show that. 
Q. And again, you've come to that conclusion 
because you just through your own mental processes 
have reached that determination? 
A. As I reviewed what I had testified to, I 
realized that SMI and STC was not a subsidiary. 
Q. And what is your understanding, then, as to 
who is the owner of STC? 
A. The owner of STC, as I've stated before, is 
KWD Associates, LC; AST Associates, LC; Julee 
Associates, LC; and when the company was sold to 
WordPerfect Corporation, the LDS Church. 
Q. And had those entities, the ones you've iust 
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referred to, at all times have they been the only 
shareholders of STC? 
A. Correct. 
Q. There are no other persons who were ever 
prior shareholders of STC? 
A. No. 
Q. No other prior entities of any kind that 
were prior shareholders of STC? 
A. No. 
MR. NIELSEN: When you say "no other," you 
mean other than the KWD, AST and Julee? 
THE WITNESS: The ones I just mentioned. 
Q. (BY MR. CALL) Yeah. So you're absolutely 
clear on that, then, now? 
A. Absolutely clear. 
Q. That under no circumstance was there any 
entity prior to those entities that owned any interest 
in STC? 
A. That's correct. 
MR. NIELSEN: Are you including the limited 
partnerships or are you referring --
MR. CALL: Let's just go forward, and then 
you-all can ask him questions, I guess, on cross, if 
you'd like, or when I finish, because I'm kind of 
going to try to stick to our deadline if I can here. 
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Mr. Leavitt is not an attorney of record in this case. 
THE JUDGE: Well, we'll see what we see then. 
All right? 
By way of presentation who wants to begin? 
MR. SCHNIBBE: Your Honor, I believe we'll 
proceed however you, you would like to proceed, Your Honor. 
But I think it makes sense t o — 
THE JUDGE: They're yours. 
MR. SCHNIBBE: I'm sorry? 
THE JUDGE: The morning is really yours. 
MR. SCHNIBBE: Right. And so we begin, and I 
think it makes sense to start with the various motions 
dealing with the July 10th, 2002 order. And for the 
convenience of the Court we've met and feel it's appropriate 
that one party lead the arguments and then the other parties 
counsel say whatever maybe they missed, make it a little bit 
quicker for Your Honor, and then Mr. Call be entitled to 
respond to whatever is said. 
THE JUDGE: Hold on to that one just a second. 
Somebody is going to make the presentation in support of the 
motions and then somebody is going to come back and pick up 
what was missed? 
MR. SCHNIBBE: No, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: No, I don't think so. 
MR. SCHNIBBE: No. The point is that the movants 
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MR. SCHNIBBE: I'm sorry? 
THE JUDGE: For the supplemental proceeding? 
MR. SCHNIBBE: No. We're asking with regard to 
the July 10th order of last year. It is labeled as 
supplemental order, Your Honor, but it's not just an order to 
bring a witness into court and answer to assets. It's a 
substantive motion making these other third parties liable 
for, for the prior judgments against Tremco and 
Softsolutions, Inc. What its more akin to, Your Honor, is a 
grant of summary judgment on a complaint that's never been 
filed. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. You had something you wanted 
to say, Mr. Nielsen? 
ARGUMENT BY MR. NIELSEN 
MR. NIELSEN: I was going to say, Your Honor, I 
agree with Mr. Schnibbe in the, in the sense that the 
July 10th order is void, and it is not yet a final order 
because there are these post judgment motions that have been 
filed which, which prevents the order from becoming a final 
order. When these motions are disposed of by Your Honor 
then it will become a final order and it will become 
appealable separate and apart from the June 13th order, which 
is now on appeal to the, to the Supreme Court. But this 
July 10th order is not yet a final order, it is not yet 
appealable because of the post judgment motions which 
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preclude its being determined a final order until such time 
as these motions are either granted or denied. And at that 
time then if there needs to be an appeal then the appeal 
would, would go forward as a final order. 
But I agree with Mr. Schnibbe, that this order 
essentially is not a supplemental order in the sense that 
it's merely a supplemental proceeding to the July, to the 
June 13th order because this order in substance and effect 
and actuality enlarges the relief, increases the persons 
liable, increases the, the property, determines ownership and 
liability with regard to property. 
So, therefore, it is not just a supplemental 
order. And, therefore, Mr. Call's argument to the Court 
really does not apply. Mr. Call's argument is really based 
upon the basic disagreement as to what this order is and what 
it really does. 
THE JUDGE: Well, let's... For the purpose of 
our proceeding here this morning we're going to go ahead with 
the motions as they have been filed. So that's the 
process. 
MR. CALL: Your Honor, Mr. Leavitt is here now and 
we're happy to put that on the record if that's a convenient 
time. 
THE JUDGE: What is it you want to put on the 
record? 
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that needed to be changed, I changed it and in making the 
final change I put it on our caption, and I sent it over to 
his office and he approved it as to form. So the Tremco 
judgment was approved as to form by, by the attorneys and it 
was certified final under Rule 54(b) so that it could be 
appealed. 
At the same time there was no question that a 
separate order was going to be prepared, i.e. the 
certification. That's why it was certified. There were 
other, there were other matters, and the supplemental order 
was prepared to reflect the court's ruling that we could 
execute on these proceeds. And everything was done 
properly. 
These proposed orders were served. And I know 
Mr. Peck's, I've listened to his arguments about what we 
didn't know what was going, we, we never had any knowledge of 
this. But attached to the second affidavit that I filed 
with this court, and I have to say I was somewhat disturbed 
when I came upon these, but I've attached two exhibits, the 
one is a bill that was prepared by Nielsen and Senior, and 
the other is a letter that was sent to this court that copied 
Mr. Peck on, on these matters. 
Could I approach, Your Honor? 
THE JUDGE: Yes, sir. 
MR. CALL: What was interesting, Your Honor, is 
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that when the Tremco judgment was prepared as to form with 
Mr. Gaufin and myself it was submitted to Judge Howard for 
his signature. And in going through my file three weeks ago 
I came upon the fact that I actually received two letters, 
not one. And I looked and I thought why did I receive two 
letters. And I looked at the second letter at the bottom 
there and noticed that it had been copied to Earl Jay Peck 
and Neil Sabin and Nielsen and Senior. 
And then we went into some documents that we 
obtained through the execution sale and came upon a bill that 
was prepared by Mr. Peck's firm. And in the bill it appears 
that on August 11th, 2000, that David Hartvigsen... Now in 
the original litigation between Softsolutions and BYU, that 
was handled by Mr. Peck and Mr. Hartvigsen, and BYU used its 
own in-house counsel. 
In this litigation Mr. Duncan prepared a great big 
fat affidavit where he goes through and says I'm the 
president of Softsolutions, I'm the president of Tremco, I 
know everything about everything. Well, the letter from 
Nielsen and Senior, or the bill here reflects telephone, 
telephone Ken regarding Ned Boyd's (?) relationship with 
BYU. And then underneath it on August 11th, it says review 
reply from Sam Gaufin, calls with Ken Duncan concerning the 
same. And then later there's a bill for call with Ken 
Duncan concerning affidavit edits, etcetera. 
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There's no question, Your Honor, that they were, 
not only were they involved but they edited some of the 
pleadings that were filed with this court in what was, in 
what was proceeding before the court. 
If in fact Mr. Peck was not involved, then you have 
to ask yourself this question. Why was he copied on a 
proposed judgment that was to be entered against Tremco if he 
was solely counsel for Softsolutions, and why was it copied 
to both Earl, or Earl Jay Peck and also Neil Sabin. It just 
doesn't make any sense. He would have been copied on an 
order for just Softsolutions had he only been informed in 
that manner. 
Your Honor, the fact is that the agreement entered 
into between STC and Tremco states, I read from paragraph 
one: 
"Tremco consents and acknowledges that 
Tremco is the responsible party with 
respect to the BYU claims and is solely 
responsible for the defense and pursuit 
of claims with respect to that matter. 
In connection therewith Tremco shall 
assume all costs and expenses of every 
nature including legal costs and expenses 
with respect to the current dispute with 
BYU, and shall indemnify and hold 
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We'll be in recess for a few minutes and we'll see 
where we go. 
(Recess). 
COURT'S RULING 
THE JUDGE: All right. We're back on the record 
again. Counsel are present. As I indicated to you, 
gentlemen, I would return with respect to the ruling on the 
motion that's just been argued concerning the July 10th, 2000 
order of Judge Howard. 
As I indicated previously I have gone through the 
boxes of materials, the binders that have been provided by 
both sides in an effort to try to educate myself on the 
issues that you wanted to address here today, and then 
anticipated hearing from all sides as to your perspective 
concerning the written material that's been provided and 
the questions that needed to be resolved concerning the 
motions. 
Based upon all of that material and your 
discussions here today, the order with regard to the motion 
to vacate the July 10th, 2000 order of Judge Howard is as 
follows: 
With that ruling I will say, Mr. Call, you prepare 
the order. 
I find that there is, that there have been no due 
process violations by Judge Howard as to the July 10th, 2000 
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order. The motion to vacate is denied. EXHIBITS L and M 
will remain as received. 
That ruling is based upon the following findings 
and observations: 
I do not perceive that the order improperly expands 
the BYU judgment against Softsolutions, Inc. or the judgment 
against Tremco. From my perspective in reviewing all of the 
information and listening to your arguments it is this 
Court's finding and perspective that it only provided an 
opportunity for collection of the judgment from the proceeds 
of the sale that could properly be executed on by reason of 
the proper identity of the companies and individuals that 
received the proceeds of the sale to WordPerfect. 
I believe that Judge Howard's ruling and the 
observations he made in that ruling with respect to the 
support of his findings are proper and will remain the law of 
the case. 
It is also my perspective from all of the 
information provided and your discussions here today, 
gentlemen, that as to the collateral issue of Mr. Peck and 
the Berman firm, Mr. Berman, or Mr. Peck's participation 
terminated by way of his physical appearance and presence in 
dealing with the activities of the case once Berman's office 
took over. 
Now Mr. Peck argues gee, we should have followed 



























the rule, and if the rule had been followed all of the, all 
of the troubles that have been argued here today as to that 
limited issue would have been resolved and, therefore, we 
wouldn't have any discussion. 
I don't know what happened behind the scenes from 
Berman's office and from, with Mr. Peck. But to me it is 
distinctively clear that the agreement was reached between 
Berman's office and Peck that Berman's office would take over 
the active participation in the activity of the case. And 
that I used the phrase Mr. Peck stepped behind the curtain. 
Mr. Peck was no longer the front person, no longer the lawyer 
that was participating and being seen with respect to court 
appearances. But Mr. Berman's office was. And that was 
the arrangement that was reached. And Mr. Peck, from my 
perspective of everything that has been provided by way of 
documentation and argument here today, Mr. Peck was kept in 
the loop by way of information from Mr. Berman's office. 
I cannot buy Mr. Peck's proposition that 
Softsolutions just is entitled have its day, that he didn't 
know what was going on. It is, it is obviously clear to 
me that once the discussions were had between the lawyers as 
to Berman's participation beginning, that that in fact 
occurred by their involvement and their arguments before the 
court. 
I do not believe that Judge Howard's order and his 



























reliance upon 16-10a-204 was inappropriate. If one looks at 
the scheme of participation of entities and individuals in 
this case, it is my perception and my finding that the 
judgment which was affirmed on behalf of BYU, that the 
agreement for Tremco to step in and accept the position of 
responsibility with respect to that claim, and then the 
ultimate sale of the corporate assets of, of Softsolutions 
STC, Softsolutions Technology Corporation to WordPerfect, 
with the payment of those assets from WordPerfect then coming 
to the three entities governed and controlled by the three 
individuals of, of Alvin, Lee, and Ken Duncan, and the three 
companies that Mr. Nielsen represents of the KWD and the 
Julie Associates and the ASD, the finding of the, of the 
association and the identity of, of those organizations and 
individuals by Judge Howard in allowing the execution to take 
place on the proceeds of those sales, on the proceeds of the 
sale was a proper order. 
I do accept the notion and the argument that was 
made by Mr. Call, a simple observation if I can put it in 
that perspective, that, that if Brigham Young were to step in 
and begin executing on the judgment against cars or property 
or personal items of the Duncans or of the three companies 
without a demonstration that the money, that the monies used 
from the sale to WordPerfect were used to obtain that 
property, BYU would not be in a supportable position. They 



























can't do that. But they can with the, with the ruling of 
Judge Howard, which I believe was appropriate, execute 
against the proceeds of the sale to WordPerfect. 
Concerning the arguments made with respect to 
Tremco, I find it very difficult to support the proposition 
that Tremco isn't somehow responsible for the judgment that 
BYU obtained with respect to the Softsolutions case, and 
ultimately the judgment that was obtained against Tremco 
itself. That's on the appeal. That first judgment has 
already been affirmed by the Supreme Court and that's a 
matter of law. 
And from all of the information provided in all 
of the settings that is here today as well as documentation 
given to me, it is clear to me that there is a common 
involvement and common identity of persons and companies 
with respect to Softsolutions STC and Tremco. And with 
those findings by me I believe that Judge Howard's language 
in his order, that has been read into the record here and 
referred to by both sides, is appropriate and it will 
remain. 
All right. That's it. Prepare it, Mr. Call. 
Next, which one do you want to address, 
gentlemen? 
MR. NIELSEN: Your Honor, if the Court please. 
Commensorate with that I believe there are still some motions 
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for stay of execution and I don't— 
THE JUDGE: You've got a motion, you've got a 
motion by Tremco and Duncans and others for a stay on the 
enforcement and execution of the judgment. 
MR. NIELSEN: That's correct, Your Honor and— 
THE JUDGE: Until the resolution of the appeal. 
MR. NIELSEN: That's correct, Your Honor, and I 
would want to argue that if the Court would like to have that 
argued. But in view of the Court's ruling maybe the Court 
says don't waste my time, Mr. Nielsen. But I would like to 
have it clear on the record that the Court would deny that, 
or if the Court is willing to entertain a stay for the 
purposes of allowing the appeal, then I would like to discuss 
that with the Court. 
THE JUDGE: I'll make it clear on the record for 
you. As I previously indicated concerning the last issue 
that we addressed as to the July 10th matter, and all of the, 
all of the motions that were, were filed and counsel provided 
me material, I went through all of that information. 
Unless counsel has something new that you believe 
needs to be explained to me, material that was not included 
in all of the information that was contained in all of the 
binders, I am prepared to rule on that motion. 
And my ruling is that as to the motion by Tremco 
and Duncans and others for the stay on the enforcement of the 
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execution of the judgment until resolution of the appeal, 
that motion is denied. 
MR. NIELSEN: Okay. 
THE JUDGE: The reason for the denial is as 
follows: 
From all of that information provided it appears to 
me, gentlemen, that the, there has never been filed with this 
court a bond to stay the execution. A supersedeas bond has 
never been filed, anything else that would act or participate 
as a, as a containment to the execution has been filed. 
There has never been obtained an order from the appeal 
process that would stay that execution. And until one of 
those two things occurs the execution may proceed. 
As to the information that was argued in the 
material, in the written materials concerning Tremco's 
request for a hearing, I find that Tremco's request was not 
timely. 
The counsel in this room especially, knowing some 
of you before you walked in here and knowing all of you now 
as you've participated, all know that the filing of the 
appeal doesn't stay the execution of a judgment. 
If I can use Mr. Peck's line, I've always liked 
Jay's, and I'll use it in that context, I've always liked 
Jay's approach to things in life when it comes to arguing, 
Mr. Peck. And that is it's sort, it's sort of the approach 




























If you'll just moved to your left just a touch 
there, Mr. Nielsen. 
It's always been perceived by me if you just give 
me a chance, Judge, I think that I can convince you of my 
position that I've never quite had the opportunity to do. 
And that's not always a bad approach. And I've always 
respected Mr. Peck for a lot of years with regard to his 
evaluation of situations, as we have had limited exposure 
with each other. 
But taking that philosophy I have to say to you, 
fellows, if you just sort of look at the rule, if you want to 
have a stay of execution on a judgment while it's on appeal, 
then you need to comply. And the rule sort of says file 
your bond or get your order from the appeal process to avoid 
the execution on a judgment, and if you don't get it, be 
prepared on the execution because more often than not the 
person who's obtained the judgment is going to come after 
you. And you can't cry foul if you don't comply. 
That's sort of the simple approach to life, 
Mr. Nielsen. But that's where I see this argument with 
respect to that motion. 
To finish up my thought with regard to the 
timeliness issue. I don't believe that, that Tremco can step 
in now and to make the argument that things ought to be 



























stopped. The motion for the stay I think is moot as to, as 
to Tremco. The execution took place. Tremco didn't file 
the documents until after the fact. And I think that all 
things being considered with respect to what the rule 
requires with the stay of the execution, it hasn't been 
complied with, and until it's been complied with BYU can 
have at it in properly executing on the judgment. And that 
means if it's appropriate they can look to your folks, 
Mr. Nielsen. 
MR. NIELSEN: I understand that the Court has 
reached that ruling. If I may for clarity for the record, 
when the Court's referred to Tremco's request for hearing 
you're, the Court is referring to a separate execution 
against Tremco— 
THE JUDGE: Correct. 
MR. NIELSEN: — which was not necessarily the 
motion, motion for stay that we're talking about. 
THE JUDGE: That's right. 
MR. NIELSEN: And I wanted to make sure that that 
was clear. 
And I also wanted to make sure that it was clear 
that the court is, that we have indicated to the court that 
the, I believe the Rule 62 allows the court to, 
notwithstanding the lack of a bond, but the court may still 
issue a stay in the interests of justice, and that we would 
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proffer to the court the irreparable harm that the Duncans 
would suffer with regard to taking of their property when the 
court has lacked jurisdiction to do so. But also that, 
because the assets are— 
THE JUDGE: But I have found that there was not a 
lack of jurisdiction. 
MR. NIELSEN: I understand that, Your Honor. So 
for that purpose I make the record. 
But also that there are numerous assets that are 
highly encumbered and that by allowing execution on that the 
Duncans may suffer by the permanent loss of that, the real 
property and assets. And the court is, as I understand it, 
is ruling that notwithstanding all of that that it is 
declining to enter a stay in the interests, on that 
additional provision that does not require a bond. 
THE JUDGE: My ruling is that you are correct, 
that I can in the absence of the bond being filed on BYU's 
judgment, I can say all right, a stay may be entered. But 
I'm not going to make that finding. I am not going, I am 
not finding that the interests of justice weighs in favor of 
this court staying execution on the judgment pending the 
appeal. 
And I am finding, in spite of my aside and 
observations with respect to my comments that I made about 
Mr. Peck's arguments, I am finding that if there is a stay to 



























take place on the judgment, that will be in one of two 
forms. It will be by the filing of the appropriate bond as 
provided by the statute, or the appeals court, wherever it 
falls, will make that order. Okay? 
MR. NIELSEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: You're welcome. 
There was also a motion as to staying BYU's request 
for discovery. I perceived it to be a protective order as to 
BYU's continued participation of, to satisfy the judgment. 
That's been filed as well. Right, gentlemen? 
MR. NIELSEN: Your Honor, yes. With regard to 
that motion, that was the court's hearing that we had in 
June. That motion by the Duncans did go to stay, that we 
also asked the court to stay execution, but I understand 
the court has now ruled on that and so I would assume that 
the court would, has encompassed all of that within its 
ruling. 
THE JUDGE: That was just going to be my 
observation too. You correctly stated it, Mr. Nielsen. 
MR. NIELSEN: Sometimes it's hard to be correct. 
THE JUDGE: I've known that feeling for a lot of 
years. 
What else do you have to address? 
MR. HOGLE: Your Honor, Chris Hogel for Tremco. 
We have a motion to quash a subpoena on the nonparty Squires 
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Company (short inaudible, no mic). 
THE JUDGE: I'm prepared to rule on that as 
well. My ruling with respect to that is as follows: 
That motion is denied. I find from the, all of the 
information provided to me that there was never anything 
which properly allowed the instruction to the CPA not to 
appear and participate as the subpoena duces tecum required 
him to do. And that, that subpoena duces tecum will be 
honored, and that BYU has its right to examine him to 
determine what property, if any, or what information, if 
any, he can provide to them to properly satisfy the 
judgment. 
I don't like the notion of, of a unilateral 
decision being made by somebody to tell, given to a, given to 
an individual whose got a subpoena duces tecum on, been 
served on them to not appear and don't participate, unless 
you've got an agreement between counsel or you've got an 
order of the court that says you don't have to honor that 
subpoena duces tecum. 
In, in my opinion the proper procedure should have 
been if there was a problem or a concern, at least from my 
perspective as I've seen in the past, if I had a problem that 
way I had counsel and I'd get on the telephone with the judge 
and we'd talk about it for a few minutes to see if we can 
resolve that issue and keep the person from having to appear 
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on the subpoena duces tecum. Just in the same process as 
you're involved in discovery and you reach an impasse in 
answering questions in depositions that sometimes, and I only 
remember having to do it once in all of the 28 years I 
practiced law, getting on the telephone with a judge and 
saying we need your help to intervene here in answering 
questions or having somebody appear. 
And that should have been the procedure as opposed 
to some unilateral decision to say don't appear. So that 
subpoena will be honored. 
Anything else? Mr. Nielsen? 
MR. NIELSEN: Yes, Your Honor. I apologize for 
continuing to pop up but I — 
THE JUDGE: It's all right. No problem. 
MR. NIELSEN: Your Honor has before the court the 
motion to intervene. And the court has denied the 
substantive issues but I think that we need to clarify the 
court's ruling with respect to that. I'd be happy to 
address the Rule 24 and the right, intervention by right 
under (a) or by permission under (b) if the court desires to 
hear that. 
THE JUDGE: Yes, I want to hear argument on it. 
I'll hear you, I'll hear you both on the question. Briefly, 
gentlemen. 
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ARGUMENT BY MR. NIELSEN 
MR. NIELSEN: Your Honor, under Rule 24 
Mr. Duncan, Mr. Lee Duncan and Mr. Tedjamulia, AST Associates 
and the other limited liability companies file a motion to 
intervene in this case so that the court would be able to 
hear its motion to vacate, and also because the rights of 
the individuals under the, and the liabilities of the 
individuals as well as the liability companies to the 
property being discussed, which was the property of the 
limited liabilities, as well as the order which adjudicates 
the joint liability of Messrs. Duncan and Tedjamulia were, 
was issued by the court and, therefore, that these people who 
are not parties who were never made parties and never served, 
then ought to be allowed to intervene as a matter of right 
under Rule 24. 
The rule does require that there be a timely 
application, and that when the applicant claims an interest 
relating to the property or transaction which is the subject 
of the action. 
Now the, my clients do claim an interest in this 
property which the court has now indicated has been properly 
adjudicated, and so that they ought to be entitled to 
represent their interests with regard to that property. 
Their interests were not the same interests as the corporate 
defendants Tremco or Softsolutions, Inc. And they should be 
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entitled under a matter of right under (a) to intervene. 
The only issue that I can see that plaintiff has 
raised in opposition to this is claiming that they were 
in open court in May and so they should have known in May 
that the claims were being made against their individual 
assets or against the assets of the LLC. I don't know that 
that— 
THE JUDGE: Excuse me. I don't have anything 
before me that says that there's been a claim made against 
their individual assets. 
MR. NIELSEN: Your Honor, and I'm speaking with 
regard to the LLCs. 
The proceeds, we would maintain that the proceeds 
from the, the sale of the stock were individual assets, they 
were never titled in the name of Softsolutions, Inc., they 
were never titled in the name of Softsolutions as an 
unincorporated association, they were never titled in the 
name of Tremco. And so our position has been that they 
were, they were distributed to AST as a shareholder, KWD as a 
shareholder and Julie Associates as a shareholder for their 
shares. And so, therefore, they were their properties and 
they were not properties of the association. 
But in any event that's the, that was the gravamen 
of the motion on the merits and the court has denied the 
motion on the merits. But notwithstanding, there's no 
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question that the interests of these entities was a separate 
and distinct and different interest that was being asserted 
before Your Honor in the motion than where the interests 
of Tremco or Softsolutions. And so, therefore, under Rule 
24 that qualifies as, as an intervention as a matter of 
right. 
With regard to the timeliness issue, I submit to 
the court that counsel's continuing to refer or infer that 
they had some notice in May at the time of the hearing or 
April at the time of the hearing, and yes they did, maybe 
they did. But they certainly could not have jumped up in the 
middle of the hearing in front of Judge Howard and said wait 
Judge Howard, wait, that's mine, you can't do that. And so 
when the orders were then entered with regard to those and 
particularly with regard to the July 10th order, their motion 
was not at all untimely, it was not at all in delay, it was 
made expeditiously and in a timely manner for this court to 
be able to hear and rule upon the motions that were then 
before the court. 
So I submit to the court that under (a) as a matter 
of right they have the right to intervene. 
Under (2), the court should allow them permissive 
intervention. It's a much more lax requirement. Rule 24(b) 
says that: "Upon timely application anyone may be 
permitted to intervene in an action when 
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a statute confers a conditional right to 
intervene; or, 
(2) when an applicant's claim or defense 
in the main action have a question of law 
or fact in common.". 
And we've submitted to the court that that is what 
we have seen here today that our claim or defense at least 
has a common question of law and fact in common with both the 
plaintiff's claims as well as with the other, the named 
defendants and the judgment debtors. 
"In exercising its discretion the court 
shall consider whether the intervention 
will unduly delay or prejudice the 
adjudication of the rights of the 
original parties". 
In no way has a consideration of these motions 
today impeded or delayed or prejudiced the adjudication of 
any of the rights, the court has, having made its ruling it 
doesn't, it has not impeded the court's ruling at all. And 
in fact, I think the intervention has helped the court to be 
focused on what the court, what the court's position has 
been. 
But in any event the court should allow 
intervention either under (a) as a matter of right or under 
(b) as a matter of permission because of the common claims 



























and defenses that all the parties have had in this. 
THE JUDGE: Thank you. Mr. Call? 
ARGUMENT BY MR. CALL 
MR. CALL: I'm going to be very brief. 
The Rule 24 states with respect to intervention of 
right that it should be granted if the statute provides for 
it, there is no such statute, or in the interest of 
justice. Then at the last phrase of that it says quote: 
"Unless the applicant's interest is 
adequately represented by existing 
parties". End quote. 
I believe, Your Honor, that Tremco and 
Softsolutions has been handling the litigation, has 
adequately represented the interests of Mr. Nielsen's clients 
in connection with the sale proceeds. So I don't think that 
further intervention is needed so that he can come in and we 
can have an extra set of lawyers argue about those same 
issues. Mr. Duncan and Mr. Tedjamulia and Mr. Duncan have 
controlled all of the litigation, they have had an 
opportunity to raise any defenses that they choose through 
their present counsel. 
With respect to separate property that may in some 
writ of execution be picked up, the rules are clear that 
Mr. Nielsen's clients would be entitled to file a request for 
hearing at that time with respect to separate property. 
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So in conclusion, Your Honor, I don't think that 
the court should allow these three companies to intervene at 
this stage given that they basically have been controlling 
all of this litigation with respect to the sale proceeds. 
If Mr. Nielsen's clients, if they're served with a writ of 
execution and they, and they feel that there's some 
individual piece of property that's been attached they at 
that point in time can we request a hearing and we can 
address that with the court. I don't see any reason to 
have them intervene in this action at this point because 
there has been no execution on any such personal property, 
and it's BYU's intent not to execute on that personal 
property. 
So in conclusion, Your Honor, I think the rules 
will protect Mr. Nielsen's clients' interests with respect to 
individual property. 
And I would finally just cite that the Jenner case 
states that intervention generally should not be allowed 
after a judgment has been entered. Mr. Nielsen's clients 
have been fully aware of all of these proceedings. They 
waited until after the orders and judgments had been entered 
to come in and seek to intervene so we also think it's 
untimely. 
So for those reasons we would ask the court to deny 
the motion for intervention. Thank you. 
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ARGUMENT BY MR. NIELSEN 
MR. NIELSEN: If I may, Your Honor. 
First of all, the Jenner case does not say that 
it's inappropriate after judgment. It said that in that 
case the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to 
do so when the, this was the motion to intervene was not done 
until long after the judgment and long after the appeal had 
been pending with the court. 
I submit that the argument with regard to being 
adequately represented by the interests of the judgment 
debtors is inappropriate in the sense that counsel for 
Tremco at the hearing in which, before Judge Howard 
specifically said I don't represent these people and I don't 
represent their interests, and he told the court at that 
time. 
The statement that, that the individuals have 
always known what was going on in this case, the complaint in 
this case only alleges that there were, there were other 
unnamed parties who may be members of an association and we 
don't know who they are, we think they might be the Duncans 
but we're not making any allegation here that they were or 
they weren't. 
And so until you get to the hearing when the 
argument is made that, you know, we should, should pursue all 
of these assets in the hands of nonparties did this issue 
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really ever come up. 
And finally, counsel continues to point to the fact 
that Mr. Duncan and Mr. Tedjamulia have controlled this 
litigation. They have acted in this litigation as a 
director and an officer of Softsolutions, Inc. and in their 
position as director and officer of Tremco. And in those 
positions they acted. They didn't act out of personal 
interests but they acted in their position as officers and 
directors. And those two interests are distinctly different 
here. 
And I submit to the court that they have not always 
been adequately represented as to their personal interest. 
Thank you. 
COURT'S RULING 
THE JUDGE: Thank you. I suspect that it's fair 
to say that there's probably, there's probably not a week 
that goes by in this building that someone doesn't come in 
before one of us who is assigned to the civil rotation to 
argue that, that a collection of a judgment against some 
asset that's being executed on is improper and that that 
particular asset is, is or should not be subject to the 
execution. It is a common, routine type of process that's, 
it's just seen all the time here. 
And the rules provide for the process to take place 
and the rules say that if there is an execution filed against 
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an individual or an entity and there is a belief that that 
execution is inappropriate by reason of what it, what it is 
intending to take, that one can file and make the request for 
hearing and that hearing is to be properly and timely 
granted, and then a determination is to be made as to whether 
or not that property is exempt. And if it's exempt the 
execution on that is not allowed and, and those seeking to 
satisfy the judgment go someplace else. 
I, I believe that that process works and that if 
there is, if there is an execution by BYU against Mr. Duncan 
or anybody else, for the sake of our discussion here today, 
that is, and that execution is, is against property or assets 
that is not properly to be satisfied, used to satisfy the 
judgment, then the objection can be filed and the hearing can 
be held as allowed by the rule and a determination can be 
made as to whether or not it's proper or not. 
I don't believe... Excuse me. I'll back up. 
As to the argument that Mr. Call makes that certain 
individuals have been controlling this litigation, I don't 
know who's been controlling the litigation. That really 
isn't important to me anyway. What's been going on with you 
folks in causing you to have a perception that, causing some 
of you to have a perception that certain individuals are 
controlling litigation is not something that I've been privy 
to nor is it important to me with respect to handling this 
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My perspective in dealing with this motion I have 
to determine one of two things; is the motion proper based 
upon a matter of right to intervene, if it's not is it a 
permissive intervention that should be allowed. 
Considering all of the information that's been 
provided, your motion is denied. 
I believe that the last phrase of the rule does 
have value and is important and does apply with the language, 
in paraphrasing, that the interests are adequately 
represented and protected by some other means. And that 
means is, as I indicated, in objecting to executions on 
judgments. 
So that motion is denied, Mr. Nielsen. 
Now I believe, I believe that takes care of all of 
the issues, doesn't it? 
MR. SCHNIBBE: No, Your Honor. I still believe we 
have the motion regarding the ex parte communications with 
the court. 
THE JUDGE: Oh. You know, I sort of assumed, 
and I guess my assumption was absolutely incorrect, that 
with my comment on the record the last time we were all 
together that, that an issue with respect to ex parte 
communication had been resolved. But you don't believe it 
has and so— 
R. SUPP. 108 


























MR. SCHNIBBE: I don't believe it has, 
Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: I'll let you, I'll let you make your 
comments and observation for the record and then we'll see 
where we go. 
MR. SCHNIBBE: Sure, I understand. 
THE JUDGE: You do remember what I said before 
ARGUMENT BY MR. SCHNIBBE 
MR. SCHNIBBE: Yes, Your Honor. And that 
corrected it for me so that Your Honor obviously has not 
violated the Code of Judicial Conduct. I think the fact that 
the contact was not with Your Honor, yourself, means there's 
no color on the court with that. 
The problem is it's still the same from the other 
parties. We still have a disputed issue in the case, which 
was disputed up until today, of whether or not BYU is able to 
pursue these third parties and execute on that July 10th 
order. It was a hotly contested issue, which is why we've 
been here for nearly three hours arguing about it, 
Your Honor. 
In the May 29th ruling Your Honor said, stated that 
everything stayed pending appeal. At that point we thought 
well fine, we haven't had a hearing on our motions in some 
eight months but, you know, Judge Stott has looked at the 
record himself, realizes that there are serious issues here, 


























nothing can happen going forward. 
Mr. Call was unhappy with the results. The proper 
action to take would be to make a motion to lift that stay, 
make some sort of motion with regard to that minute entry 
or do something that would allow the parties on the other 
side of the, the aisle to at least respond and at least 
know what's been communicated to the court through its 
clerk. 
Here instead of doing that he made a phone call, 
spoke with the court's clerk, and apparently failed to impart 
that there was at all a controversy to the clerk, just merely 
represented that this is just a run of the mill proceeding 
for a supplemental order. So the clerk obviously had no 
idea what, you know, what the problem was with this, the very 
fundamental problem. 
And a lot of the, a lot of the motion is mooted to 
this point because of the examinations. Nonetheless we want 
full disclosure, Your Honor. We want to know what was said, 
we want to know, you know, what the nature of that was and 
if there is a need, an opportunity to respond. And we're 
going, just want to make sure there have been no other 
communications. 
Basically it's that simple, Your Honor. I think 
the law is clear on this point. Thank you. 
THE JUDGE: Doesn't binder four contain all of the 


























information you wanted to present? 
MR. SCHNIBBE: Yes. It does, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
ARGUMENT BY MR. CALL 
MR. CALL: Your Honor, with respect to that 
motion, I have previously indicated to this court that I've 
not had any ex parte communications with the court. I 
clarified that at the last hearing. 
As this court recognizes there is a judgment that 
has been entered in favor of BYU in this case. The standard 
proceedings for obtaining supplemental orders are indeed with 
the contact with the court's clerk. And in fact Rule 69(i), 
that supplemental proceedings may be obtained with or without 
notice. I'm sorry, it's not (i), it's (o). 
I have submitted an affidavit setting forth 
precisely what I did. 
THE JUDGE: I read the affidavit. 
MR. CALL: And I acted entirely in good faith. I 
indicated in the affidavit what I indicated to the clerk. 
And even if that supplemental order had been stayed we would 
be entitled to talk with the clerk with respect to other 
supplemental orders, that is the underlying judgment having 
been affirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court. 
I don't believe that there was any improper 
communication of any kind and I think I've made an adequate 


























disclosure in my sworn affidavit, and I believe that that 
would be verified by the clerk if she were called to 
testify. 
But frankly I don't see, I just don't see the 
issue. I think it's a spiteful matter that they've brought 
against me simply because I've tried to be aggressive in this 
matter representing my client. 
And I'll submit it on that, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Mr. Call, never feel picked on in this 
business, it doesn't pay. 
MR. CALL: Okay. 
THE JUDGE: Thick skin. 
MR. CALL: I'm pretty thick skinned, I am pretty 
thick skinned. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Well, toughen it up then. 
Where is that thing I told you to hold, the 
execution? 
THE CLERK: Oh, it's in the file, Judge, in file 
11 right there. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Go ahead. 
ARGUMENT BY MR. SCHNIBBE 
MR. SCHNIBBE: Your Honor, this is not a personal 
attack on Mr. Call. This is simply a request for a remedy 
so that we can be placed on equal footing here. 
And Rule 69(o) doesn't authorize this unless the 


























court first makes the determination the notice is not 
appropriate. The rule states with or without notice as the 
court may determine. There's been no determination before 
this phone call of his allowing them to, to proceed ex parte 
and without notice. 
But beside the point, the issue is not whether or 
not it's a proper Rule 69(o) that he was calling about. 
The minute entry said all proceedings in this case are 
stayed. It didn't say I'm merely striking the one. It 
said all proceedings in this case are stayed. The, the 
nature of the phone call was in accordance with asking the 
court to lift a stay pending appeal. That's, that goes far 
beyond merely asking to schedule a new supplemental 
proceeding. 
And with that I will submit it, Your Honor. 
COURT'S RULING 
THE JUDGE: Well, I haven't perceived your motions 
to be personal in nature. So from my perspective that's not 
a problem. And that's why I told Mr. Call he needs to 
thicken up a little bit. Sometimes those kinds of motions, 
proceedings are filed and we as lawyers have to roll with it 
when questions are raised because the questions can be 
legitimate, as I think they are in this case. 
I will clarify something for you so that there's no 
concern from here on and that is that, as I said earlier, 


























without a bond in place or a stay being ordered by the 
appeals court, an execution may proceed to satisfy that 
affirmed judgment. 
Now, I do not find that there was anything 
inappropriate or improper on behalf of BYU in their attempt 
to, to seek the execution method that they, that they sought 
and making contact with the clerk and filing the documents. 
I'll advise all of you that there was sent to the 
clerk a letter and documents as follows. The letter states 
the following: 
"Dear Clerk, 
Enclosed for filing by Brigham Young 
University in the above-referenced matter 
is the original writ of execution. Also 
enclosed are copies of the writ. Please 
return the original signed document to me 
in the enclosed self-addressed 
envelope. 
If you have any questions you can 
contact me at this address.". 
And then it's signed by Don E., is it Bouvier? 
MR. CALL: Bouvier. 
THE JUDGE: Bovier, for Steven W. Call. And then 
the documents are attached. 
When this set of information came into the hands 


























of my clerk I told her don't do anything with it, time-out, 
kings X, because of the sensitive nature of this case with 
respect to the issues concerning satisfaction of judgment. 
My ruling is as follows: 
Any attempts on the part of Brigham Young 
University to satisfy their judgment will not be unilateral 
and without notice. Notice will be given to counsel for the 
defendants. And then you, and then Brigham Young University 
may proceed after that notice to them of efforts to satisfy 
the judgment by way of the writ of execution or whatever it 
is. And if there's an objection, if there's a problem then 
counsel can make contact with me and we'll see where we go 
with it. 
Mr. Nielsen? 
MR. NIELSEN: Your Honor, may I ask the court to 
also require that I receive notice if the execution involves 
my clients? 
THE JUDGE: Your clients are not parties in this 
case. I've denied your motion. 
MR. NIELSEN: That's correct. If, if they are 
involved in the execution. 
THE JUDGE: Out of professional respect only I 
will ask Mr. Call to give you notice as well. Simply to 
give you notice and that's, that's the only purpose. So 
from this time forward if BYU wants to step forward and 


























collect their judgment without the bond or an order being in 
place you can do it. But you will first, to avoid any 
further problems and concerns that have just been raised 
you'll, you'll send counsel a copy of the documents you've 
got and place them on notice of your efforts, and then you'll 
go about making your effort to satisfy your judgment. 
MR. CALL: And typically what we've done, 
Your Honor, is we've obtained the writ of execution and then 
we've served copies on them as required by the rules. 
In this particular case we did, in fact, contact 
Mr. Nielsen. He had requested us to advise him if we were 
going to seek a writ. We contacted his office in advance 
and told him we were presenting that writ. And it was our 
intent to serve notice of that on everyone once the writ had 
been issued. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Well, I'm just telling you I'm 
making it a matter of an order now. 
MR. CALL: Okay. 
THE JUDGE: Nobody can cry foul. 
MR. NIELSEN: I didn't hear, Your Honor. Nobody 
what? 
THE JUDGE: Can cry foul. 
MR. NIELSEN: Thank you. 
I don't know what writ he's referring to, 
Your Honor, unless Your Honor has a writ before him now. 


























But he did sent me a letter saying he intended to seek one. 
He did not provide a copy of the writ, he did not provide 
anything other than the letter that was saying, and this was 
the letter last week saying he intended to seek one. 
I understand the rule to say that when you provide 
notice you provide notice at the time you submit a document 
to the court that you would also (short inaudible). It is 
true that in the past we have received copies but oftentimes 
our copies did not arrive in the mail until as long as a week 
or, or 10 days after a particular writ was issued or a 
particular notice was given. 
So I only want to clarify that for the record as to 
what has happened in the past. 
MR. CALL: Well— 
THE JUDGE: Just a moment. What he-says-he-says 
really isn't important to me now. All I'm telling you is 
that from, from this time forward the expectation on my part 
is that there's going to be notice to people when you attempt 
to collect your judgment. That's the bottom line. 
MR. CALL: So when we seek a, when we seek a 
writ— 
THE JUDGE: You don't have to obtain information, 
or excuse me, you don't have to obtain permission from me, 
you don't have to involve me in that process at all. The 
rules say that, that you don't actually have to give anybody 


























notice. All you have to do is get your documents, have the 
clerk issue them and you can satisfy it. 
MR. CALL: Right. 
THE JUDGE: All I'm saying is that when you intend 
to take action to satisfy your judgment, however it is, that 
you will first send written notice, a letter from you, a copy 
of the documents, to defense counsel and tell them that these 
documents are going to be filed with the clerk's office and 
you're going to obtain your writs, or whatever it is that 
you're attempting to do to satisfy your judgment, and you put 
them on notice. 
MR. CALL: We will do that. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. CALL: Yes. 
THE JUDGE: All right. I think that now takes 
care of all of them, doesn't it? All of the issues? 
MR. SCHNIBBE: I believe so, Your Honor. Yes. 
MR. NIELSEN: Your Honor, I think there's still 10 
minutes before the lunch hour. I assume there's got to be 
another one. 
THE JUDGE: Well, I'll just say this, Mr. Nielsen, 
I'm not wasting away and I don't think you are yet. 
MR. NIELSEN: Oh, I know. 
THE JUDGE: So you can eat early if you want to, 
sir. 
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Anything else, gentlemen? Good to see you all. 
MR. CALL: Thank you. 
THE JUDGE: Thank you very much for your good 
efforts and good lawyering. 
Mr. Peck, nice to see you. 
MR. PECK: Nice seeing you. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. Everybody is excused. Thanks 
a lot, gentlemen. 
WHEREUPON the hearing was concluded. 
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where it is indicated that the tape recording was inaudible. 
WITNESS my hand and official seal this 8th day of 
August, 2003. 
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I'Y C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTEF PE$NY R
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decided the issue against the widow, the fact 
that the court retained, jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate farther matters did not Leave open far 
reconsideration the question as to who owned 
the property, and the decree entered was final 
and appealable and became conclusive m the 
absence of a timelv appeal. In re Voorhees7 
Estate, 12 Utah 2d 361, 366 P.2d 977 (1961). 
Where plaintiff's complaint contained eight 
causes of action, court's judgment on merits as 
to one cause with reservation of jurisdiction 
and judgement as to other causes was not a 
final judgment from which an appeal could be 
taken. J.B.& R.E. Walker, Inc. v. Thayn, 17 
Utah 2d 120, 405 P.2d 342 (1965). 
Where court granted one defendant's motion 
to dismiss with prejudice and entered default 
judgment in favor of that defendant on his 
counterclaim, but action against other defen-
dants and one defendant's counterclaim re-
mained alive, court's order was not final and an 
appeal from it would be dismissed. Kennedy v. 
New Era Indus., Inc., 600 R2d 534 (Utah 1979). 
A judgment that disposes of fewer than all of 
the causes of action alleged in the plaintiff's 
complaint is not a final judgment from which 
an appeal may be taken. Salt Lake City Corp. v. 
Layton, 600 P.2d 538 (Utah 1979). 
A partial summary judgment is not generally 
a final judgment and hence it is not appealable 
under the limitations prescribed by this rule. 
South Shores Concession, Inc. v. State, 600 P.2d 
550 (Utah 1979). 
District court order setting aside certain pro-
visions in a default decree of divorce and pro-
viding for a further hearing on the matter was 
not a final ruling from which an appeal could be 
taken. Pearson v. Pearson, 641 P.2d 103 (Utah 
1982). 
Postjudgment orders. 
An order vacating a judgment is not a final 
order from which an appeal can be taken pur-
suant to this rule. Van Wagenen v. Walker, 597 
P.2d 1327 (Utah 1979). 
The final judgment rule does not preclude 
review of postjudgment orders; such orders 
were independently subject to the test of final-
ity, according to their own substance and effect 
Cahoon v. Cahoon, 641 P.2d 140 (Utah 1982). 
Purpose of notice. 
The object of a notice of appeal is to advise 
the opposite party that an appeal has been 
taken from a specific judgment in a particular 
case, N\mley v Stan Katx Real Estate, Inc , 15 
Utah 2d 126, 388 R2d 798 (1964). 
Review in equity cases. 
In the appeal of an equity case, the Supreme 
Court may weigh the facts as well as review the 
law, but will reverse on the facts only when the 
evidence clearly preponderates against the 
findings of the trial court. Crimmins
 v 
Simonds, 636 R2d 478 (Utah 1981). 
In reviewing trial court's findings of fact in 
equity cases, the Supreme Court Would give 
due deference to the trial court's decision and 
reverse only when the evidence clearly prepon-
derated against the trial court's findings 
Jensen v. Brown, 639 R2d 150 (Utah 1981). 
Review of acquittal prohibited. 
An appellate court may not reassess an ac-
quittal even though the acquittal was made 
under an incorrect application of the law or an 
improper determination of the facts. State v 
Mtisseiman, 667 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1983) 
Summary judgment. 
Order setting aside summary judgment was 
not final judgment from which aggrieved per-
son might appeal as matter of right. Jensen v. 
Nielsen, 22 Utah 2d 23, 447 R2d 906 (1968). 
Order denying a motion for summary judg-
ment was not a final order and was not appeal-
able. Denison v. Crown Toyota Motors, Inc., 571 
R2d 1359 (Utah 1977). 
A summary judgment in favor of .one defen-
dant alone is not a final judgment where the 
action against the remaining defendant re-
mains alive. Neider v. State DOT, 665 P2d 1306 
(Utah 1983) 
Unsigned minute entry. 
An unsigned minute entry did not constitute 
an entry of judgment, nor was it a final judg-
ment for purposes of appeal. Wilson v. Man-
ning, 645 P.2d 655 (Utah-1982); Utah State Tax 
Comm'n v. Erekson, 714 P.2d 1151 (Utah 1986); 
Sather v. Gross, 727 P.2d 212 (Utah 1986); 
Ahistrom v. Anderson, 728 R2d 979 (Utah 
1986). 
An unsigned minute entry does not consti-
tute a final order for purposes of appeal. State v. 
Crowley, 737 R2d 198 (Utah 1987). 
Cited in Huston v. Lewis, 818 P.2d 531 (Utah 
1991); Boggs v. Boggs, 824 P.2d 478 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991); Sierra Club v. Utah Solid & Haz-
ardous Waste Control Bd., 964 R2d 335 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1998); City of Kanab v. Guskey, 965 
P.Cd 1065 (Utah Gt. App 1998V 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review, — Case Law Develop 
ment: I. Appellate Review and Procedure, 1998 
Utah L. Rev. 585. 
A.L.1I. —Appealability of order suspending 
imposition or execution of sentence. 51 
A.L.R.4th 939. 
Rule I, ^{jpeiil as oi r iyli l . vilii'ii ll.ilin 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal is 
permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the 
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court 
within 30 davs after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
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However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible entry or 
unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed 
with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of entry of the 
judgment or order appealed from 
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judgment under 
Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional findings of fact, 
whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be required if the motion 
is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment; or (4) under Rule 
59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all parties shall run from the entry 
of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such motion. 
Similarly, if a timely motion is filed in the trial court (1) for a new trial under 
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; or (2) to withdraw a plea 
under Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6, the time for appeal for all parties shall run 
from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting or denying the 
motion to withdraw the plea. A notice of appeal filed before the disposition of 
any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of appeal must be 
filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of the order of the 
trial court disposing of the motion as provided above. 
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in 
paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a 
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of 
the trial court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof. 
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a party, 
any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date on 
which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise 
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires. 
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusable 
neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon 
motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time prescribed 
by paragraph (a) of this rule. Amotion filed before expiration of the prescribed 
time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires. Notice of a 
motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given to the other 
parties in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court. No extension 
shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the date of entry 
of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later. 
(f) Appeal by an inmate confined in an institution. If an inmate confined m 
an institution files a notice of appeal in either a civil case or a criminal case, the 
notice of appeal is timely filed if it is deposited in the institution's internal mail 
system on or before the last day for filing. Timely filing may be shown by a 
notarized statement or written declaration setting forth the date of deposit and 
stating that first-class postage has been prepaid. If a notice of appeal is filed in 
the manner provided in this paragraph (f), the 14-day period provided in 
paragraph (d) runs from the date when the trial rourt receives the first notice 
of appeal. 
(Amended HTertivn November L, 1998; April 1, 1999; November 1, 2001! ) 
Amendment Notes. —The 1999 amend- of Subdivision (b), added "(2) to withdraw a plea 
ment deleted provisions for motions under Rule under Utah Code Ann. ^ 77-13-6," added the 
26 from the second sentence in Subdivision lb), phrase beginning "or granting" at the end, and 
The 2002 amendment, m the second sentence made related stylistic changes. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Administrative actions —Construction 
Attorney fees — Denied. 
Attorneys failure to rile notice. Filing of notice 
Cross-appeal. Filing with county clerk. 
Extension of time to appeal Final order or judgment. 
—Amendment or modification of judgment. Form of notice 
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Reconsideration of order. 
Timeliness of notice. 
—Date of notice. 
—Final judgments. 
—Prison delivery rule. 
Cited. 
A d m i n i s t r a t i v e ac t ions . 
Subdivision (c) does not apply to petitions for 
review of administrative actions. Maverik 
Country Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 860 
P.2d 944 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
The cross-appeal provisions of this rule do 
not apply to proceedings for judicial review of 
agency decisions. Viktron/Lika Utah v. Labor 
Comm'n, 2001 UT App 8, 18 R3d 519. 
A t t o r n e y fees. 
No cross-appeal is necessary where plaintiffs 
merely sought attorney's fees incurred in de-
fending their judgment on appeal Wallis v. 
Thomas, 632 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981) 
A t to rney ' s fa i lu re to file no t i ce . 
Where if, within the statutory period for 
appeal, defendant has requested counsel to 
take an appeal and counsel gave defendant 
reason to believe that he would but then failed 
to do so, the remedy to establish the denial of 
his right to appeal is not in the Supreme Court 
but by a motion for relief under Rule 65B(i), 
U.R.C.P. in the sentencing court. State v. John-
son, 635 P.2d 36 (Utah 1981) (decided under 
former U.R.Crim.P. 26). 
If it is found upon a hearing that a defendant 
was induced, by reason of his attorney's repre-
sentation that an appeal would be perfected, to 
allow his time to take an appeal to expire, or 
that he was misled as to his right to appeal, the 
defendant should be resentenced nunc pro tunc 
upon previous finding of guilt so as to afford 
him an opportunity of prosecuting and perfect-
ing an appeal, since the time for taking such 
appeal would date from the rendition of the 
new judgment. State v. Johnson, 635 R2d 36 
(Utah 1981) (decided under former U.R.Crim.P. 
26). 
Although the trial court has broad discretion 
to determine if a party's neglect to file in a 
timely manner is excusable, this discretion is 
not limitless, and the trial court exceeded its 
discretion by granting the plaintiffs an exten-
sion to file their notice of appeal where the 
piaintiffs, attorney misread the the date on the 
entry of judgment notice he received and then 
did nothing to check on his initial misinterpre-
tation for almost thirtv days. Serrato v. Utah 
Transit Auth., 2000 UT App 299, 13 R3d 616. 
Cross -appea l . 
A judgment or decision mav be based on any 
number of subsidiary rulings or grounds, but as 
long as that judgment or decision produces a 
distinct and tangible result, it is only the result 
that requires an appeal, a cross-appeal, or 
cross-petition; thus. when determining 
whether a responding party must file a cross-
appeal or a cross-petition to raise an argument 
which was aiso raised below and which is 
offered merely as a ground for affirming the 
trial court's decision, it is the outcome of the 
case upon which the focus must be brought to 
bear, not the reasoning employed to reach that 
outcome. Sta te v. South, 924 P.2d 354 (Utah 
1996). 
E x t e n s i o n of t ime to a p p e a l . 
Neither Rule 6(b), U.R.C.P, granting the 
court power to extend a time limit where a 
failure to act in time is due to excusable neglect 
generally, nor Rule 60(b)(1), U.R.C.P, authoriz-
ing the court to relieve from final judgment for 
inadvertence or excusable neglect, applies 
where a notice of appeal has not been timely 
filed. Holbrook v. Hodson, 24 Utah 2d 120, 466 
P.2d 843 (1970). 
A party could not extend the time for filing an 
appeal simply by filing a "Motion for Reconsid-
eration of Order Striking Petition and Motion 
for Relief from Final Judgment." Peay v. Peay, 
607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980). 
When the question of "excusable neglect" 
arises in a jurisdictional context, as opposed to 
a nonjurisdictional context, the standard con-
templated thereby is a strict one; it is not 
meant to cover the usual excuse that the lawyer 
is too busy, but is to cover emergency situations 
only. Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply 
Co., 676 P2d 952 (Utah 1984). 
The time for filing an appeal is jurisdictional 
and ordinarily cannot be enlarged. State v. 
Montoya, 825 P.2d 676 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Proper remedy of defendant whose cross-
appeal was not timely filed under Subdivision 
(d), upon having the notice returned, was to file 
a motion to extend time with the district court 
under Subdivision (e); the appellate court could 
not consider such a motion, or grant an exten-
sion, on appeal. Glezos v. Frontier Inv., 896 P.2d 
1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
The trial court's regular six-month delay in 
issuing and entering orders was not a per se 
excuse for counsers failure to check periodically 
with the clerk as to whether orders were en-
tered, but such delays could be considered with 
other factors in determining whether a finding 
of excusable neglect was warranted. West v. 
Grand County, 942 P.2d 337 (Utah 1997). 
— A m e n d m e n l or modi f i ca t ion of j u d g -
men t . 
If an amendment or modification does not 
change the substance or character of a judg-
ment, it does not enlarge the time for appeal. 
Nielson v. Gurley, 888 P.2d 130 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994), cert denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995). 
Because the issues should have been raised 
in a timely motion to alter or amend the judg-
ment under Rule 59(e) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure or in a timely motion to amend 
the trial court's findings under Rule 52(b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and even if the 
motion to reconsider were construed as such a 
motion, it was not timely under either rule and 
could not operate to extend the time for appeal 
under Subdivision ib) of this rule. Bonneville 
Billing & Collection v. Torres. 2000 UT App 338, 
15 P.3d 112. 
— C o n s t r u c t i o n . 
The piam meaning of Subdivision <e) is that 
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"good cause" is not limited and is an appropri-
ate ground for granting an extension after the 
initial thirty-day period. Murphy v. Crosland, 
915 P.2d 491 (Utah 1996) 
—Denied. 
The district court did not abuse its broad 
discretion in denying motion for extension of 
time to party whose attorney miscalculated the 
calendar date for the deadline and assumed 
that the postal service and district court clerk's 
office would work in concert to file the notice 
within two business days of his sending it. 
Reisbeck v. HCA Health"Servs. of Utah, Inc., 
2000 UT 48, 2 P.3d 447. 
F i l ing of no t ice . 
The mailing of a notice of appeal was not 
equivalent to a filing of notice of appeal. 
Isaacson v. Dorius, 669 R2d 849 (Utah 1983). 
Filing with county clerk. 
Filing with the county clerk was not a timely 
filing with the juvenile court, where there was 
no indication when the clerk transmitted a copy 
of the notice of appeal to the juvenile court, and 
the original was returned to appellant's coun-
sel. State, In re M.S., 781 P.2d 1287 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). 
Final order or j u d g m e n t . 
Where the trial court signed two different 
judgments but neither party served his pre-
pared judgment on the other party before sub-
mitting it to the court, the filing of either 
judgment would be erroneous, and an appeal 
taken from either is premature because the 
judgments are not properly "final." Larsen v. 
Larsen, 674 P.2d 116 (Utah 1983). 
Juvenile court's order for temporary confine-
ment in a youth facility for observation and 
assessment prior to a final disposition was not 
a final order, for purposes of appeal, because it 
did not finally dispose of all issues, including 
the rights of the juvenile and/or his mother's 
rights as parental custodian. State, In re 
T.D.C., 748 P.2d 201 (Utah Ct. App.), cert. 
denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). 
An unsigned minute entry is not a final 
judgment for purposes of appeal. A judgment, 
tolled by a timely post-judgment motion, s tar ts 
to run on the date when the trial court enters 
its first signed order denving the motion. 
Gallardo v. Bolinder, 800 P.2d 816 (Utah 1990). 
A signed minute entry ordering defendant's 
counsel to prepare an order showing that plain-
tiff's post-judgment motions filed pursuant to 
Rules 52(b) and 59, U.R.C.P, were denied was 
not a final appealable order. Swenson Assocs. 
Architects v. State, 889 P.2d 415 (Utah 1994). 
An appeal filed before a formal post-judg-
ment order is entered is ineffective and a new 
appeal has to be filed within thirty days after 
the entry of the formal order. State v. Gardner, 
2(J01UT41, 23P .3d l043 . 
Form of notice. 
As with post-judgment motions, the court of 
appeals looks to the substance of a notice of 
appeal and not its caption. Reeves v. Steinfeidt. 
915 P.2d 1073 (Utah'Ct. App. 1996). 
Where a letter written by defendant, alleging 
ineffective assistance of counsel and requesting 
an appeal, was misplaced and then later dis-
covered after defendant's petition for writ ha-
beas corpus and motion for appeal were denied 
on the basis that neither was timely filed, the 
court vacated the earlier orders and remanded 
the case to determine whether defendant's let-
ter was an at tempt to file an appeal or an 
at tempt to file a petition for writ of habeas 
corpus. Bennett v Hoiden, 932 P.2d 598 (Utah 
1997). 
P o s t - j u d g m e n t m o t i o n s . 
Where a post-judgment motion was timely 
filed under Rule 59(a)(6), U.R.C.P, to upset the 
judgment, and notices of appeal from the judg-
ment were filed after the motion was made, but 
before the disposition of the motion, the motion 
rendered the notices of appeal ineffective, and 
notice of appeal had to be filed within the 
required time from the date of the entry that 
disposed of the motion. U-M Invs. v. Rj.y, 658 
P.2d 1186 (Utah 1982). 
The time for appeal of an order confirming an 
arbitrator's award runs from the order denying 
appellant's timely motion to alter or amend 
tha t judgment under Rule 59, U.R.C.P. Robin-
son & Wells v. Warren, 669 P.2d 844 (Utah 
1983). 
The Supreme Court may not consider an 
appeal from the dismissal of a complaint for 
unpaid overtime compensation until the trial 
court has had an opportunity to review the 
order in question by ruling on all pending 
post-judgment motions. Bailey v. Sound Lab, 
Inc., 694 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1984). 
A notice of appeal filed before the disposition 
of a proper post-judgment motion is ineffective 
to confer jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court. 
Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Hafen, 723 
P.2d 425 (Utah 1986); DeBry v. Fidelity Nat'l 
Title Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 520 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992), cert, denied. 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). 
Filing a post-judgment motion of a type listed 
in this rule suspends the finality of the judg-
ment, and a notice of appeal filed prior to 
disposition of such a motion by entry of a signed 
order is not effective to confer jurisdiction on an 
appellate court. Anderson v. Schwendiman, 764 
P.2d 999 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Filing of an "exception to order and motion 
for reconsideration" of summary judgment 
tolled the thirty-day time period within which 
to file a notice of appeal, notwithstanding the 
incorrect title placed upon the pleading, since 
the judge ruled on the motion as if it were a 
motion for a new trial. Watkiss & Campbell v. 
Foa & Son. 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991). 
Where a motion to set aside a judgment was 
not timely served and was subsequently with-
drawn, and thus the court neither granted nor 
denied the motion and did not enter an order, 
the motion did not trigger a new thirty-day 
appeal time under Subdivision «b). Nielson v. 
Gurlev, 388 P.2d 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) cert. 
denied. S99 P.2d 1231 lUtah 1995). 
When a partv tiles a post-judgment motion 
pursuant to either Rule 52(b) or Ruie 59, 
U.R.C.R. a notice of appeal must be tiled after 
the order disposing of the motion is entered in 
order to vest jurisdiction in an appellate court. 
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Swenson Assocs Architects v State, 889 P2d 
415 (Utah 1994) 
Although captioned 'Objections to the Pro-
posed Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, ' 
defendant's post trial motion was m substance 
a U R C i v P 59 motion, inasmuch as it asked 
the court to alter its findings and to amend its 
conclusions and judgments therefore, defen-
dant's motion tolled the time for filing a notice 
of appeal until the motion was denied Reeves v 
Steinfeldt, 915 P2d 1073 (Utah Ct App 1996) 
The appellate court lacked jurisdiction to 
consider the merits of a party s appeal because 
the notice of appeal was not filed within thirty 
days of the entry of judgment and, alterna-
tively, because no new notice of appeal was filed 
after disposition of the post-judgment motion 
extendmg the appeal time, as required by this 
rule Farley v Sykes, 91S P2d 895 (Utah Ct 
App 1996) 
Defendant was not required by Subdivision 
(b) of this rule to file a new notice of appeal 
after the trial court's denial of its motion to 
correct the record, as such a motion is neither 
included in this rule nor the equivalent of the 
motions listed in this rule Fitz v Synthes 
(USA), 1999 UT 103, 990 P 2d 391 
The period for filing a notice of appeal was 
not tolled by defendant's motion to arrest judg-
ment under Utah R. C n m P 23 State v 
Putmk, 2002 UT 122, 463 Utah Adv Rep 22 — 
P3d — 
Pre-judgment m o t i o n s 
A motion made before the entry of judgment 
that is not disposed of either expressly or by 
necessary implication by the judgment sus-
pends the running of the time for taking an 
appeal until the court disposes of the motion 
Kurth v Wiarda, 1999 UT App 153, 981 P 2d 
417 
The mere entry ot a final judgment inconsis-
tent with but silent regarding a post-trial pre-
judgment motion does not dispose of the motion 
by necessary implication unless the surround-
ing circumstances indicate that the trial court 
considered and rejected the motion Kurth v 
Wiarda, 1999 UT App 153, 981 P2d 417 
Where the trial court stated during a hearing 
on the defendant's pre-judgment motions that 
it would sign the judgment on the same day, 
and did m fact do so, the facts indicated that 
the trial court considered and rejected the mo-
tions, and supported the conclusion that the 
judgment on the verdict, although silent on the 
issue, disposed of the motions by necessary 
implication Kurth v Wiarda. 1999 UTApp 153, 
9 8 1 P 2 d 4 1 7 
A timely motion to alter or amend the judg-
ment or tor a new trial filed under U R C P 
52(b) or 59 suspends the finahtv :>f the chal-
lenged order or judgment, rendenng a notice of 
appeal filed beiore disposition of such a motion 
bv entry of »a signed order metfective to confer 
jurisdiction on an appellate court Regan v 
Blount 1999 UT App 154 97S P2d 1051 
Plaintirf's motion to amend the judgment 
filed several davs beiore the e n n v ot an 
amended ordei and judgment challenged bv *he 
motion >vas umeiv oince the phrase lo t later 
t h a n ' does not lequire that theie be a pre-
existing judgment, but rather sets only a max-
imum period, and does not nullify an otherwise 
valid motion made before a formal judgment 
has been entered Regan v Blount, 1999 UT 
App 154, 978 P2d 1051 
Where nothing in the record indicated that 
the trial court considered or was even aware of 
a motion to amend a judgment made before it 
signed an amended order and judgment, or 
supported the assumption that the order and 
judgment disposed of the motion by necessary 
implication, the motion therefore suspended 
the finality of the judgment until disposed of by 
order of the trial court Regan v Blount, 1999 
UTApp 154, 978 P2d 1051 
Premature notice. 
A notice of appeal filed after a ruling on a 
motion to alter or amend a judgment has been 
announced, but before the entry of an order 
disposing of the motion, is premature and does 
not confer jurisdiction on the court Anderson v 
Schwendunan, 764 P2d 999 (Utah Ct App 
1988) 
A notice of appeal filed before the trial court 
disposes of any post-judgment motions listed in 
this rule is piemature and not effective to 
initiate appeal Kay v Summit Sys , 913 P2d 
349 (Utah 1996) 
Where the trial court entered an unsigned 
minute entry, which gave no specific reasons for 
denying defendant's motion for new trial, and 
defendant filed notice of appeal eleven days 
later, the defendant's appeal had to be dis-
missed because the Supreme Court has consis-
tently dismissed appeals from unsigned mmute 
entries and because the defendant's notice of 
appeal was prematurely filed State v Jiminez, 
938 P2d 266 (Utah 1997) 
Reconsiderat ion of order. 
The Court of Appeals declined to reconsider 
and overrule its prior denial of the s ta tes 
leques t to dismiss an appeal as untimely State 
ex rei C Y v Yates 765 P2d 251 {Utah Ci App 
1988) 
Timel iness of not ice 
Notice of appeal filed within the requued 
period from date of entry of order of contempt 
was filed timely and Supreme Court had juris-
diction to hear appeal concerning the contempt 
order Burgers v Maiben, 652 P2d 1320 (Utah 
1982) 
An untimely motion for a new trial had no 
effect on the running of the time for filing a 
notice of appeal Burgers v Maiben 652 P2d 
1320 (Utah 1982) 
Case was temporanlv remanded to the jm e-
nile couit in oidei to allow that court to make a 
determination whether an order extending the 
time for appeal should be entered by the juve-
nile court under this rule when it was not 
apparent whether the notice ot appeal was 
either timelv t ied or deemed timely filed bv tue 
juvenile court State In le M S 7S1 P2d 12S7 
l U t a h C t ADD 1989) 
Where plaintiff, one da\ liter the \ o luntar 
withdrawal ot ts -notion tor diiected \eiaict 
filed I notice or appeal ind also moved for an 
extension oi time n which to rue a notice JI 
appeal the aotice ot appeal was ameiv nled 
D C1IDP 1 9 7 
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irrespective of ^aether the oraer granting" ad-
ditional tune for filing' had a Tunc pro tunc 
effect Guaraian State Ban* v Stangl, 773 P2d 
1 'Utah 1989; 
Notice of arjpeal placed in the prison mail by 
an uicaiceratea criminal defendant within the 
30-dav period set foith in this rule was not 
timely vhei e the notice was filed m the district 
court more than 30 da\s after entry of *he 
judgment being aopealed State v Palmer 777 
P 2d 521 (Utah Ct ADP 1989) 
By using the disjunctive "or,* Subdivision (c) 
cleaily allows the notice oi appeal to be filed 
after the announcement of either a decision, a 
judgment, or an order "Decision' is broadly 
defined to cover final judgments, interlocutory 
orders, or "the first step leading to a judgment,"' 
and includes a trial courts determination of 
guilt City of St George v Smith 814 P2d 1154 
(Utah Ct App 1991), overruled on other 
grounds, City of St George v Smith, 828 P2d 
504 (Utah Ct App 1992) 
Appellant's notice of appeal, which was hied 
after the announcement of the decision of guilt 
but before sentencing", was timely filed under 
Subdivision (c) CitvofSt George v Smith, 814 
P2d 1154 (Utah Ct App 1991), overruled on 
other grounds, City of St George v Smith, 82S 
P2d 504 (Utah Ct App 1992) 
Motion filed within ten days of an entry of 
judgment, objecting to trial court's award of 
pre-judgment interest to plaintiff was a motion 
to alter or amend the judgment under U R C P 
59(e) Filing of notice of appeal wichm 30 days 
of the order disposing of that motion was 
timely Brunettiv Mascaro 854 P2d 555 (Utah 
Ct App 1993) 
When the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdic-
tion to consider defendants cross-appeai be-
cause it was not timely filed the lack of juris-
diction was not waived by plaintiff's failure to 
move for dismissal within ten days after defen-
dant filed its docketing statement under 
RAppP 10(a) Rule 10(a) is permissive, not 
mandatory, and a lack of subject matter juris-
diction cannot be waived Glezos v Fiontier 
Inv 896 P2d 1230 (Utah Ct App 1995) 
To vebt jurisdiction in the appellate court a 
notice of appeal undei this rule must be hied 
atter entiv ot the order disposing of motions 
under U R C P 50(b), 52(b) and 59 Kurth \ 
Wiarda 1999 UT App 153 981 P2d 417 
The period tor filing a notice ot appeal began 
with the entry of deiendant's sentence, not with 
the later entiv of on amended order denving a 
motion to arrest judgment the original denial 
having been issued beiore derendants ^encpnc 
rng State Bo vers 2002 LT 100 >7 P3d 
1065 
Defendant was required by this rule to file a 
motion for appeal within 30 da^s of sentencing 
because his motion for a new trial, vhich was 
filed aftei the verdict but before sentencing, 
was prematuie and, thus not timeiv filed 
within 10 daj s after the imposition of sentence 
as lequired by Utah R Cnm P 24(c) State v 
Putmk, 2002 UT 122 -163 Utah \dv Rep 22 — 
P3d — 
— Date of notice 
In determining whether a notice ot appeal is 
timely filed and establishes jurisdiction in an 
appellate court the appellate court is bound bv 
the filing date on the notice of appeal transmit-
ted to it by the trial court State In re M S , 781 
P2d 1287 (Utah Ct App 1989) 
Where derendant's motion for new tnal was 
untimely, because it was filed before sentenc-
ing, it had no effect on the time for filing a 
notice of appeal, and his notice of appeal filed 
within 30 days after entry of the final judgment 
was timely State v Vessev, 95^ P 2d 1239 (Utah 
Ct App 1998) 
—Final judgments. 
When the court vacated a first supplemental 
judgment, there was nothing to appeal until 
after the second supplemental judgment was 
entered, therefore, plaintiff's notice ot appeal 
that was filed within thirty days of the second 
supplemental judgment was timely Sittner v 
Schnever 2000 UT 45 2 P3d 442 
— Prison delivery rule. 
Dismissal of appeal as untimely vvas af-
firmed, Court of Appeals refused to adopt 
prison delivery rule, whereby an mcarcerated 
pro se prisoner's notice of appeal is considered 
timeiv filed when the prisoner delivers it to 
prison authorities for forwarding to the district 
court clerk withm the required 30-dav period 
State v Parker 936 P2d 1118 (Utah Ct Apn 
1997) 
Cited in Neenngs v Utah State Bar 817 
P2d 320 (Utah 1991), Wiggins v Board of 
Review 824 P2d 1199 (Utah Ct App 1992), 
DLB Collection Trust v Hams S93 P2d 593 
(Utah Ct ADP 1995), City of Kanab v Guskev, 
965 P2d 1065 (Utah Ct App 1998) Pasouin v 
Pasquin. 1999 UT App 245, 988 P2d 1, cert 
denied, 994 P2d 1271 (Utah 2000), Stoddard v 
Smith 2001 UT 47, 27 P3d 546 Alvey Dev 
Corp v Maciceiprang, 2002 UT ADP 220 51 
P3d 45 State v Houskeeper 2002 UT US, 462 
Utah \dv Rep 24 — P nd — 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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REVISE'' BU^CiESS CORPORATION ACT 16-10a-204 
—Fraud or inequitable result. 
A claimant's inability to collect a judgment 
from a corporation is not enough to show that 
fraud or inequitable conduct resulted from the 
use of the corporate structure and the fact that 
harm may result from legitimate liquidation is 
insufficient to show corporate misconduct or 
earn judgment against stockholder individu-
ally. Baldwin v. Matthew R. Wince Invs., Inc., 
669 F. Supp. 1054 iD Utah 1987) 
Personal liability. 
Because a certificate of incorporation had not 
been issued to defendants before their purchase 
of a car wash, from plaintiffs and, further, 
defendants had actual or constructive knowl-
edge that the corporation did not exist under 
state law, the trial court's conclusions that 
there was a de facto corporation and a corpora-
tion by estoppel were erroneous, making the 
defendants personally liable under the con-
tract. American Vending Servs., Inc. v Morse, 
381 P2d 917 (Utah Ct. App 1994). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Bngham Young Law Review. — Note, 
American Vending Services, Inc. v. Morse. The 
Problem of Defective Incorporation in Utah, 
1995 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 303. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 18 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations 
§ 67. 
C J.S. — 18 C J S Corporations § 51 
A.L.R. — Failure to issue stock as factor in 
disregard of corporate entity, 8 A.L.R.3d 1122. 
16-lQa-204. Liability for preincorporation transactions. 
All persons purporting to act as or on behalf of a corporation, knowing there 
was no incorporation under this chapter, are jointly and severally liable for all 
liabilities created while so acting 
History: C. 1953, 16-10a-204» enacted by 
L. 1992, ch. 277, <} 29. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
iStfM irSIS 
Corporation by estoppel. 




Corporation by estoppel. 
The doctrine of corporation by estoppel, be-
cause it coexists with the relevant provision of 
the Model Business Corporation Act (former 
iV? 16-10-139), can be invoked only where both 
parties believe they are dealing with a corpora-
tion and neither party has actual or construc-
tive knowledge that the corporation does not 
exist. American Vending Servs.. Inc. v. Morse. 
881 ?2d 917 (Utah Ct App. 1994) 
De facto corporation. 
—Doctrine abolished. 
The doctrine or de facto corporations ithat a 
bona nde attempt to create a corporation, and 
the suphequent exercise of corporate powers, 
can excuse a iormal defect in .ncorporation; no 
longer exists m Utan. The legislature intended 
to extinguisn tne doctrine wnen it adopted rhe 
Business Corporation Act because the lelevant 
portions (former ^ 10-6-51 and 16-10-139) 
were taken verbatim from the Model Business 
Corporation Act and. in addition, Vincent Drug 
Co. v. State Tax Comin'n, 17 Utah 2d 202, 407 
P.2d 683 (1965), was effectively overruled by 
later Supreme Court holdings. American Vena 
mgServs., Inc. v Morse, 881 P.2d 917 (Utah C 
App. 1994). 
Personal liability. 
Because a certificate of incorporation had nut 
been issued to defendants before their purchase 
of JL car wash trom plaintiffs and, further, 
defendants had actual or constructive knowl-
edge that the corporation did nut exist under 
state law, the trial court's conclusions that 
there was a de factn corporation and a corpora-
tion by estoppel were erroneous. Thus, the 
defendants were personally liable under the 
contract. .American Vending Sen's.. Inc. v. 
Morse. 381 P.2J 917 Utan Ct. ADD 1994). 
Suspended corporation. 
Former ^ 16-10-lu9. assigning 'laoihtv o 
persons issuming corporate sower * vithout 
luchontv,' auDiiea to tnose who assumed to act 
4i: 
i t SiiPP I** 
16-10a-205 CORPORATIONS 
as or on behalf of a corporation thai was itself suspended. Murphy v. Crosland, 886 P.2d 74 
without authority to conduct business, either (Utah Ct. App 1994), afFd, 915 P.2d 491 'Utah 
because the corporation had not been properly 1996). 
incorporated or because its authority had been 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. Note, Problem of Defective Incorporation m Utah, 
American Vending Services, Inc. u. Morse: The 1995 B YU L. Rev. 303 
16-10a-205. Organization of the corporat ion. 
(1) After incorporation: 
(a) if initial directors are named in the articles of incorporation, the 
initial directors may hold an organizational meeting, at the call of a 
majority of the directors, to complete the organization of the corporation 
by appointing officers, adopting bylaws, and carrying on any other 
business brought before the meeting; or 
(b) if initial directors are not named in the articles of incorporation, 
then until directors are elected, the incorporator or incorporators may hold 
an organizational meeting at the call of a majority of the incorporators to 
do whatever is necessary and proper to complete the organization of the 
corporation, including the election of directors and officers and the 
adoption and amendment of bylaws. 
(2) Action required or permitted by this chapter to be taken by incorporators 
at an organizational meeting may be taken without a meeting if the action 
taken is evidenced by one or more written consents describing the action taken 
and signed by each incorporator. 
(3) An organizational meeting may be held in or out of this state. 
History: C. 1953, 16-iOa .ilJ.i cnai !< ill li 
L. 1992, ch. 277, § 30. 
16-10a-206. Bylaws. 
(1) (a) The board of dirorfori of i corporation may adopt initial bylaws for 
the corporation. 
(b) If no directors have been electesi tho mcnrpnr i ton may adopt imti d 
bylaws for the corporation. 
(c) If neither the incorporators nor the board of directors have adopted 
initial bylaws, the shareholders may do so. 
(2) The bylaws of a corporation may contain any provision for managing the 
business and regulating the affairs of the corporation that is not inconsistent 
with law or the articles of incorporation, including management and regula-
tion of the corporation in the event of an emergency 
History: C. 11153, i6-i0a-20b\ enacted by 
L. 1992, ch. 277 ? II. 
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16-10a-40 I unjui ifp mint-
Par t 10 
Amendment of Articles of Incorporation 
and Bvlaws 
Section 
16-10a-1008 7 Conversion to or from a do-




16-10a-204. Liability for p r e i n e o r p > i. 1111111 I r: 111 sactions. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Applicability. on behalf of a corporation and does not refer to 
This section did not address question of any abdity by such persons to enforce contracts, 
whether plaintiffs had the right to enforce an Miller v. Celebration Mining Co., 2001 UT 64, 
agreement because the section speaks only to 29 P3d 1231. 
the liability of persons purporting to act as or 
PART 4 
NAME 
16-10a-401. (.. orpoiaLc n a m e . 
(1) The name of a corporation: 
(a) except for the name of a depository institution as delmed in .sectiun 
7-1-103, must contain: 
(i) the word: 
(A) "corporation"; 
(B) "incorporated"; or 
(C) "company"; 
(ii) the abbreviation: 
(A) "corp."; 
(B) "inc."; or 
iC) "co.", or 
(hi) words or abbreviations of like import to the words or abbrevia-
tions listed in Subsections (l)(a)(i) and (ii) in another language; 
(b) may not contain language stating or implying that the corporation is 
organized for a purpose other than that permitted by: 
(i) Section 16-10a-301: and 
(ii) the corporation's articles of incorporation, 
(c) without the written consent of the United States Olympic Commit-
tee, baay not contain the words: 
(i) "Olympic"': 
(ii) "Olympiad": or 
(hi) "Citius Altius Fortius ana 
48-MO PARTNERSHIP 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, 1 12; R.S. 193:] & 
C. 1943, 69-1-9. 
t t ILATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59AAm. Jur 2d Partnershn < I ^ .—68 C.J.S. Partnership § 175 
§§ 252 to 256 
48-1-1 0 Par tne rsh ip bound b> par tner ' s wrongful net. 
Where by any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in the ordinary 
course of the business of the partnership or with the authority of his copartners 
loss or injury is caused to any person, not being a partner in the partnership, 
or any penalty is incurred, the partnership is hable therefor to the same extent 
as the partner so acting or omitting to act. 
History: L. 1921, ch, iBf i 1*1, it.o. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 69-1-10. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Rogers v Mu Bitner Co., 738 P2d 
1029 (Utah 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59AAm. Jur. 2d Partnership tort of partner in law firm, 70 A.L.R.Ja 1298. 
§§ 647 to 661, 667 to 672. Embezzlement, larceny, false pretenses, or 
CJ.S. — 68 C J S. Partnership §§ 168 to allied criminal fraud by a partner, 82 A.L.R.3d 
171- ^ 822. 
A.L.R, -- Vicarious liability of attorney for 
48-1-11. Par tnersh ip buuml bj par tner ' s breach of t rust . 
The partnership is bound to make good the loss. 
(1) where one partner acting within the scope of his apparent authority 
receives money or property of a third person and misapplies it; and, 
(2) where the partnership in the course of its business receives money 
or property of a third person and the money or property so received is 
misapplied by any partner while it is in the custody of the partnership. 
History: L. 11)111, cii. 89, S 14; ILS. 1933 & 
C. 1943. 69-1-11. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59AAin Jur. 2d Fanners hip CJ .S , - 6R (\l S P irrnersbjp ^ 169. 
§§ 662 to 666. 
48-1-1—. Nature of par tner ' s liability. 
(1) Except is provided in Subsection (2), ail partners are liable. 
ia) jointly and severally for everything chargeable to the partnership 
under Sections 48-1-10 and 48-1-11. 
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(b) jointly for all other debts and obligations of the partnership, except 
a partner may enter into a separate obligation to perform a partnership 
contract. 
(2) (a) A partner in a limited liability partnership is not liable, directly or 
indirectly, including by way of indemnification, contribution or otherwise, 
for a debt, obligation, or Liability chargeable to the partnership arising 
from negligence, wrongful acts, or misconduct committed while the part-
nership is registered as a limited liability partnership and in the course, of 
the partnership business by another partner, or an employee, agent, or 
representative of the limited liability partnership. 
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(a), a partner in a hmited liability 
partnership is liable for his own negligence, wrongful acts, or misconduct. 
History: L. 1921, ch. 89, § 15; R.S. 1933 & 
C. 1943, 69-1-12; L. 1994, ch. 61, § 3. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Joint and several liability. 
Parties. 
Satisfaction of debts. 
Service on partners. 
Cited. 
Joint and several liability. 
Partners who had failed to comply with the 
former Utah Limited Partnership Act were li-
able as general partners and were jointly and 
severally liable for a partial failure of consider-
ation paid by the partnership for stock. 
Bergeson v. Life Ins. Corp. of Am., 265 F.2d 227 
(10th Cir.), cert, denied, 360 U.S. 932, 79 S. Ct. 
1452, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1545 (1959). 
Where a right of recovery, in a stockholder's 
derivative action against a life insurance com-
pany, was based on the fraud of the directors in 
acting both as directors and as members of the 
partnership that organized the company, the 
liability of the directors was jomt and several. 
Bergeson v. Life Ins. Corp. of Am., 170 F. Supp. 
150 (D. Utah 1958), aff'd in part and rev'd in 
part on other grounds, 265 F.2d 227 (10th Cir. J, 
cert, denied, 360 U.S. 932, 79 S. Ct. 1452, 3 L. 
Ed. 2d 1545(1959). 
Parties . 
An individual member may not be sued on an 
alleged claim of only an individual obligation 
and recovery had against him on proof of a 
partnership obligation not qualifying under 
Subsection (l)(a) of this section as a joint and 
several obligation, but coming under Subsec-
tion (l)(b) as only a joint obligation, unless the 
partnership or all the members thereof a re 
made parties. Palle v. Industrial Comm'n, 79 
Utah 47, 7 P.2d 284, 81 A.L.R. 1222 (1932). 
Satis fact ion of debts . 
Partnership debts and obligations coming 
within the scope of joint liability must be sat-
isfied by par tnership assets to the extent any 
exist before a creditor can seek satisfaction 
from the individual assets of a partner. McCune 
& McCune v. Mountain Bell Tel., 758 P.2d 914 
(Utah 1988). 
Service on partners . 
If a partner 's liability is joint rather t h a n 
joint and several, each defendant must be indi-
vidually served in order to be liable. Barber v. 
Emporium Partnership, 800 P.2d 795 (Utah 
1990). 
Cited in First Sec. Bank v. Feiger, 653 F. 
Supp. 175 (D. Utah 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59AAm. Jur. 2d Partnership 
S§ 633 to 672. 
C.J.S. — 68 C.J.S. Partnership $ ISO. 
A.L.R. — Vicarious iiaoiiity of attorney for 
tort or partner m law tirm, 70 A.L.R.3d 129S. 
Derivative liaoiiity of partner for punitive 
damages for wrongful act of copartner. 14 
A.L.R.4th 1335. 
Partnersnip or joint venture exclusion in 
contractors or other similar comorenensive 
general liability insurance poiicv, 37 A.L.H.4tii 
1155. 
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SUPREME COURT 78-2-2 
(4) If the justices are unable to elect a chief justice within 30 days of a 
vacancy in that office, the associate chief justice shall act as chief justice until 
a chief justice is elected under this section. If the associate chief justice is 
unable or unwilling to act as chief justice, the most senior justice shall act as 
chief justice until a chief justice is elected under this section. 
(5) In addition to the chief justice's duties as a member of the Supreme 
Court, the chief justice has duties as provided by law. 
(6) There is created the office of associate chief justice. The term of office of 
the associate chief justice is two years. The associate chief justice may serve in 
that office no more than two successive terms. The associate chief justice'shall 
be elected by a majority vote of the members of the Supreme Court and shall 
be allocated duties as the chief justice determines. If the chief justice is absent 
or otherwise unable to serve, the associate chief justice shall serve as chief 
justice. The chief justice may delegate responsibilities to the associate chief 
justice as consistent with law. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Membership on board of control of state law 
Supp., 104-2-1; L. 1969, ch. 247, § 1; 1986, library, § 9-7-301. 
ch. 47, § 40; 1988, ch. 248, § 4; 1990, ch. 80, Proceedings-unaffected by vacancy,. § 73-7-
§ 4. 21. 
Cross-References. — Chief justice, Utah Qualifications of justices, Utah Const., Art. 
Const., Art. VHI, Sec. 2. Vm, Sec. 7. 
Disqualification in particular case, Utah Retirement, Utah Const., Art. VHI, Sec. 15; 
Const., Art. VHI, Sec. 2. Title 49, Chapters 17 and 18; §§ 78-8-103, 
Judicial nomination and selection, Title 20A, 78-8-104. 
Chapter 12. Salary, Utah Const., Art. Vm, Sec. 14. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Note, Death Qualin- Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts §§ 67, 
cation and the Right to an Impartial Jury 68. 
Under the State Constitution: Capital Jury C.J.S. — 21 C.J.S. Courts § 111 et seq.;.48A 
Selection in Utah After State u. Young, 1995 C.J.S. Judges §§ 3, 7, 8, 21 to 25, 85. 
Utah L. Rev. 365. 
78-2-1.5, 78-2-1.6. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 78-2-1.5 (L. 1969, ch. Section 78-2-1.6 (L. 1979, ch. 134, § 1; 1981, 
225, § 2), relating to salaries of Supreme Court ch. 156, § 1), relating to salaries of justices, 
justices, was repealed by Laws 1971, ch. 182, was repealed by Laws 1981, ch. 267, § 2, effec-
§ 4. ' tive July 1, 1982. 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdict ion. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of state 
law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior to 
final judgment by the Court of Appeals: 
(c) discipline of lawyers: 
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(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originat-
ing with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(hi) the School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; 
(v) the state engineer; or 
(vi) the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources 
reviewing actions of the Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (3)(e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of 
a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction or charge of a 
first degree felony or capital felony; 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction; and 
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, or decrees 
ruling on legislative subpoenas. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a 
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and 
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) through (d). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition 
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the 
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals 
under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, 
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2-2, enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, § 41*, 1987, ch. 161, $ 303; 1988. 
ch. 248. $ 5: 1989, ch. 67, 4 1; 1992. ch. 127, 
$ 11: 1994. ch. 191, § 2; 1995. ch. 267, $ 5; 
1995. ch. 299, $ 46:1996, ch. 159. 5 18; 2001, 
ch. 302, $ 1. 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 
1986, en. 47, § 41 repeals former § 73-2-2. as 
enacted by Laws 1951. ch. 58. § 1. relating to 
original "appellate jurisdiction of Supreme 
Court, and enacts the above section. 
Amendment Notes. — The 2001 amend-
ment, effective April 30, 2001, inserted "or 
charge'' in Subsection (3)(i) and made stylistic 
changes. 
Cross-References. — Cluef justice to pre-
side over impeachment of governor, § 77-5-2. 
Election contest appeals. §§ 20A-4-406. 
Extraordinary writs. Utan Const., Art. VIII. 
Sec. 3; U.R.C.P. 65B Utan R. App. P. 19. 
Jurisdiction, Utah Const., Art. VTTT, Sec. 3. 
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—Final orders and judgments. 
—Formal adjudicative proceedings. 
—Probate orders. 
—Sentence reduction. 









—District judge filling vacancy. 
—Newly elected justice. 






Although this section did not govern a land 
conveyance because it was not in effect when 
petitioner filed its writ of review, this section 
did not divest the Supreme Court of jurisdic-
tion, because jurisdiction attached under the 
statute in effect when the petition for review 
was filed. National Parks & Conservation Ass'n 
v. Board of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909 (Utah 
1993). 
—Final orders and judgments. 
The order granting the plaintiffs' motion for 
summary judgment was not a final order be-
cause the defendants' counterclaim and a third 
party's intervening claim remained pending 
before the trial court. Therefore, under the final 
judgment ru^e, the court did not have jurisdic-
tion over the appeal because the defendants 
were not appealing from a final order or judg-
ment. Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT 50, 397 
Utah Adv. Rep. 7. 
—Formal adjudicative proceedings. 
Subdivision (3)(e) confers jurisdiction in the 
Supreme Court only over final orders and de-
crees that originate in formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings in agency actions. Southern Utah Wil-
derness Alliance v. Board of State Lands & 
Forestry, 330 P.2d 233 lUtah 1992). 
—Probate orders. 
Final orders in probate were appealable un-
der former 4 20-2-2. Code 1943. In re Cliffs 
'Estate, 101 Utah 343, 122 P.2d 196 H942). 
—Sentence reduction. 
When a conviction is reduced under <j 76-3-
402, the appeal lies in the court having juris-
diction of the degree of crime recorded in the 
judgment of conviction and for which defendant 
is sentenced, rather than the degree of crime 
charged in the information or found in the 
verdict. State v. Doung, 313 R2d 1163 (Utah 
1991). 
—Timeliness of filing". 
Petition for review was dismissed where the 
Tax Commission's Fourth Order was unambig-
uously the last final agency action in the case, 
and taxpayer's petitions for judicial review in 
both the Supreme Court and the district court 
were filed late, depriving both courts of juris-
diction. Union Pac. R.R. v. State Tax Comm'n, 
2000 UT 40, 999 P.2d 17. 
Certiorari . 
Even prior to express statutory authoriza-
tion, Supreme Court had original jurisdiction to 
issue a writ of certiorari. Young v. Cannon, 2 
Utah 560 (1880). 
Where district court exceeded its jurisdiction 
on appeal from justice of peace, Supreme Court 
had power by certiorari to review jurisdictional 
question, judgment not being reviewable by 
further appeal. Oregon Short Line R.R. v. Dis-
trict Court, 30 Utah 371, 85 P. 360 (1906). 
Supreme Court, and not justice thereof, was 
authorized to issue writ of certiorari, and stat-
ute, which conferred such power on justice of 
Supreme Court, had to give way to Constitu-
tion. Robinson v. District Court, 38 Utah 379, 
113 P. 1026 (1910). 
Supreme Court can exercise a reasonable 
discretion in granting or refusing a writ of 
certiorari. Rohwer v. District Court, 41 Utah 
279, 125 P. 671 (1912). 
When exercising certiorari jurisdiction 
granted by this section, the Supreme Court 
reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals, 
not of the trial court; therefore, the briefs of the 
parties should address the decision of the Court 
of Appeals, not the decision of the trial court. 
Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97 (Utah 1992). 
Docketing statement. 
—Citation. 
In all cases appealed after January 1, 1987. 
reference in the docketing statement to this 
section will be considered insufficient: instead 
the appropriate subsection must be included to 
alert the Supreme Court that it lias original 
appellate jurisdiction over the case. Gregory v. 
Fourthwest lavs., Ltd., 735 P.2d 33 lUtan 
1987). 
In general. 
Supreme Court is exclusive judge of its own 
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jurisdiction. National Bank v. Lewis, 13 Utah. 
507, 45 P. 890 (1896). 
'The Supreme Court is not a court of general 
original jurisdiction: it is a reviewing court. 
Nielsen v. Utah Na t l Bank, 40 Utah 95, 120 P. 
211 (1911). 
Supreme Court can inquire into its own ju-
risdiction no matter how that question is called 
to its attention and regardless of whether par-
ties desire it to do so. Woldberg v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 74 Utah 309, 279 P. 609 (1929). 
Question of Supreme Court's jurisdiction to 
hear and determine an appeal is one that can 
be raised by the court on its own motion. City of 
Logan City v. Blotter, 75 Utah 272, 284 P. 333 
(1929). 
Original jurisdict ion. 
—Equity. 
Supreme Court no longer possesses any orig-
inal jurisdiction in equity cases; in making its 
own findings in such cases, the court acts 
merely as an appellate or reviewing tribunal. 
In re Raleigh's Estate, 48 Utah 128, 158 P. 705 
(1916). 
—Extraordinary writs . 
Even prior to express statutory authoriza-
tion, Supreme Court had jurisdiction to issue 
writ of mandamus in a proper case. Maxwell v. 
Burton, 2 Utah 595 (1880). 
It did not necessarily follow from fact tha t 
Supreme Court had original jurisdiction to is-
sue writs, enumerated in former Utah Const., 
Art. VIII, Sec. 4, that it was court's duty to issue 
such writs in every instance merely on applica-
tions for them. State v. Booth, 21 Utah 88, 59 P. 
553 (1899). 
Former Utah Const., Art. VIII, Sec. 4, in 
conferring authority upon the Supreme Court 
to issue writs of prohibition, contemplated a 
writ having the same character and functions 
as the writ denned by the territorial s tatute 
then in existence. Barnes v. City of Lehi City, 74 
Utah 321, 279 P. 378(1929). 
After remittitur had gone down to district 
court, Supreme Court did not have exclusive 
jurisdiction to issue a writ of prohibition in the 
cause. Plutus Mining Co. v. Orme, 76 Utah 286, 
289 P. 132(1930). 
Where situation called for relief more nearly 
analogous to purpose of writ of mandamus 
rather than to writ of prohibition, and neither 
standing alone would bring about desired re-
sult. Supreme Court had authority to issue 
both writs of mandamus and prohibition. Child 
v. Ogden State Bank, 31 Utan 464. 20 P.2d 599. 
88A.L.R. 1284H933). 
Whether district court had jurisdiction was 
not determinative of wnether Supreme Court 
wouid entertain application for writ of prohibi-
tion: whether there was a plain, speedy and 
adequate remedy at law was determinative. 
Mayers v. Bronson, 100 Utah 279, 114 P.2d 213 
(1941). 
Objections to jurisdiction of administrative 
tribunals are to be first presented to such 
tribunal before applying to Supreme Court for a 
writ of prohibition. Furbreeders Agrl. Coop. v. 
Wiesley, 102 Utah 601, 132 P.2d 384 (1942): 
Supreme Court's discretion was exercised in, 
favor of making writ of prohibition permanent 
to prevent enforcement of city court criminal 
contempt judgment, as against contention that 
petitioner had plain, speedy and adequate rem-
edy by appeal, where alleged contempt was not 
committed in presence of court or judge, and 
court, did not acquire jurisdiction over either 
person of petitioner or of offense claimed be-
cause of absence of initiatory affidavit required 
by former § 104-45-3, so t ha t contempt pro-
ceedings were void. Robinson v. City Court, 112 
Utah 36, 185 P.2d 256 (1947). 
The term "original" in Subsection (2) adds 
nothing to the Supreme Court's writ jurisdic-
tion — and its absence in § 78-2a-3(l) takes 
nothing from the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Appeals — because jurisdiction over petitions 
for extraordinary writs necessarily invokes a 
court's jurisdiction to consider a petition origi-
nally filed with it as opposed to its appellate 
jurisdiction over cases tha t originated else-
where. Barnard v. Murphy, 882 P.2d 679 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994). 
Rehearings . 
—Distr ict j u d g e filling vacancy. 
A district judge called to sit in lieu of disqual-
ified justice is a member of the court for all 
purposes so far as his right to participate in the 
case and in its decision and should sit in on a 
rehearing even after the vacancy is filled. In re 
Thompson's Estate, 72 U tah 17, 269 P. 103 
(1927). 
— N e w l y e l ec ted just ice. 
Member of Supreme Court, elected after case 
had been decided, was not entitled to partici-
pate in consideration for rehearing. Cordner v. 
Coroner. 91 Utah 474, 64 P.2d 828 (1937). 
Scope of review. 
In original proceeding in Supreme Court to 
review proceedings of district court, Supreme 
Court will ignore mere irregularities or legal 
errors in trial court, and would limit review to 
question of whether district court exceeded its 
jurisdiction or was without jurisdiction in mak-
ing and entering the judgment complained of. 
Jerfries v. Third Judicial District Court, 90 
Utah 525, 63 R2d 242 (1936). 
Where no motion was made for directed ver-
dict or new m a i . Supreme Court was precluded 
from reviewing sufficiency of evidence in cause 
at law. since under former Utah Const.. Art. 
VIII. Sec. 9 and predecessor of this section 
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review could be made only an Questions of law 
Bngnam v Moon Lake Elec Ass'n, 24 Utah 2d 
292, 470 P2a 393 (1970) 
Transfer authority. 
An appeal by criminal defendant under Rule 
22(e) of the Utan Rules of Criminal Procedure 
from the denial of his motion to declare his 
sentence illegal was not an appeal of his capital 
felony conviction and the Supreme Court had 
the power to pour it over to the Court of Appeals 
for decision State v Hua, 926 P2d 884 (Utah 
1996) 
Zoning appeals. 
Although § 78-2a-3, describing the Court of 
Appeals' jurisdiction, does not specifically as-
sign that court original appellate jurisdiction 
over a district court's review of a city council's 
decisions on zoning issues, the Supreme Court 
has consistently determined that it does not 
have original appellate jurisdiction over zoning 
cases under the catch-all provision m Subsec 
tion (3)(j) of this section. Therefore, "adjudica-
tive'7 in § 78-2a-3(2)(b)d) must be read oroadly 
to include both administrative and legislative 
proceedings of state political subdivisions and 
local governments, and when read in conjunc 
tion with this section, § 78-2a-3(2)(b)d) confers 
original appellate jurisdiction to the court of 
appeals over these matters Bradlev v Payson 
City Corp , 2001 UT App 9, 17 P3d 1160 
Cited m Conder v A L Williams & Assocs , 
739 P2d 634 (Utah Ct App 1987), State v 
Humphrey, 823 P2d 464 (Utah 1991), Renn. v 
Utan State Bd of Pardons, 904 P 2d 677 (Utah 
1995), Coulter & Smith, Ltd v Russell, 966 
P2d 852 (Utan 1998), Clark v Pangan, 2000 
UT 37, 998 P2d 268, County Bd of Equaliza-
tion v Stichting Mayflower Recreational Fonds, 
2000 UT 57, 6 P3d 559, Lysenko v Sawaya, 
2000 UT 58, 7 P3d 783, In re West Side Prop 
Assocs, 2000 UT 85, 13 P3d 168, Clark v 
Clark, 2001 UT 44, 27 P 3d 538, cert denied, — 
U S —, 122 S Ct 666, 151 L Ed 2d 580 
(2001), State v Morgan, 2001 UT 87, 34 P3d 
767 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — The Utah Supreme 
Court and the Rule of Law Phillips and the Bill 
of Rights in Utah, 1975 Utah L Rev 593 
Recent Developments in Utah Law — The 
Utah Court of Appeals, 1988 Utah L Rev 150 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am Jur 2d Courts §§ 98, 
107 to 110 
C.J S. — 21 C J S Courts § 9 et seq. 
AX JL — Judgment granting or denying writ 
of mandamus or prohibition as res judicata, 21 
A.L R 3d 206 
Mandamus to compel disciplinary investiga-
tion or action against physician or attorney, 33 
A L R 3 d l 4 2 9 
78-2-3, Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1986, ch 47, § 80 repeals 
§ 78-2-3, as enacted by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 1, 
requiring the concurrence of three justices in a 
judgment. 
78-2-4. Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges pro tem-
pore, and practice of law. 
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence for use 
in the courts of the state and shall by rule manage the appellate process The 
Legislature may amend the rules of procedure and evidence adopted by the 
Supreme Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses of the 
Legislature. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Constitution, the Supreme 
Court by rule may authorize retired justices and judges and judges pro 
tempore to perform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of 
the United States, Utah residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah. 
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the practice of law, including 
admission to practice law and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted 
to the practice of law. 
History: C. 1953, 78-2-4. enacted by L. 
1986, ch. 47, * 42. 
Repeals and Reenacnnents. — Laws 
1986 v.a ±7. a ±2 reDeais lormer ^ "S-2-^ as 
11 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Houghton v Dep't of Health 2002 v E A , 2002 UT 126, 463 Utah Adv Rep 20, 63 
UT 101, 57 P3d 1067 cert denied, — US —, P3d 100 
123 S Ct 1632, 155 L Ed 2d 485 (2003), State 
CHAPTER 2a 
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78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Final order. the Labor Commission ruled on its request for 
Appellate court lacked jurisdiction to con- reconsideration of a workers' compensation 
sider an employer's appeal because its petition award McCoy v Utah Disaster Kleenup, 2003 
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Brian T. MURPHY and Shelly 
F. Murphy, Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
v. 
Todd CROSLAND and Jeff Crosland, 
Defendants and Petitioner. 
No. 950055. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 12, 1996. 
Rehearing Denied April 29, 1996. 
Judgment creditors of corporate guaran-
tor brought suit seeking to hold officers of 
corporation jointly and severally liable for 
judgment. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Glenn K. Iwasald, J.y granted 
summary judgment in favor of president but 
against vice president. Creditors appealed 
and vice president cross-appealed. The 
Court of Appeals, 886 P.2d 74, affirmed in 
part and reversed in part. Certiorari was 
granted. The Supreme Court, Durham, J., 
held that: (1) "good cause" standard for 
granting of extension of time in which to 
appeal was available without requirement 
that request be made within 30 days of origi-
nal judgment or order, and (2) president 
signing guarantee on behalf of corporation, at 
time it was suspended, was personally liable 
to discharge guarantee commitment. 
Affirmed. 
1. Appeal and Error <3=42S(2) 
Appellate procedure rule allowing for 
court approved extension of time in which to 
file notice of appeal, upon motion tiled not 
more than 30 days after expiration of 30-day 
period following date oi entry of judgment or 
order appealed from, provided that "good 
cause'' or "'excusable neglect" is shown, al-
lowed consideration of motion under ''good 
cause'' standard i made during aggregate 
60-day period, and was not limited to mo-
tions made during rirst 30-dav period. 
Rules AoD.Proc. Rule 4(a, e). 
\ CROSLAND Utah 4 9 1 
{ 491 (Utah 1996) 
2. Corporations <s=>349 
Officers of corporation are personally li-
able for acts of corporation while it is in state 
of suspension, as well as when corporation is 
terminated. U.C.A.1953, 16-10-38.2, 16-10-
139 (1991). 
3. Corporations <s>254, 349 
President, director and principal share-
holder of corporation was personally liable ' 
for guarantee made by corporation while it 
was suspended for failure to file annual re-
port. U.C.A.1953, 16-10-88.2, 16-10-139 
(1991). 
Scott B. Mitchell, Salt Lake City, for the 
Murphys. 
Ellen Maycock, David C. Wright, Salt 
Lake City, for Todd Crosland. 
Gerald H. Kinghorn, David W. Scofield, 
Salt Lake City, for Jeff Crosland. 
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
DURHAM, Justice: 
This case involves review of Murphy v~ 
Crosland, 886 P.2d 74 (Utah CtApp.1994), 
cert, granted, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995). 
The court of appeals reversed the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment in favor 
of defendant Todd Crosland and held him 
personally liable for negotiating and execut-
ing guarantee agreements on behalf of a 
corporation operating under suspended sta-
tus. We affirm. 
Todd Crosland was the president, director, 
and principal shareholder in Crosland Indus-
tries. Incorporated in Utah in January 1986, 
Crosland Industries7 corporate status was 
suspended on March 1, 1987, for failure to 
file its annual report pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 16-10-38.2 (1987). On January 8, 
1988, plaintiffs Brian and Shelly Murphy (the 
Murphys) entered into a contract to sell their 
cinnamon roll store. Granny's Buns, to Ar-
nold Swenson. Although its corporate status 
was suspended, Crosland Industries, with M l 
agreement of all board members and through 
its nee president and director Jeff Crosland. 
guaranteed Swenson's performance on both 
the oaies contract and the note. Thereafter, 
having tailed to remedv its suspended status. 
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Crosland Industries was involuntarily dis-
solved on March 1,1988. 
Swenson subsequently defaulted under the 
terms of both the promissoij note and the 
security agreement, and Crosland Industries 
failed to honor its guarantee. The Murphys 
obtained a default judgment against Swenson 
and Crosland Industries and brought suit 
against Todd and Jeff Crosland, inter alia, to 
hold both defendants jointly and severally 
liable under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-139 
(1987). On August 14, 1990, the Murphys 
moved for partial summary judgment against 
Jeff and Todd Crosland pursuant to section 
16-10-139. The trial court granted partial 
summary judgment against Jeff Crosland on 
the ground that he was personally liable for 
signing a contract on behalf of a "non-exis-
tent" corporation. As to Todd Crosland, the 
trial court denied partial summary judgment 
on the ground that an issue of fact remained 
because he had not personally signed the 
guarantee. Todd Crosland then moved for 
summary judgment, contending that section 
16-10-139 does not impose personal liability 
on corporate officers when corporate authori-
ty is suspended rather than- terminated. In 
response to Todd Crosland's motion, the 
Murphys stipulated to the dismissal of all 
other claims against Todd' Crosland except 
his liability under section 16-10-139. The 
trial court granted Todd Crosland's motion 
for summary judgment on the ground that 
section 16-10-139 did not impose personal 
liability under these circumstances. 
On March 18, 1993, the Murphys Sled a 
timely notice of appeal of the summary judg-
ment in favor of Todd Crosland. On the 
following day, Jeff Crosland filed a rule 59 
motion to amend the summary judgment 
against him or for a new trial. On May 25, 
1993, the trial court entered an order deny-
ing Jeff Crosiand's rule 59 motion and thus 
disposed of the matter in its entirety. On 
June 29, 1993, Todd Crosland moved to dis-
miss che Murphys'' appeai because their no-
rice of appeai was premature due co the 
intervening ruie 59 motion and because they 
had not riled a notice of appeal within thirty 
days arter ;he order denying Jeff Crosiand's 
morion. In response, on Juiy 7, 1993. ± e 
1. The Aci -.vas reDeaiea in 1992 and replaced by 
Murphys moved to extend the time in which 
to file their notice of appeal pursuant to ruie 
4(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure. The trial court, finding "good cause," 
granted the Murphys' motion, and the Mur-
phys' subsequent notice of appeal was ffled 
on July 14, 1993. 
In Murphy, the Utah Court of Appeals 
reversed the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Todd Crosland. Specif-
ically, the court interpreted Utah Code Ann. , 
§§ 16-10-58.2 and 16-10-139 to impose per-
sonal liability on corporate officers for acts 
done while the corporation is suspended: 
[W]e conclude that a corporation suspend-
ed under section 16-10-38.2 may engage in 
business activities allowed during winding-
up and in business necessary to remedy 
the corporation's suspended status. How-
ever, a suspended corporation does not 
have authority to conduct business as usu-
al. 
Todd and Jeff Crosland exceeded their 
suspended corporation's authority . .\ 
[and] are jointly and severally liable for 
the default judgment entered against 
[Crosland Industries] 
886 P.2d at 84-35. 
On certiorari, Todd Crosland raises two 
issues: (1) whether the court of appeals 
lacked jurisdiction to hear the Murphys' ap-
peal because the trial court erroneously ap-
plied the "good cause" standard in granting 
the Murphys' rule 4(e) motion to extend the 
time for filing their notice of appeal, and (2) 
whether the court of appeals erred in inter-
preting the former Utah Business Corpora-
tion Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-10-1 to -
148,l to impose personal liability on corporate 
officers for corporate obligations incurred 
while the corporation is operating under sus-
pended status. 
[1] Todd Crosland argues that the trial 
court applied, che wrong standard under ruie 
4(e) oi the Utah Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure and thereby improperly granted the 
Murphys an extension of time in which co tile 
their notice of appeai. Under rule 4(e/, 
,4[t]he ~riai court, upon a showing of excusa-
5§ 16-iOa-iOl to-1705. 
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ble neglect or good cause, may extend the 
time for filing a nouce of appeal upon motion 
filed not later than 30 aays after the expira-
tion of the time prescribed by paragraph (a) 
of this rule " 2 (Emphasis added ) Todd 
Crosland contends that this court should re-
strict the apphcation of rule 4(e)'s "good 
cause" standard to motions made before the 
expiration of the initial thirty-day period al-
lowed under rule 4(a) For all motions filed 
after the expiration of the initial thirty-day 
period, he argues that the trial court should 
employ only the "excusable neglect" stan-
dard Consequently, since the Murphys filed 
their rule 4(e) motion after the initial thirty-
day period, Todd Crosland argues that the 
trial court erred m granting their motion 
without a finding of "excusable neglect." 
This court has not yet decided whether 
rule 4(e)'s "good cause" standard applies to 
motions filed after the initial thirty-day peri-
od. In deciding this issue, "we look to the 
express language of our rules and, to the 
extent that they are similarly worded, to the 
federal rules and cases interpreting them " 
First Security Bank of Utah v. Conlvn, 817 
P 2d 298, 299 (Utah 1991). 
Rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules ot Appellate 
Procedure is patterned after the 1979 amend-
ment to rule 4(a)(5) of the Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. There is a split of 
authority among the federal courts as to 
whether the "good cause" standard applies 
alter the initial thirty-day period. A majori-
ty of courts have limited the apphcation of 
this standard to the initial thirty-day period. 
This limitation is based in part on an adviso-
ry committee note to the 1979 amendment to 
rule 4(a)(5), which provides in pertinent part: 
The proposed amended rule expands to 
some extent the standard for the grant of 
an extension ot time. The present rule 
requires a 'showing of excusable neglect.' 
Wlnle this was an appropriate standard in 
cases in wmch the motion is made arter rhe 
time tor filing the notice or cDpeal has run, 
ana remains ao, -t las never fit exactly the 
situation n whicn the appellant seeKs m 
extension oeiore "he expiration oi the ou-
- Ruie -id) eauires aonce or JDDeal vithin 20 
JaVb wircer aie uaie u enrn JC he uaamenr or 
CROSLAND Utah 493 
491 (Utah 1996) 
tial time In such a case "good cause," 
which is the standard that is applied m the 
granting of other extensions of time under 
Ruie 26(b) seems to be more appropriate. 
Relying on the foregoing language, the 
Nmth Circuit Court of Appeals in Oregon v 
Champion International Corp, 680 F 2d 
1300 (9th Cirl982), held that a finding of 
''good cause" was insufficient to extend the 
time for filing the notice of appeal when the 
rule 4(a)(5) motion was filed after the initial 
thirty-day period: 
Although the Rule allows an extension of 
time upon a showing of excusable neglect 
or "good cause,'' the latter is applicable 
only where a motion is filed before the 
[expiration] of the thirty-day period. The 
good cause language was added to the 
Rule by a 1979 amendment because the 
excusable neglect standard "never fit ex-
actly the situation m which the appellant 
seeks an extension before the expiration of 
the initial time." 
Id at 1301 (quoting Advisory Committee 
Notes to 1979 amendment to Fed.R.App.P 
4(a)(5)), see also Pontarelli v Stone 930 
F2d 104, 109 (1st Cirl991) ("The advisory 
committee note has been relied upon by the 
seven regional courts of appeals which ad-
here to the view that the 'good cause' stan-
dard is applicable exclusively to FRAP 
4(a)(5) motions made during the thirty-day 
period for taking an appeal as a matter of 
right under FRAP 4(a)(1) "). 
However, it appears to us that reliance 
upon the advisory committee note to inter-
pret rule 4(a)(5Vs "good cause" standard is 
misplaced. Rule 4(a)(5), as formally adopted, 
is different from the draft rule to which the 
comment was addressed: 
The April, 1977 Preliminary Draft of the 
Proposed Rule 4(a)(5) clearly provided that 
an extension was available on a showing oi 
good cause d che extension was sought 
duiing the original anpeol time, but oould 
be granted oniy on a showing JI excusable 
neglect if the extension were ^ougnt la-
ter As ictuailv adopted. Rule 4(a)(5) 
applies the excusaoie neglect or gooct cause 
order aDpeaiea from J t an R \op P -(a) 
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standard to any motion that satisfies its 
time requirements. The Note of the Advi-
sory Committee, however, was not changed 
to reflect this difference. 
16 Charles A. Wright et aL, Federal Practice 
and Procedure § 3950 (Supp.1995). 
The First Circuit has adopted the better-
reasoned position on this question. In Scar-
pa v. Murphy, 782 F.2d 300 (1st Cir.l9S6), 
the court rejected the majority position on 
federal rule 4(a)(5) and reversed the trial 
court's denial of the plaintiffs rule 4(a)(5) 
motion: 
We regard the Oregon court's statement 
that the phrase "good cause" is applicable 
only when the motion is filed before the 
time for filing the appeal has expired . . . 
as an unwarranted maiming of the 
ru l e . . . . The rule expressly recognizes 
"good cause1' as a basis for extension both 
before and after the expiration of the ap-
peal time. 
Id. at 301 (citation omitted). 
Following the First Circuit's rationale, the 
Montana Supreme Court in Northwest Truck 
& Trailer Sales. Inc. v. Dvorak 265 Mont. 
327, 877 P.2d 31 (1994), found both "good 
cause" and "excusable neglect" where the 
defendants filed for an extension of their 
notice of appeal one day after the initial 
thirty-day period: 
Like the federal rule, the plain language of 
[the Montana rule] does not support [the 
plaintiffs] argument that we should adopt 
the reasoning of the majority of federal 
courts which require a separate standard 
before and after the expiration of the ini-
tial thirty-day time for filing an appeal. 
We therefore decline to adopt the rationale 
of those courts which restrict the applica-
tion of the good cause standard. We em-
3. In Dvorak, the court noted that defining 'good 
cause ' by a more liberal standard than "excusa-
ble negiect' *.vas not inconsistent with its use 
after the .niual diirrv-dav period. .Vorr/nvesr 
Truck & Trailer Sales, Inc. ". DvoraK, 377 ?.ld 
31. 34 (Mont. 199^) 
phasize that [the Montana rule] is clear on 
its face. 
Id. at 33.' 
Thus, the majority rule among the federal 
circuits relies on an outdated advisory com-
mittee note, and we decline to adopt it. The 
plain meaning of Utah's rule 4(e) is that 
"good cause" is not limited and is an appro-
priate ground for granting a rule 4(e) exten-
sion after the initial thirty-day period. 
Therefore, on the basis of its finding of "good 
cause," the trial court's grant of the Mur-
phys' rule 4(e) motion was appropriate, and 
the Murphys' subsequent notice of appeal 
was timely. 
[2] We next address Todd Crosland's 
contention that the court of appeals erred in 
interpreting the former Business Corpora-
tion Act, specifically Utah Code Ann. §§ 16-
10-38.2(1) and 16-10-139, to impose liability 
on corporate officers for corporate obli-
gations incurred while the corporation was 
operating under suspended status. Under 
section 16-10-58.2(1) (1988), "[a] domestic 
corporation that remains delinquent for more 
than 30 days after the mailing of the notice of 
delinquency . . . shall be suspended."4 Fur-
thermore, under section 16-10-139 (1987), 
"[a]ll persons who assume to act as a corpo-
ration without authority so to do shall be 
jointly and severally liable for all debts and 
liabilities incurred or arising as a result 
thereof." Todd Crosland argues that section 
16-10-139 applies only to de facto corpora-
tions and is not a basis for personal liability 
of officers or directors of a corporation which 
has been properly incorporated under state 
law. 
We recently interpreted section 16-10-139 
in Steenblik v. Lichfield, 906 P.2d 872 (Utah 
1995), and therefore treat Crosland's argu-
ment summarily. In Steenblik the defen-
dant argued that the suspension of corporate 
authority terminated his personal liability as 
a director and an officer of the corporation. 
4. In sections 16-I0a-1420 and -1421 at the Re-
vised Business Corporation Act. all references to 
corporate suspension have been deleted. Sec-
tion i6-10a-i420(2) allows the division to com-
mence admimstranve dissolution if 'the corpo-
ration aoes not deliver a corporate or annual 
r e n n r t ' v n e n
 Lr : s a -M £ > ' 
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Id at 875. Interpreting section 16-10-139, 
this court held that individuals are liable for 
corporate obligations incurred while the cor-
poration is suspended: 
As to corporations that have been suspend-
ed and not reinstated, we hold that officers 
and directors who continue the business of 
a suspended corporation are personally lia-
ble for all debts and liabilities arising from 
those operations that are a continuation of 
the types of activities the corporation per-
formed Thus, persons who act as if 
pursuant to valid corporate authority, after 
that authority has been suspended, are 
personally responsible for liabilities arising 
from the continued operations They 
are jointly and severally liable with others 
who know the corporation's authority is no 
longer effective but continue its operations. 
Id at 878 (citations omitted). 
[3] Todd Crosland, in his capacity as the 
president, director, and principal shareholder 
of Crosland Industries, authorized Jeff Cros-
land to execute guarantees on Swenson's be-
half for the Murphys. Todd Crosland there-
fore continued to conduct business as usual 
while Crosland" Industries7 corporate status 
was suspended. Because Crosland Indus-
tries' corporate status was not subsequently 
reinstated, Todd Crosland is personally liable 
for the default judgment entered against the 
corporation. Inasmuch as the court of ap-
peals' decision is consistent with Steenblik, 
we affirm. 
ZIMMERMAN, C.J., STEWART, A.CJ., 
HOWE and LYON, JJ., concur in 
DURHAM'S. J., opinion. 
RUSSON, J., having disqualified himself, 
does not participate herein: MICHAEL D. 
LYON, District Judge, sat. 
O | KEY NUMBER Si STEM } 
WILLIAMS Utah 4 9 5 
495 (Utah 1996) 
Marie V. SHARP, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Noel WILLIAMS and Does 1 through 
10, Defendants and Appellee. 
No. 940379. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 4, 1996. 
Mail carrier sued dog owner for injuries 
sustained when carrier fell while attempting 
to escape from dog. The District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Pat B. Brian, J., entered judg-
ment of no cause of action on jury verdict. 
Following denial of her motion for new trial, 
plaintiff appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Howe, J., held that evidence was insufficient 
to support jury's finding that plaintiff was 50 
percent contributorily negligent. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Appeal and Error <$> 1005(2) 
Trial court's denial of motion for new 
trial will be sustained on appeal if there is 
evidentiary basis for jury's decision and will 
be reversed only if evidence to support ver-
dict is completely lacking or so slight and 
unconvincing as to make verdict plainly un-
reasonable and unjust. Rules Civ.Proc, 
Rule 59(a)(6). 
2. Animals <s=68 
Statute imposing liability on owner or 
keeper of dog for injury committed by such 
dog imposes strict liability and thus it is 
unnecessary for injured party to allege and 
prove negligence. U.C.A.1953.18-1-1. 
3. Animals <s=>«>8 
Statute imposing strict liability on owner 
or keeper oi dog for injury committed by 
such dog does not require physical conduct 
between dog and injured party, and it is only 
necessary that dog committed injury. 
U.C.A.1953.18-1-1. 
R. SUPP. 144 
872 Utah 906 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
Lawanna W. STEENBLIK, individually 
and as trustee of the Lawanna W. 
Steenblik Family Trust Plan, Plaintiff 
and Appellee, 
v. 
Aaron LICHFIELD, Robert I. Rasmussen, 
Scott Craw, Zephor Planning Corpora-
tion dba Zephor Advisors, Inc., and De-
bra Rasmussen, Defendants and Appel-
lant. 
No. 930358. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 3, 1995. 
Investor brought suit against vice presi-
dent and director of financial planning com-
pany, alleging violations of Uniform Securi-
ties Act, common-law fraud, constructive 
fraud and negligence. The Second District 
Court, Davis County, Jon M. Memmott, J., 
awarded investor damages, treble damages 
and punitive damages, and held defendant 
vicariously liable for other defendants' negli-
gence. Defendant appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Stewart, Associate C.J., held that: (1) 
defendant was sufficiently involved with the 
company and with plaintiffs investments to 
support liability under the Act; (2) defendant 
could be held vicariously liable for 20% of the 
negligence of the company and its president; 
(3) award of punitive and triple damages 
under Uniform Securities Act was improper-
ly duplicative; and (4) award amounting to 
more than three times the consideration paid 
by plaintiff exceeded amount authorized by 
Uniform Securities Act. 
Affirmed in part and vacated in part. 
1. Appeal and Error ^ 757(3), 930(1), 
999(1) 
To support claim that jury verdict is 
against clear weignt of evidence, appellant 
must marsnal all evidence that supports the 
'inclines ana demonstrate that wnen viewed 
d\ xignt mobt ravorable :o the ^eraiet. there .s 
nsumcient evidence ~o support _t. 
2. Appeal and Error <3=930(1) 
On appeal of jury verdict, all reasonable 
inferences must be drawn in favor of verdict 
3. Securities Regulation <3»302 
Vice president and director of financial 
planning company was sufficiently involved 
with the company after its corporate authori-
ty was suspended and with plaintiffs invest-
ments in entities in which he had a personal 
interest to support liability under the Uni-
form Securities Act. U.C.A.1953, 61-1-22; 
U.C.A.1953, 16-10-139 (Repealed). 
4. Corporations <2>617(1) 
Suspension of corporate authority is 
temporary restriction on corporation's au-
thority and functions that renders the corpo-
ration powerless or unable to continue its 
normal operations. 
5. Corporations <3=3349 
Person who purports to act for and on 
behalf of corporation that has no corporate 
authority is personally liable. U.CA.1953, 
16-10-139 (Repealed). 
6. Corporations <£=>349 
Officers and directors who continue the 
business of the suspended corporation are 
personally liable for all debts and liabilities 
arising from those operations that are a con-
tinuance of the types of activities the corpo-
ration performed. U.C.A.1953, 16-10-139 
(Repealed). 
7. Corporations <3=>349 
Persons who act as if pursuant to valid 
corporate authority, after that authonty has 
been suspended, are personally responsible 
for liabilities arising from continued opera-
tions; they are jointly and severally liable 
with others who know the corporation's au-
thority is no longer effective but continue its 
operations. U.C.A.1953, 16-10-139 (Re-
pealed). 
3. Securities Regulation <5=>302 
Even if vice president and director of 
financial planning company neither knew u 
nor participated .n plaintiffs investment :n 
comnanv .»i vmcn du-ector was treasurer. 'ie 
was atill iame, vnere ae lenew investor vas 
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being fraudulently enticed into making in-
vestments. U.C.A.1953, 61-1-22(2). 
9. Securities Regulation <s=>308 
Finding that vice president and director 
of financial planning company recklessly or 
intentionally violated Uniform Securities Act 
was supported by evidence that he was per-
sonally involved in plaintiffs investments, 
signed loan disclosure and stock purchase 
agreements, continuously reassured plaintiff 
that her money was secured, and funded his 
personal business ventures by repeatedly re-
turning to plaintiff for funds. U.C.A.1953, 
61-l-22(l)(b). 
10. Corporations <3=>336 
Vice president and director of financial 
planning company could be held vicariously 
liable for 20% of the negligence of the compa-
ny and its president based on the vice presi-
dent's and president's joint actions in unau-
thorized business with plaintiff following sus-
pension of company's corporate authority. 
U.C.A.1953, 16-10-139 (Repealed). 
11. Damages <s=315 
Defendant's vicarious liability for other 
defendants' securities violations was satisfied 
if those defendants paid the judgment, but if 
defendant paid full amount of his vicarious 
liability, he would have indemnity or contri-
bution claim against other defendants for 
their shares of the judgment; plaintiff would 
not therefore, receive double recovery but 
virtue of imposing vicarious liability. U.C.A. 
1953, 16-10-139 (Repealed). 
12. Securities Regulation <3=309 
Award of punitive and triple damages 
under Uniform Securities Act was improper-
ly duplicative, where both awards were based 
on same conduct; defendant's "reckless and 
intentional" acts in violation of the Act were 
the same "malicious*' acts for which jury 
awarded punitive damages. U.C.A.1953. 61-
l-22(l)(b). 
13. Damages ^ 1 5 
Election oi Remedies o=34 
Prevailing paiTv nust be allowed :o 
.•noose between auniicative awaras. 
r. LICHFIELD Utah 873 
872 (Utah 1995) 
14. Securities Regulation @=309 
Award amounting to more than three 
times the consideration paid by plaintiff ex-
ceeded amount authorized by Uniform Secu-
rities Act. U.C.A.1953, 61-l-22(l)(b). 
15. Appeal and Error <3=*204(7) 
Claim that trial court committed revers-
ible error by allowing plaintiffs expert to 
testify about defendant's intent was waived, 
where defendant did not object to the testi-
mony at trial. Rules of Evid., Rule 103(a). 
L. Rich Humpherys and David C. Rich-
ards, Salt Lake City, for Steenblik. 
Raymond N. Malouf, Logan, and R. Ste-
phen Marshall, and Matthew M. Durham, 
Salt Lake City, for Lichfield. 
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice: 
Plaintiff Lawanna Steenblik sued Zephor 
Planning Corporation, a financial planning 
company through which she invested and lost 
her life savings, and four individuals connect-
ed with Zephor in various capacities. Appel-
lant Aaron Lichfield was Zephor's vice-presi-
dent and a director. He was also a financial 
planner. The other individual defendants 
were Robert I. Rasmussen, Zephor's presi-
dent, a director, and a financial planner; Ins 
wife, Debra Rasmussen, the corporate secre-
tary; and Scott Craw, a financial planner. 
Steenblik alleged violations of Utah's Uni-
form Securities Act, common law fraud, con-
structive fraud, and negligence. The jury 
found all defendants liable. Only Lichfield 
appeals. 
I. FACTS 
Steenblik's association with defendants be-
gan on the day of her husband's death. Ras-
mussen. who held a local ecclesiastical posi-
tion in addition to his positions at Zephor, 
came to her home to console her married 
son, Steven. Shortly after her husband's 
funeral Steenblik. at the urging of her son. 
contacted Rasmussen for advice on investing 
her 'ire savings and :he insurance proceeds 
irom >ier husband's death. Rasmussen re-
newed ail Steenblik's assets and ai Decem-
oer 19S7 developed a financial oian :ov lier. 
D C l i n r t * m * 
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The first page of the plan stated, "Prepared 
By: Zephor Advisors Inc.," and the plan 
referred to "the Zephor Corporation" 
throughout. Unknown to Steenblik, Ze-
phor's corporate authority had been suspend-
ed by the State of Utah in November 1987. 
In January 1988, Rasmussen invited 
Steenblik to his office. Outside the building 
stood a sign identifying the business as Ze-
phor. At the Zephor office, Rasmussen con-
vinced her to invest a total of $45,000 in 
three companies, Equi-Healthcare, Equi-De-
velopment, and PLD Interior. At this point, 
Steenblik had not met Aaron Lichfield, nor is 
there any evidence that he knew of the above 
three investments made in January. 
On April 27, 1988, Rasmussen encouraged 
Steenblik to lend money to Healthcare Pro-
fessional Services (HPS) and Fairway, Inc. 
At the Zephor offices, Rasmussen introduced 
her to Aaron Lichfield, who, in addition to 
being vice-president of Zephor, was presi-
dent of HPS and treasurer of Fairway. Ras-
mussen also had a personal interest in both 
HPS and Fairway. Steenblik was assured 
that HPS was a sound investment. Howev-
er, no one disclosed the fact that HPS was a 
proposed start-up company that had no 
clients, operating history, assets, or stock. 
In fact, HPS was not even incorporated for 
another two months. To induce Steenblik to 
loan HPS $20,000, both Rasmussen and Lich-
field signed a loan disclosure statement pur-
porting to secure the debt with HPS pre-
ferred stock. 
At the same meeting, Steenblik was also 
persuaded to lend $35,000 to Fairway, Inc. 
Fairway has never been a corporation. The 
only evidence of its existence as a company 
of any land was a "corporate" bank account 
at First Interstate Bank of Utah. The signa-
ture card authorized Rasmussen, as Fair-
way's president, and Lichfield, as its treasur-
er, to withdraw money. The card was signed 
by both men. The loan was purportedly 
secured by nonexistent preferred stock. 
On October 20, 1988. Steenblik again met 
both Rasmussen and Lichfield at the Zephor 
offices, where they induced her to lend an-
other $8,000 to HPS. They signed a loan 
disclosure statement purporting to secure the 
loan with HPS stock. Thev also sold her 
$3,000 of what they claimed was valuable 
stock in Rex Mining Company, an Arizona 
corporation that had been dissolved. Both 
Rasmussen and Lichfield were principals in 
Rex Mining. They told Steenblik that the 
value of the stock was backed by the compa-
ny's mining equipment, when, in fact, the 
company owned no equipment. Lichfield 
signed the stock purchase agreement for Rex 
Mining. 
Steenblik frequently called Rasmussen to 
check on her investments. When Rasmussen 
was out, Lichfield responded to her calls and 
continually assured her that her investments 
were safe and secure. 
In November 1988, Rasmussen urged 
Steenblik to lend $12,000 to Green Construc-
tion Co. Rasmussen was a principal in 
Green Construction. Steenblik explained 
that her only remaining money was tied up in 
an individual retirement account and that she 
would suffer severe interest and tax penalties 
for early withdrawal. When Rasmussen as-
sured her that all penalties would be covered 
if she made the loan, she agreed. Lichfield 
went to Steenblik's home to deliver a promis-
sory note and collect the money. Although 
Lichfield was not a principal in Green Con-
struction, Rasmussen had promised Lichfield 
a share in the company if Lichfield helped 
raise capital. When Lichfield arrived at 
plaintiffs home, Steenblik noted some irregu-
larities in the promissory note and initially 
refused to go through with the loan. To 
obtain the money, Lichfield altered the in-
strument to plaintiffs satisfaction and col-
lected the $12,000. 
Lichfield's relationship with Rasmussen 
and Zephor continued until March 1989, 
when Lichfield resigned. In his letter of 
resignation, Lichfield complained that he 
could no longer manage to cover Zephor's 
and Rasmussen's numerous overdue and un-
satisfied obligations. 
After Steenblik's money was exhausted, 
the payments to her from the investments 
stopped. Unable to recover either the prin-
cipal or the interest on her loans and invest-
ments. Steenblik sued. A jury found Lich-
field liable for violation of the Utah Uniform 
Securities Act, for common law fraud, and for 
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negligence and awarded Steenblik $50,000 in 
damages against Lichfield.1 The jury also 
found that the damages were the proximate 
result of Lichfield's "reckless or intentional" 
violations of the ActT which entitled plaintiff 
to treble damages, reasonable attorney fees, 
and costs pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 61-
1-22(2). In addition, the jury found Lichfield 
vicariously liable to Steenblik for 20% of 
Rasmussen's and Zephor's negligence for a 
total of $26,914.95 and awarded her an addi-
tional $50,000 in punitive damages against 
Lichfield. On this appeal, Lichfield argues 
that the jury verdict was against the clear 
weight of the evidence with respect to the 
claims (1) under the Act, including the find-
ing that he recklessly or intentionally violat-
ed the Act, (2) for vicarious liability, and (3) 
for punitive damages. Lichfield also argues 
that the vicarious liability award against him 
wrongfully gave plaintiff a double recovery. 
In addition, he contends that the trial court's 
treble damage award under the Act was du-
plicative of the jury's punitive damage award. 
Finally, Lichfield argues that the court com-
mitted reversible error by allowing plaintiffs 
expert to testify about Lichfield's intent. We 
affirm the judgment except for the punitive 
damages award, which duplicates the treble 
damages awarded under the Act. 
[1,2] To support a claim that the jury 
verdict is against the clear weight of the 
evidence, an appellant must marshal all of 
the evidence that supports the findings and 
demonstrate that when viewed in the light 
most favorable to the verdict, there is insuffi-
cient evidence to support i t In re Estate of 
Beesley, 883 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994); 
State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50, 55 (Utah 
1993); Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 
769 (Utah 1985). All reasonable inferences 
must be drawn in favor of the verdict. See 
Von Hake, 705 P.2d at 769. If the evidence 
taken in the light most favorable to the ver-
dict supports the verdict, we will affirm. See 
Germonto. 868 P.2d at 55. 
II. VIOLATION OF UTAH UNIFORM 
SECURITIES ACT 
[3] Lichfield attacks the verdict finding 
him liable for violating the Utah Uniform 
I. The court ruled that Lichtield's liability lor 
negligence was buosumea in ihe $50,000 award 
7. LICHFIELD Utah 875 
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Securities Act. He argues (1) that Zephor's 
corporate authority was suspended in No-
vember 1987, prior to any of Steenblik's in-
vestments, (2) that his position with Zephor 
as a director and an officer was terminated 
when Zephor's corporate authority was sus-
pended, and (3) that his personal involvement 
with Steenblik was so nominal that he had no 
legal liability. Lichfield contends that the 
evidence shows he had no knowledge that 
Rasmussen had induced Steenblik to invest 
through Zephor and that he assumed that 
plaintiff was Rasmussen's personal client, not 
Zephor's. He further claims that although 
he continued to be involved in various busi-
ness dealings with Rasmussen after Zephor 
was suspended, he did so only on an infor-
mal, ad hoc basis, not as a principal of Ze-
phor. In short, Lichfield argues that the 
evidence shows that his relationship was sev-
ered with Zephor and Rasmussen to such an 
extent that the jury could not reasonably find 
him liable under the Act. 
Contrary to Lichfield's contentions, the ev-
idence clearly shows that Lichfield's relation-
ship with Zephor continued after the suspen-
sion of its corporate authority. In a letter to 
Rasmussen dated March 6, 1989, Lichfield 
complained that work for Zephor was con-
suming "at least 50%" of Lichfield's time and 
that "[a]s you may perceive, I am sick of 
making excuses for you [Rasmussen] and 
Zephor, so I QUIT." Lichfield complained 
about his involvement with other businesses 
including Rex Mining, Green Construction, 
and HPS, and he withdrew from them also. 
Significantly, he referred to these companies 
as "Zephor skeletons." 
Lichfield also had personal involvement 
with Steenblik's investments that manifested 
a continuing relationship with Zephor. He 
met with Steenblik in April October, and 
November 1988. During those three meet-
ings, Steenblik was induced to invest $78,000 
in HPS, Rex Mining, Green Construction, 
and Fairway. Lichfield signed or prepared 
documents purporting to secure all of these 
tor violating ihe Act and for rraua. 
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investments except the $35,000 loan to Fair-
way. He had a personal interest in each of 
these entities. The evidence, rather than 
showing that Lichfield's relationship with Ze-
phor ceased on the corporation's suspension, 
as he maintains, clearly allowed the jury to 
conclude that Lichfield had a connection with 
Zephor that existed long after Zephor's cor-
porate authority was suspended. 
Lichfield's participation in Zephor's opera-
tions after its corporate authority was sus-
pended subjected him to liability for acts 
proscribed by the Utah Uniform Securities 
Act (the Act).2 The Act applies to those who 
are able to exert control and influence over 
the policies and decisions of others. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22; Wool v. Tandem 
Computers, Inc., 818 F.2d 1433, 1441 (9th 
Cir.1987); Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 
F.2d 880, 885 (3d Cir.1975). Section 61-1-22 
imposes liability on any person who sells "a 
security by means of any untrue statement of 
a material fact or any omission to state a 
material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made . . not misleading." Utah 
Code Ann. § 61-1-22.3 It also imposes lia-
2. Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1 to -30 (1986) 
(amended 1992). 
3. The full text of subsections (1) and (2) reads: 
(1) Any person who: 
(a) offers or sells a security in violation of 
[specifically enumerated sections], or 
(b) offers, sells, or purchases a security by 
means of any untrue statement of a material 
fact or any omission to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements 
made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they are made, not misleading, the buy-
er not knowing ot the untruth or omission, and 
who does not sustain the burden of proof that 
he did not know, and in the exercise of reason-
able care could not have known, ot the untruth 
or omission, is liable to the person belling the 
secuntv to or buying the security from him, 
who mav sue either at law or in equity to 
recover the consideration paid tor the security, 
together with interest at \2% per vear from the 
date ot payment, costs, and reasonable attor-
ney b fees 
The court in a buit brought under Subsection 
(l)(b) mav award an amount equal to three 
Limes the consideration paid ror the becuntv, 
.cgether wun nterest. ^.osts. ana attorney ^ 
lees, less anv amounts all as bDecmea in Sub-
bection 11Kb) upon a showing thai the woiation 
vuj n-cklcbs uf ntentionai 
bility on "[e]very person who directly or indi-
rectly controls a seller . . . , every partner, 
officer, or director of such seller . . . , [and] 
every person occupying a similar status or 
performing similar functions" unless he "sus-
tains the burden of proof that he did not 
know, and in exercise of reasonable care 
could not have known, of the existence of the 
facts by reason of which the liability is al-
leged to exist." Id. 
Thus, a partner, an officer, a director, a 
person of similar status or function, or a 
seller of securities is liable for violations com-
mitted by the entity unless that person 
proves the affirmative defense that he lacked 
knowledge of the unlawful acts. Thus, the 
scope of liability under the Utah Act is simi-
lar in a number of respects to § 77o of the 
Federal Securities Act of 1934.4 However, 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22(2) deviates from 
the federal act by expressly imposing liability 
on every partner, officer, director, or the 
like. The plaintiff need not demonstrate that 
such a person was able to control the trans-
action. If it is established that the defendant 
functioned in or occupied one of these posi-
(2) Every person who directly or indirectly 
controls a seller or buyer liable under Subsec-
tion (1), every partner, officer, or director of 
such a seller or buyer, every person occupying 
a similar status or performing similar func-
tions, every employee of such a seller or buyer 
who materially aids in the sale or purchase, 
and every broker-dealer or agent who materi-
ally aids in the sale are also liable jointly and 
severally with and to the same extent as the 
seller or purchaser, unless the nonseller or 
nonpurchaser who is so liable sustains the 
burden of proof that he did not know, and in 
exercise of reasonable care could not have 
known, of the existence of the facts by reason 
of which the liability is alleged to exist. 
Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-22. 
4. The federal statute. 15 U.S.C. § 77b, states: 
Every person who, bv or through stock own-
ership, agencv, or otherwise, or who. pursuant 
to or m connection with an agreement or un-
derstanding with one or more other persons bv 
or through stock ownership, agencv, or other-
wise, controls anv person liable under section 
77k or 77Z of this title, shall also be liable 
ointlv and severally with and to the same extent 
as ±ucit controlled person to anv person to 
wnom ±ucn controlled person i liable, itntess 
ihe controlling verson naa no Knowledge or or 
teasonatile ^ound to fietieve <n rne existence or 
the racts «;v >eason or wmcn Llie Liaoilit\ of the 
uonnotlea person ± alleged .o exist. 
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tions, the defendant has the burden of prov-
ing that he did not know and, in the exercise 
of reasonable care, could not have known of 
the violation of the Act. See Mitchell v. 
Beard, 256 Ark. 926, 513 S.W.2d 905, 907 
(1974) (construing similar statute); Arnold v. 
Dirrim, 398 N.E.2d 426, 433-34 (Ind.Ct.App. 
1979) (same); Foelker v. Kivake, 279 Or. 379, 
568 P.2d 1369, 1373 (1977) (en banc); McGa-
ha v. Mosley, 283 S.C. 268, 322 S.E.2d 461, 
465 (CtApp.1984). Furthermore, Utah Code 
Aim. § 61-l-22(l)(b) provides that "upon a 
showing that the violation was reckless or 
intentional." the court may award treble 
damages, interest, costs, and attorney fees. 
[41 Lichfield argues that the suspension 
of Zephor's corporate authority terminated 
his personal liability as a director and an 
officer of Zephor. Suspension is a tempo-
rary restriction on the corporation's authori-
ty and functions5 that renders the corpora-
tion powerless or unable to continue its nor-
mal operations. See Mackay & Knobel En-
ter., Inc. v. Teton Van Gas, Inc., 23 Utah 2d 
200, 203, 460 P.2d 828, 829 (1969); Micciche 
v. Billings, 727 P.2d 367, 370 (Colo.1986); 
Kupski v. Bal Invest Co., 35 MichApp. 680, 
192 N.W.2d 519, 522 (1971); see also Colo. 
Rev.Stat. § 7-10-109(2) (repealed 1994) (pro-
viding that "[a]ny domestic corporation which 
is suspended . . . shall be inoperative and no 
longer competent to transact business in this 
state"). Under the former Business Corpo-
ration Act, the corporation could cure the 
default and regain its powers by correcting 
any delinquencies and paying a reinstate-
ment fee. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-88.2 (re-
pealed 1987).s A temporary revocation of 
authority is intended to encourage a delin-
quent corporation to rectify its delinquency. 
Bank of America Nat'l Vmst «& Savings 
Assoc, v. Morse, 265 Or. 72. 508 P.2d 194. 196 
(1973). Thus, the suspension revoked Ze-
phor's authority and gave the corporation 
one year to rectify its delinquency or be 
dissolved. 
5. "Suspend" comrnoniv means "to debar, or 
cause [o withdraw temporarily, hrom any privi-
lege, otfice. or runcuon ' Weosier s Mew Im I Dic-
nonan.' '2d ed. 1949). BlacKs detinuion ot sus-
pend 's ":o discontinue cemporanlv, but with an 
expectation or purpose or resumption. ' 31UCK'~ 
Law Dicuonan- 144-0 .cth ^a. '990). 
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[5] Zephor's officers' liability for its oper-
ations during suspension, however, was not 
terminated. The liability for operating a cor-
poration without authority is set forth in 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-139, which pro-
vides: 
All persons who assume to act as a 
corporation without authority so to do shall 
be jointly and severally liable for all debts 
and liabilities incurred or arising as a re-
sult thereof. 
A person who purports to act for and on 
behalf of a corporation that has no corporate 
authority is personally liable. See Gillham 
Advertising Agency, Inc. v. Ipson, 567 P.2d 
163, 165 (Utah 1977); see also Loveridge v. 
Dreagoitx, 678 F.2d 870, 878 (10th Cir.1982) 
(interpreting Utah law). Section 16-10-139 
is a codification of general corporation law 
that holds promoters personally liable as 
partners for preincorporation debts and obli-
gations. See Maliseiuski v. Singer, 123 Ariz. 
195, 598 P.2d 1014, 1015 (Ct.App.1979); Ga-
zette Pub. Co. v. Brady, 204 Ark. 396, 162 
S.W.2d 494, 496 (1942); Holzer Sheet Metal 
Works v. Reynolds & Marshall, 43 So.2d 169 
(La.CLApp.1949). 
There is, however, a split of authority as to 
whether personal liability as provided by the 
general rule embodied in § 16-10-139 ap-
plies when a corporation's authority is sus-
pended or whether its application is limited 
to preincorporation activities. A minority of 
jurisdictions hold that individuals are not lia-
ble for corporate obligations incurred while 
the corporation is suspended. Micciche v. 
Billings, 727 P.2d 367, 371 (Colo.1986), for 
example, held that corporate officers were 
not personally liable, under a statute worded 
identically to § 16-10-139, for obligations 
they incurred during suspension. The Colo-
rado Supreme Court gave three reasons for 
its holding. First, it stated that a purpose of 
the statute was to eliminate de facto corpora-
tions. Second, che absence of express lan-
6. Chapter 10 ot Tide 16 was repealed in 19° 2 
and was replaced bv the Revised Business Corpo-
ration Act. Sen L9°2 Utah Laws en. 277. § 248 
(etfecme July I. 1992). Similar provisions a re 
AOW 'ocatea at Utan Code Ann. $§ Ib-'Oa-l-J-Zl 
co ->422 <Supp.i9°5). 
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guage imposing personal liability indicated 
that no liability was intended because prior 
statutes had expressly imposed personal lia-
bility on officers and directors for corporate 
debts incurred during suspension. Finally, 
the court stated that Colorado case law held 
that upon reinstatement there is no personal 
liability for corporate debts incurred during 
suspension. The Colorado court reasoned 
that it would be anomalous to impose person-
al liability if reinstatement is not sought and 
at the same time eliminate that liability if 
reinstatement is obtained. Such a rule 
would make personal liability contingent on 
corporate actions over which the individual 
has no control. In Colorado, therefore, per-
sons operating a suspended corporation are 
not personally liable for obligations arising 
from those operations. 
A contrary rule is followed in a majority of 
jurisdictions. For example, a corporate offi-
cer was held personally liable, under a Mis-
sissippi statute identical to § 16-10-139, for 
continuing business while the corporation 
was suspended. Carolina Transformer Co. 
u. Anderson, 341 So.2d 1327, 1329-30 (Miss. 
1977). Likewise, in T-K Distributors, Inc. v. 
Soldevere, 146 Ariz. 150, 152, 704 P.2d 280, 
282 (CtApp.1985), principal stockholders 
were held personally liabie for their acts 
performed after revocation of corporate au-
thority but before reinstatement. See also 
Anderson v. Hillsborough Sheet Metal, Inc., 
513 So.2d 1359 (Fla.Dist.CtApp.1987); Es-
tate of Plepel v. Industrial Metals, Inc., 115 
Ill.App.3d 803, 71 IlLDec. 365, 450 N.E.2d 
1244 (1983); Kessler Distributing Co. v. 
Neill, 317 N.W.2d 519 (Iowa CtApp.1982). 
T-K Distributors acknowledged that its stat-
ute, identical to § 16-10-139, was intended to 
abolish the doctrine of de facto corporations 
but further noted that its broad language 
applied to all who assume to act as a corpora-
tion without authority and "sets forth no 
exception for individual liability which might 
arise during the period of revocation and 
reinstatement of a corporation."' 704 P.2d at 
282: see also Carolina Transformer, 341 
So.2d at 1330: Kessler Distributing, 317 
N.W.2d at 522. The statutory history in 
Arizona also indicated :hat individuals who 
continued a corporation's business after its 
authoritv had been revoked were personailv 
liable. See T-K Distributors, 704 P.2d at 
282. Also following the majority rule, the 
Iowa Court of Appeals reasoned: 
Reinstatement of the corporate charter 
should not be viewed as retroactively re-
storing the privilege of limited liability 
with respect to transactions which took 
place during the period of time when the 
corporate charter was revoked. 
Kessler Distributing, 317 N.W.2d at 522; T-
K Distributors. 704 P.2d at 283. Jurisdic-
tions that do not automatically eliminate per-
sonal liability upon reinstatement do not cre-
ate an anomaly by holding persons liable for 
assuming to act as a corporation when the 
corporation's authority has been suspended. 
[6, 7] In our view, the reasoning that sup-
ports the majority rule is persuasive. By its 
terms, § 16-10-139 applies to all persons 
who act as a corporation without authority. 
See Murphy v. Crosland, 886 P.2d 74, 80 
(Utah CtApp.1994). It therefore abolishes 
the de facto corporation doctrine, but nothing 
in the statute's language suggests that it is 
limited to that purpose. See cases cited in 
American Vending Servs. Inc. v. Morse, 881 
P.2d 917 (Utah Ct.App.1994). Further, noth-
ing in Utah's statutory history suggests that 
§ 16-10-139 is limited to preincorporation 
activities. Here, Zephor's authority not only 
was suspended, but was never reinstated. 
As to corporations that have been suspended 
and not reinstated, we hold that officers and 
directors who continue the business of a sus-
pended corporation are personally liable for 
all debts and liabilities arising from those 
operations that are a continuation of the 
types of activities the corporation performed. 
Under such circumstances, the relationship 
of persons who continue the operations of a 
suspended corporation is like the relationship 
of preincorporation promoters, which is es-
sentially that of partners. Thus, persons 
who act as if pursuant to valid corporate 
authority, after that authority has been sus-
pended, are personally responsible for liabili-
ties arising from the continued operations. 
First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Silberstein. 398 
S.W.2d 914. 915-16 (Tex.1966). They are 
jointly and severally liable with others who 
know the corporation's authority is no longer 
effective but continue its onerations. Mobil 
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Oil Corp. v. Thoss, 385 So.2d 726, 726-27 
(Fla.Dist.CtApp.1980) (construing a similarly 
worded statute); Steve's Equip. Service, Inc. 
v. Riebrandt 121 IH.App.3d 66, 76 Ill.Dec. 
612, 615, 459 N.E,2d 21, 24 (1984) (same); 
Kessler Dist Co. v. Neill, 317 N\W.2d 519, 
522 (Iowa CtApp.1982) (same). 
As stated, the Utah Securities Act provides 
that "every partner" of a secuiities seller and 
"every person occupying a similar status or 
performing similar functions,, is liable unless 
he proves that he neither knew nor in the 
exercise of reasonable care could have known 
of the violations. Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-
22(2). Lichfield argues that the evidence 
shows he did not know and could not have 
known that the securities sold to Steenblik 
were sold in violation of the Act. His argu-
ment does not comport with the facts and the 
inferences the jury was entitled to draw. 
Lichfield was present when plaintiff invested 
$20,000 in HPS before it was incorporated. 
He listened as Rasmussen assured Steenblik 
that HPS was a sound investment without 
disclosing the material facts that HPS was a 
start-up company with no operating history 
and no clients. In addition, he signed the 
loan disclosure statement which falsely pur-
ported to show the loan was secured with 
HPS preferred stock. It is inconceivable 
that he did not know of this violation. Lich-
field's knowledge of Steenblik's subsequent 
investments in HPS, Rex Mining, and Green 
Construction is equally clear. He was pres-
ent at each meeting; he had a personal inter-
est in each investment; and similar untrue 
statements or material omissions induced 
plaintiffs investments. 
Lichfield was a director or an officer as 
those terms are used in § 61-1-22, and he 
participated in meetings where false or mis-
leading statements were made or material 
facts were omitted in the sale of a security. 
Under such circumstances, such a person is 
liable if he does not exercise his power or 
influence to prevent the illegal conduct. San 
Fmncisco-Oklahoma Petroleum Exploration 
Corp. v. Carsmn Oil Co.. 765 F.2d 962, 964 
(10th Cir.1985) (per curiam). Actual knowl-
edge or the violations is sufficient for the jury 
to find a defendant liable. See id. at 964: 
Wool :\ Tandem Commaers. Inc., 818 F.2d 
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1433, 1442 (9th Cir.1987); McGaha v. Mos-
ley, 283 S.C. 268, 322 S.E.2d 461, 465 (Ct. 
App.1984). 
[8] Lichfield asserts that he neither knew 
of nor participated in Steenblik's $35,000 in-
vestment in Fairway. Even accepting his 
claim as true, Lichfield is still liable. The 
lack-of-knowledge defense of § 61-1-22(2) 
"refers not to a particular transaction, but to 
the existence of the basic facts relating to the 
course of business of the corporation. The 
director [or officerl need not have been in-
volved in the particular transaction." San 
Francisco-Oklahoma Petroleum, 765 F.2d at 
965. Ignorance of a particular transaction is 
not exculpatory because officers and di-
rectors are liable if, in the exercise of reason-
able care, they could have known. See Mon~ 
sen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 
F.2d 793, 804 (3d Cir.1978); Moerman v. 
Zipco, Inc., 302 F.Supp. 439, 450 (E.D.N.Y. 
1969). As discussed, starting in April 1988, 
Lichfield clearly knew that Steenblik was 
being fraudulently enticed into making in-
vestments. He did nothing to warn her or 
prevent her savings from being consumed. 
To the contrary, Lichfield helped defraud 
her. He cannot escape liability by claiming 
that one of the fraudulent transactions was 
completed without his knowledge. 
Lichfield also argues that Utah law re-
quires more than nominal participation to 
establish liability under the Act. He relies 
on Willis v. Spring Canyon Copper Co., 4 
Utah 2d 211, 291 P.2d 878 (1956), and Harper 
v. Tri-State Motors, Inc., 90 Utah 212, 58 
P.2d 18 (1936), for support. Those cases 
construed the forerunner of the Utah Uni-
form Securities Act, which expressly limited 
liability to defendants who "participated" or 
"aided" in some way. See Willis, 4 Utah 2d 
at 212-13. 291 P.2d at 879; Harper. 90 Utah 
at 214. 58 P.2d at 19; see also Utah Code 
Ann. § 61-1-25 (1953) (repealed 1963). As 
written, § 61-1-22 imposes liability on a 
partner, an officer, or a director without re-
quiting any direct participation in a particu-
lar transaction. In this regard, it is signifi-
cant that the Act deals differently with em-
ployees oi sellers than with officers and di-
rectors. Liability is imposed on an employee 
of a seller oniy if the empiovee "materially 
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aids" in a sale that violates subsection (1) of 
§ 61-1-22. Therefore, as a director, Lich-
field's liability was not dependent on his per-
sonal participation in the transaction. 
[9] Lichfield also contests the finding 
that he recklessly or intentionally violated 
the Act, which conduct gave rise to treble 
damages. See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-
22(l)(b). The evidence supports the jury 
verdict. Lichfield was personally involved 
with Steenblik's investments: He signed loan 
disclosure and stock purchase agreements, 
he continuously reassured her that her mon-
ey was secure, and he funded his personal 
business ventures by repeatedly returning to 
Steenblik for funds. Lichfield's conduct was 
intentional and reckless. 
III. VICARIOUS LIABILITY 
Lichfield next challenges the jury verdict 
holding him vicariously liable for 20% of the 
negligence of Zephor and Rasmussen in the 
amount of $26,914.95. The jury was instruct-
ed regarding various bases of vicarious liabil-
ity. Lichfield argues that even considering 
all the evidence in favor of the verdict, the 
evidence was legally insufficient to support 
the verdict on any ground. We disagree. 
As discussed above, Utah Code Ann. § 16-
10-139 imposes liability on all persons who 
purport to act for a corporation whose au-
thority has been suspended, just as liability 
is imposed on preincorporation promoters. 
Prior to incorporation, promoters are often 
treated as if they have entered into a part-
nership and are subject to liability as part-
ners. Maliseioski v. Singer, 123 Ariz. 195, 
598 P.2d 1014, 1015 (Ct.App.1979); Gazette 
Pub. Co. v. Brady, 204 Ark. 396, 162 S.W.2d 
494. 496 (1942). Because partners are jointly 
and severally liable, each partner can be held 
liable for the wrongful acts of the other 
partners that injure a third person. Utah 
Code Ann. § 48-1-12; see McCune & 
McCime v. Mountain Bell TeL 758 P.2d 914. 
917 (Utah 1988); Palle v. Industrial 
Comm'n. 79 Utah 47, 55. 7 P.2d 284. 288 
(1932). 
[10] That principle of partnership liabili-
ty applies ro Lichfield for his continued oper-
ations with Rasmussen after Zephor lost its 
corporate authority. In fact, Lichfield and 
Rasmussen often acted jointly in Zephor's 
unauthorized business with Steenblik. Both 
were present when Steenblik visited the Ze-
phor office and made the two EPS loans, the 
Fairway loan, and the Rex Mining stock pur-
chase. Lichfield and Rasmussen both signed 
the documents purporting to secure the HPS 
loans and the Green Construction loan. Fur-
thermore, in his March 1989 resignation let-
ter, Lichfield spoke of continuing Zephors 
operations with Rasmussen, including Lich-
field's ongoing contributions of time and 
money to the business. In that letter, Lich-
field described his relationship with Rasmus-
sen as a "general partner." Lichfield's and 
Rasmussen's relationship and conduct after 
Zephor's authority was suspended was much 
the same as co-promoters prior to corporate 
authority being granted, and under § 16-10-
139 they are subject to the same liability. 
The jury's finding that Lichfield was liable 
for 20% of Rasmussen's and Zephors mis-
conduct was not unreasonable. 
Lichfield also argues that the jury miscom-
puted his damages and that vicarious liability 
for 20% of Rasmussen's and Zephor's negli-
gence is less than $26,914.95. We have re-
viewed the computation of damages for vicar-
ious liability and find no error. 
[11] In addition, Lichfield argues that im-
posing vicarious liability on him grants plain-
tiff a double recovery. Lichfield miscon-
strues the nature of joint and several liabili-
ty. The imposition of joint and several liabil-
ity means that Steenblik may recover from 
Lichfield and/or Rasmussen and/or Zephor to 
satisfy the verdict. If Rasmussen or Zephor 
pays the judgment, Lichfield's vicarious lia-
bility is satisfied. If Lichfield pays the full 
amount of $26,914.95, Lichfield would have 
an indemnity or contribution claim against 
Rasmussen and Zephor for their shares of 
the judgment. See, e.g., Perry v. Pioneer 
WJwlesale Supply Co.. 681 P.2d 214. 218 
(Utah 1984); see also Hanover Ltd. v. Cessna 
Aim-aft Co., 758 P.2d 443, 445 (Utah Ct.App. 
1988). Steenblik may recover her damages 
only once. 
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IV. DUPLICATIVE AWARDS 
[12] The jury found Lichfield jointly and 
severally liable with Rasmussen and Zephor 
in the amount of §50,000 for "recklessly or 
intentionally'' violating the Act. Pursuant to 
Utah "Code Ann. § 61-l-22(l)(b), the court 
awarded "an amount equal to three times the 
consideration paid for the securities] . . . 
upon a showing that the violation was reck-
less or intentional." Id. The jury also 
awarded $50,000 in punitive damages. Lich-
field argues that the punitive and treble dam-
ages awards are improperly duplicative be-
cause both are based on the same conduct. 
We agree. 
The trial court characterized the treble 
damages as a statutory penalty "assessed as 
a result of the reckless and intentional viola-
tions of the Act," and said that "punitive 
damages are punishment for defendant's ma-
licious actions." Lichfield's conduct is easily 
classified as malicious, reckless, and inten-
tional Nevertheless, in Alta Industries Ltd. 
v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1292 (Utah 1993), we 
held that a statutory penalty and an award of 
punitive damages were duplicative because 
they were "based on the same set of facts." 
As a consequence, we vacated and set aside 
one of the awards. In this case, Lichfield's 
"reckless and intentional" acts in violation of 
the Act were the same "malicious" acts for 
which the jury awarded punitive damages. 
However wrongful his actions, Lichfield fol-
lowed only one course of conduct. That this 
conduct persisted over time does not create 
two sets of facts for which he should be 
punished twice. The treble damages award-
ed under the Act are punitive in nature. One 
of the awards must be vacated. 
[13] As to which award should be vacat-
ed, the prevailing party must be allowed to 
choose between the duplicative awards. 
Hale v. Basin Motor Co.. 110 N.M. 314, 795 
P.2d 1006, 1012 (1990); see Bill Temfs. Inc. 
i\ Atlantic Motor Sales. Inc.. 409 So.2d 507, 
509 (Fla.Dist.CtApp.1982). Generally, it can 
be assumed that the prevailing party will 
7. The Utah Ac: stales that the court "may award 
an amount equal to three times the consideration 
paid for the security.*' Utah Code Ann. § o l - l -
22(l)(b). \n award amounting to more than 
three times the consideration paid clearly ex-
r. LICHFIELD Utah 881 
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elect the greater punitive award. In this 
case, Steenblik has elected to receive the 
$150,000 treble damages award under the 
Act. Thus, the jury verdict for $50,000 in 
punitive damages is vacated. The award of 
treble damages under the Act is affirmed.7 
[14] One other damage issue must be 
addressed. The trial court awarded more 
damages than the Act authorized. The jury 
found that Rasmussen and Zephor were lia-
ble for all $150,000 of Steenblik's losses. It 
also found that Lichfield was jointly and 
severally liable for $50,000 of the $150,000. 
Pursuant to the Act the trial court trebled 
the award against Rasmussen and Zephor to 
$450,000 and against Lichfield to $150,000. 
As to Lichfield, the trial court ruled that 
"because $100,000 of the $150,000 in treble 
damages is a statutory penalty assessed as a 
result of the reckless and intentional viola-
tions of the Act . . . these damages are not 
[subject to] joint liability with any other de-
fendant." Thus, $100,000 of Lichfield's liabil-
ity under the Act is additional to the $450,000 
assessed under the Act against Rasmussen 
and Zephor. This awards Steenblik more 
than the Act authorizes. However, if the 
entire $150,000 of Lichfield's liability were 
joint and several with Rasmussen and Ze-
phor, then Steenblik could be compensated 
for a total of only $450,000. Thus, Lichfield's 
liability must be joint and several with Ras-
mussen and Zephor. 
V. EXPERT TESTIMONY 
[15] Lichfield's last argument is that the 
trial court committed reversible error by al-
lowing plaintiffs expert to testify about Lich-
field's intent. However, Lichfield did not 
object to the testimony at trial. "[T]o pre-
serve a contention of error in the admission 
of evidence for appeal, a defendant must 
raise a timely objection in the trial court." 
State v. Schreuder. 726 P.2d 1215,1222 (Utah 
1986); Utah R.Evid. 103(a). Otherwise, the 
eiTor is waived unless it constituted plain 
error. Utah R.Evid. 103(d); State v. Elm. 
ceeds the amount authorized by the \ct. The 
jury found that Steenblik lost S 150.000 irom 
violations of the Act. Therefore, ihe stands to 
receive no more than S450.000 under the Act. 
R. SUPP. 154 
882 Utah 906 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
808 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1991); State v. 
Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah 1989). None 
of the errors cited were so obvious that their 
admission was plain error. Elm, 808 P.2d at 
1100; Eldredge, 773 P.2d at 35. 
The judgment is affirmed on all grounds 
except that the $50,000 punitive damages 
award is vacated. 
ZIMMERMAN, C.J., and HOWE, 
DURHAM, and RUSSON, JJ., concur. 
Co f KEY NUMBER SYSTEM > 
EATON KENWAY, INC., Petitioner, 
v. 
AUDITING DIVISION OF the UTAH 
STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
No. 940126. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 6, 1995. 
Manufacturer appealed decision of State 
Tax Commission assessing sales and use tax 
on manufacturer's purchase of new machine 
and computer disk. The Supreme Court, 
Howe, J., held that: (1) Commission's regula-
tions were reasonable which define terms in 
statute exempting sale of machinery pur-
chased by manufacturer for use in new or 
expanding operations but did not exempt 
normal operating replacements, abrogating 
Neivspaper Agency Corp. v. Utah State Tax 
Com% 892 P.2d 17; (2) manufacturer's pur-
chase of computer numerically controlled ma-
chine was not exempt sale as machinery did 
not qualify as new or expanding operations 
but was normal operating replacement: (3) 
computer disks which electronically stored 
drawings,created by manufacturer was not 
custom computer software; but ii) manufac-
turers purchase of computer disks which 
electronically stored drawings created by 
manufacturer was primarily purchase of ser-
vice and not of property. 
Affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
1. Taxation <8=>1319 
When legislature explicitly grants dis-
cretion to State Tax Commission, Supreme 
Court reviews Commission's actions under 
reasonableness standard. 
2. Courts <®=>91(2) 
Although decision of Court of Appeals 
acts as persuasive authority, Supreme Court 
is not bound under doctrine of stare decisis 
to follow it. 
3. Administrative Law and Procedure 
e=>390.1 
Supreme Court will invalidate adminis-
trative rule that is not in harmony with its 
governing statute. 
4. Taxation <s=»1231.1 
Tax exemption is strictly construed 
against taxpayer, but with sufficient latitude 
to accomplish exemption's intended purpose. 
5. Taxation <3=>1222 
State Tax Commission regulation was 
reasonable which defined term "new opera-
tions" to include machinery used in manufac-
turing activities that "are substantially differ-
ent in nature, character, or purpose from 
prior activities" for purposes of statute which 
exempts equipment purchased by manufac-
turer for use in "new or expanding opera-
tions"; abrogating Newspaper Agency Corp. 
v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 892 P.2d 17. 
U.C.A1953, 59-12-104; Utah Admin. Code 
R865-19-85S(A)(3)(a). 
6. Taxation <s>1222 
State Tax Commission regulation was 
reasonable which defined term "expanding 
operations" to include activities that increase 
production or capacity but that are not nor-
mal operating replacements for purposes of 
statute which exempts from sales and use 
taxes machinery which is purchased by man-
ufacturer for use in "new or expanding oper-
ations." U.C.A1953, 59-12-104; Utah Admin. 
Code R865-19-35S(A)(3Xo. 
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